The Dead Horse Times

Denver Broncos quarterback Tim Tebow renounces Christianity

2011-12-19T12:25:00.000-08:00

Denver, CO. A day after his Denver Broncos were defeated 41-23 at Sports Authority Field in Denver, starting quarterback Tim Tebow, long known for his frequent sideline prayers, announced that he was renouncing Christianity. "I'm done with Him", a dejected Tebow told a Denver sports columnist during a locker-room interview at the Bronco's practice facility. "Everything that I've done was for the Lord, and how does He repay me? He sends His angels to speed the feet of the gosh darn, excuse me, Patriots' linebackers, and I spent half the afternoon on my back. No more!"

"I feel like Salieri, do you know what I mean?" Tebow stated, referring to the Austrian classical composer who was a contemporary and rival of Mozart. Impersonating F. Murray Abraham's Oscar-winning portrayal of the jealous court composer, Tebow continued: "From now on we are enemies, You and I. Because You choose for Your instrument a boastful, lustful, smutty, infantile boy--yeah, I'm talking about Brady--and give me for reward only the ability to recognize the incarnation. Because You are unjust, unfair, unkind, I will block You, I swear it. I will hinder and harm Your creature on earth as far as I am able."

"But it's not just Brady" sniffed the former collegiate star for the Florida Gators. "It's Favre. It's McMahon. It's Namath. Football is the greatest sport that the Heavenly Father invented, but who does He choose to be its heroes? Womanizers. Drunks. Partiers. My brother Aaron Rodgers is far too humble to tell you this, but despite leading the Packers to a 13-1 record, all he hears anywhere in the whole state of Wisconsin is Brett this, Brett that. I mean, Brett Favre went and played a season for the Minnesota Vikings. Lucifer's team. Aaron is a good man, and this is how the Lord treats him?"

"I'm done with God."

Immediately after the interview, Tebow reportedly sacrificed a small goat in the locker room's Jacuzzi. While team officials refused to comment on the incident, Tebow was suspended for Saturday's game against the Buffalo Bills for an unspecified violation of team rules.

A Bruce Springsteen classic updated for the Youtube era

2011-12-07T16:07:00.000-08:00

I bought a bourgeois loft down in the Pearl
Put it on my credit card, with my girl
Man came by to hook up my ISP
We settled in for the night my baby and me
We surfed 'round the Youtube ’til half-past down
Fifty-seven million channels and nothin’ on

Well now portable media was my baby’s desire
So I one-clicked on Amazon for a Kindle Fire
A big brown truck came with a little brown box
Punched in the wifi password and we started to watch
404 came back from the great beyond
Fifty-seven million channnels and nothin’ on

Well we might’ a made some friends with the one percent
Be stayin' in nice hotels instead of sleepin' in a tent.
All I got was a note that said "Bye-bye Juan
Our love's fifty-seven million channels and nothin’ on"

So I bought a brand new Taser down at the local Fry's
And in the blessed name of Springsteen I just let it fly.
’Til my computer lay smoking there at my feet
And they busted me for disturbin’ the almighty peace
Judge said "What you got in your defense son ?"
"Fifty-seven million channels and nothin’ on"
I can see by your eyes friend you’re just about gone
Fifty-seven million channels and nothin’ on
Fifty-seven million channels and nothin’...

The Fourth Directive of economic policy

2011-12-04T13:19:00.000-08:00

The 1987 Peter Verhoeven dystopian science-fiction film Robocop concerns the adventures of the title character--a prototype cyborg law enforcement officer, constructed from the remains of a dead Detroit policeman by a giant consumer-products conglomerate, which was seeking to win a contract to replace the Motor City's police force, which was involved in a labor dispute with the city. Robocop's activities were bound by three directives which he would mechanically repeat at public function: Serve the public trust! Protect the innocent! Uphold the law! Unbeknownst to most, including the conscious mind of Robocop himself, there was a fourth directive as well, and while the first three were arguably platitudes more than anything, the fourth was not: do not arrest or harm any senior executive of Omni Consumer Products, the aforementioned corporation which was his creator.

The movie was critically acclaimed (and a big box-office hit) and is highly recommended (its lame sequels are another matter). However, the purpose of this post is not film criticism, but analogy.

Economic policymakers around the world, both in the US and (more recently) in the Eurozone, have various policy directives which guide their activities. The Fed explicitly has a dual mandate to fight both unemployment and inflation, policymakers elsewhere are similarly charged. Yet in many cases, including the current handling of the European debt crisis, policymakers at institutions such as the Fed and the ECB act as though they are guided by a "fourth directive" as well; and that fourth directive seems to be something along the lines of the following:

Do not do anything which will significantly harm the interests of capital.

The various policy arms of the US government went to heroic lengths to bail out the financial markets, but seems far less interested in bailing out distressed homeowners. Whether or not this is because the banks are really "too big to fail" (meaning their demise would truly produce systemic collapse), or simply too politically powerful to be allowed to fail, is an open question--but after programs such as TARP were enacted, it seems offensive to hear politicians tut-tutting about moral hazard when the subject is people losing their homes to foreclosure.

A similar scenario is now playing out in Europe, where the ECB seems intent in ensuring that the financial markets in the wealthy northern countries get their pounds of flesh, via imposition of stark austerity programs on the poorer southern Eurozone countries, programs which will likely result in a severe recession (on top of the current one), and may lead to the breakup of the Euro itself. Granted, some of the debtor countries arguably went beyond their means and over-leveraged themselves to the point that an economic downturn left them unable to pay off their debts (Spain, Italy), and at least one debtor country could be fairly described as a deadbeat republic (that would be you, Greece). The sanest course of action for European policymakers--insisting that the (mainly German) banks which made the bad loans in the first place take a haircut, combined with an injection of capital into the markets to protect depositors and refloat the Mediterranean economies, however, is simply not under consideration.

Interestingly enough, the Fed last week announced a program to lend dollars at low rates to the ECB, in an attempt to stabilize European financial markets, a maneuver which prompts three questions: 1) The ECB is a sovereign currency issuer; why does it need to borrow money to fund its market operations, particularly when the bulk of the debt in question is denominated in Euros and not dollars? 2) Why is the US government being so activist in bailing out foreign financial markets? 3) And, particularly, if the answer to question #2 is "to prevent/limit recession", which is itself not unreasonable, then why is there so much reluctance to similarly intervene in the domestic economy, particularly on behalf of beleaguered consumers and underwater homeowners?

A likely answer to these three questions can be found within the fourth directive.

On the ouster of UO president Richard Lariviere

2011-11-25T00:07:00.000-08:00

This past week, the Oregon State Board of Higher Education announced that they would not be renewing the contract of University of Oregon president Richard Lariviere. Tensions had long existed between Mr. Lariviere and the board, who had placed the head Duck on a short leash last summer, awarding him only a one-year contract, a move which was highly unusual. But now the other shoe has dropped, and Mr. Lariviere is, as of next summer, out.

Mr. Lariviere is, of course, disappointed. Many in the UO community are outraged. Phil Knight called the Board's decision an example of "assisted suicide". The Board is not talking, other than to note a "disagreement about the future of the university."

I'll say.

The disagreement was about far more than the future of the University of Oregon. The dispute was about the very nature of higher education in Oregon.

(I should mention at this point that I'm an alumnus of Oregon State. While I relish beating the Ducks on the athletic field, outside of sports and other extracurricular activities, I don't view UO or any other college in the state as "competition" to be defeated; particularly when it comes to academics.)

The proposal that got Mr. Lariviere in hot water was a 2010 proposal to give the University of Oregon more independence from the Board--one which would match $800 million in private donations with $800 million from the state to provide the university with an endowment which would reduce its need for future funding from (and thus political dependence on) the state Board. He also suggested that UO have its own board of directors, separate from the state Board, a proposal which obviously did not go over well. Mr. Lariviere also annoyed some when he used private donations to raise pay for professors.

It's easy to dismiss this as political infighting, and of the Board smacking down someone who didn't know his place. That is, after all, probably part of it. It's also easy to play the Randian card, as some at the UO are doing (ironically, given the student body's political leanings), claiming that this is a case of a band of mediocrities (the Board, and by extension, the other five state universities, particularly those on the Park Blocks and in Corvallis) beating down a peer who tries to excel, like the hypothetical crabs in a bucket preventing an ambitious fellow crab from escaping. But buried in all the heated rhetoric, is a real difference of opinion on how higher education should be structured.

The current structure is of an essentially centralized system. The six general-interest public universities in the state (UO, Oregon State, Portland State, Western Oregon, Eastern Oregon, and Southern Oregon) are all supervised by the state Board, and each given a role to play in providing education to the state's students (and to students from out-of-state), and are expected to play that role and stay within their boundaries. The three regional universities focus on undergraduate education in specialized fields, with limited graduate programs; the three comprehensive universities offer a wide range of disciplines, and have extensive graduate and research programs, including doctoral studies in many fields. Different schools focus on different majors, though there is significant overlap between them.

In practice, there is quite a bit of turf war that is fought. OSU, for example guards its engineering program jealously, and attempts to expand the scope and quality of engineering at PSU as frequently treated as a threat, despite Silicon Forests' frequent demands for a flagship engineering school that is closer than Corvallis.

On the other hand, it's easy to see that administrators at other universities might view Mr. Lariviere's proposals as threatening in a way that proposals to expand Portland State's EE program might not be. Right now, the state of Oregon doesn't have a "primate university". No, that's not a term referring to monkeys, but a term meaning a dominant flagship school which is widely regarded as the premier public university in a political region. To the south, California is big enough for two primate schools, with UCLA in Southern California and UC-Berkeley in the Bay Area. To the north, the University of Washington stands head and shoulders about the other schools in the state in terms of academic and social prestige (and in resources); it's peer in the Pac-12, Washington State University, is frequently dismissed as a second-rate ag school that offers a lackluster education in anything other than agriculture and related disciplines, despite being a full-service university. On the other hand, Oregon's land-grant school (OSU) enjoys much more parity with UO in academics, and has the best reputation among the state schools in quite a few non-agricultural disciplines. However, neither UO nor OSU (nor PSU) enjoys the nationwide prestige that UW enjoys.

I suspect that a big reason that Lariviere is getting the hook, is that many in the state higher-ed establishment suspect that he wanted to erect a primate university in Eugene--that his proposed reforms were intended to go beyond simply improving the quality of the current degree programs offered at the UO, and instead try to expand the scope of UO's offerings in a manner that encroaches on the other major universities in the state. Were any of the three major public universities to transition to primate-school status, the two most likely are UO and PSU--the latter because of its location in the state's largest city and economic capital (and close physical proximity to OHSU, with which a merger has been previously discussed), and the former because of the wealth of its donor base, which far outstrips those of Oregon State or Portland State. (OSU, which is located in a college town rather than a major city, which has extensive agricultural programs, a discipline which tends to carry a stigma in the upper-class cultural circles where such decisions are often made, and which lacks billionaire alumni such as Mr. Knight, is probably the least likely candidate to become a primate school).

Should the state of Oregon have a primate school--a flagship institution which towers about the rest? Or is it better-served by the current model? I don't know the answer to that question. The quality of an educational system is often judged by the (perceived) quality of its top institution, so perhaps its better to have an A-list school and a bunch of C-list schools and/or specialty schools, than several B-list schools. On the other hand, no existing institution is going to surrender its prestige and resources voluntarily. It should be noted that the state of Washington has a higher ed structure which is more similar to what Mr. Lariviere would like, with UW and WSU having far greater autonomy, and the state higher education apparatus instead focusing on the regional schools and community colleges within the Evergreen State.

Perhaps this is a conversation that the educational establishment, and the people of Oregon, ought to be having. Perhaps the forced departure of Mr. Lariviere will encourage the conversation to take place. But the current soundbites being bandied about don't serve to enlighten the discussion--instead, they simply reaffirm suspicions that athletic rivalries have become extended in the classroom as well.

When the chain of command fails

2011-11-08T01:08:00.000-08:00

The sports world has been abuzz at the shocking story of former Penn State assistant coach Jerry Sandusky, who was recently indicted on multiple counts of sexual abuse. Much attention has been focused on an incident nearly a decade ago when a graduate assistant with the PSU football program, investigating a noise in a locker room, discovered Sandusky (then no longer employed by the university, but running a football camp for kids on campus) in the showers sodomizing a young boy. The assistant told coach Joe Paterno, who told campus higher ups--who responded by shutting down Sandusky's camp.

But nobody, apparently, bothered to call the cops.

In many institutions, one is taught to recognize--and respect--the chain-of-command. You see something wrong, you tell your boss. Or call one of those HR hotlines that promises anonymity. But going outside the chain--outside the institution--is often seen as disloyalty, and discouraged.

But here's the problem. We're not talking about a violation of team rules, or NCAA regulations, or university policy here. (Or even a minor infraction of the law such as an underage football player in a bar sloshed out of his gourd). A child was being raped. This is not a matter for the head coach, or the athletic director, or the deans and provosts and regents to deal with. This is a crime, and a matter for law enforcement. I have a son who is the same age as the victim in the rape mentioned above, so this story has a somewhat personal angle, even though it's across the country.

I'm not going to pronounce judgment on Paterno in this post, even though I believe he probably has some coming his way. Instead, it's important to make a broader point. Institutions--whether its the Roman Catholic Church, the Penn State football program, the National Restaurant Association, or any number of corporations whose employees and officers have been caught engaging in wrongdoing--like to protect themselves. People trust and believe in their friends. And when given a choice between sweeping something under the rug, and doing the right thing; many will choose the former. Institutions often create rules and policies which effectively encourage this.

For matters which are truly internal, this is fine. But for things that are the business of society--and protecting children from molesters is certainly in this category, the chain of command often fails.

When a violent crime occurs, even within the confines of an institution's ivy-covered walls, the correct--and only--response is not to tell the boss.

It's to call the police.

Thoughts on the "liberal media"

2011-09-30T11:59:00.000-07:00

Think about it, folks:

If the media were really a "liberal media"--i.e. in the tank for liberal policies and politicians, would we really be hearing about in the media how liberal the media were? After all, where do we hear that the media is liberal? From the media!

If the media were truly liberal, and trying to promote a liberal agenda--they'd be blathering instead about what a bunch of right wingers they are; and how reality is actually to the left of what the media says. In other words, they would be trying to shift the Overton window to the left.

But instead, the media goes on and on about how liberal they are, which means that someone is trying to move the Overton window to the right.

So is the media really "liberal"?

The DHT reports. You decide.

Random Facebook thought for the day...

2011-09-22T12:43:00.000-07:00

I've got a great idea for a cheesy sci-fi TV show. In said show, a group of futuristic astro-archeologists, led by a Really Nerdy Guy played by William Peterson, zooms 'round the galaxy from dead planet to dead planet, trying to figure out what natural phenomenon or act of collective stupidity offed the sentient life-forms that used to live there.

I'm not sure if Earth gets visited in the premiere, or the finale.

Bonus points if it involves apes and the Statue of Liberty.

I invite suggestions for the name of this show in the comments.

Social Security and "funny money"

2011-09-19T23:31:00.000-07:00

Social Security has been in the news lately, with the decision of current Texas governor and GOP presidential hopeful Rick "W²" Perry to refer to the program as a Ponzi scheme. While his rhetoric has been roundly disputed, and while the decision of W² to firmly grasp the third rail of US politics with both hands so far appears unwise; such rhetoric plays well into the hands of those who believe that the program is on unstable financial footing.

From an actuarial point of view, the Social Security Trust Fund is reported to have sufficient funding to pay all its expected obligations until 2036, at which point the trust fund itself (currently about $4 trillion) will be depleted--an event would sharply reduce benefits were it to occur, but which would not end the program completely. With various tweaks, such as no longer capping payroll taxes or further means-testing of benefits, the life of the trust fund can be extended many decades beyond that. (Medicare and disability insurance have more pressing funding problems; this article focuses entirely on the non-medical social insurance).

However, many critics of the program instead argue it is in perilous trouble, with apocalyptic terms such as "bankruptcy" or "fraud" or "Ponzi scheme" thrown around; accusations which are routinely given credence in the press.

What's in the trust fund

A major issue of contention is just what is in the Social Security trust fund. Conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer referred to the trust fund as "a fiction", which contains nothing but IOUs which are, in his words, "worthless". Other commentators have stated that the trust fund contains "funny money", as though there's a bank vault somewhere in the DC suburbs full of Monopoly scrip or Burger Bucks.

What the trust fund actually does contain is various types of US government treasury securities--debt which is the US is legally obligated to pay, and is backed by the full faith and credit of the US government. As such, monies owed to the Social Security trust fund is counted as part of the national debt (Social Security obligations are about 30% of the total public debt of about $14 trillion).

Mr. Krauthammer is an intelligent fellows, and both know full well how the SS trust fund is structured and what it contains. Assuming that both are being forthright in their assessments of the situation, it stands to reason that they believe either one of the following things are true:

The US government will indeed, in the near future, default on its public debt. I'm sure that Wall Street and the world of international finance (particularly the Chinese), not to mention the many patriotic Americans who directly hold Treasuries in their investment portfolios, will not be happy to hear that the securities widely considered the safest investments in the world, are in fact "funny money" and/or "worthless". The financial markets, needless to say, don't believe either to be the case, and are happily continuing to by US Treasuries despite a ridiculously low rate of return (and despite Standard and Poor's ridiculous decision to downgrade US debt).
OR---there won't be a general default on the public debt of the United States, but that the Social Security trust fund--at some point in the future--will be stiffed, either by a targeted default or by act of law.

Smart money bets that they are assuming the latter.

How independent is social security?

In discussing Social Security, it is important to consider its structure, and its independence from, the rest of the US Government. Under current law, Social Security is structured as a program with separate books from the US Treasury. It is run by a Board of Trustees (who enjoy wide immunity from political interference), and its operations are prescribed by law: Payroll taxes come in, social security checks go out. Excess funds are required, again by law, to be invested in US Government debt, and the Treasury is required to redeem these bonds when they expire. For a long time, while the Baby Boomers were in the work force, the value of the trust fund grew as receipts exceeded benefits; with the Boomers starting to retire, now the opposite is happening and the trust fund is starting to decline in value. Presently, the value of the trust fund--which represents the amount of taxes collected over the program's life, minus the benefits dispersed--is around $4 trillion, invested in US securities. This view of Social Security, as an independent actor separate from the US government, and a creditor thereto, is held by many people.

Many Washington insiders hold a different view of Social Security--namely, that it's just another government agency among many, and that the trust fund and the Treasuries contained within are little more than an accounting fiction. In this point of view, Social Security has no more claim on the Treasury than the US Forest Service or the U.S. Board on Geographic Names; and current and future recipients ought to have no expectation of future benefits. (Indeed, former Wyoming Senator Alan Simpson often refers to "greedy geezers", and infamously called the program a "cow with 310 million tits", implying that the claims of retirees are somehow illegitimate).

Which view is right? In a way, both. The key phrase above is "under current law".

If no act of Congress changes the law, Social Security will continue to operate as prescribed until the trust fund runs out (at which point benefits will be reduced to match payroll tax receipts). But that's a big if--the program is a creation of law, and if Congress wishes to alter or abolish the program, nothing prevents it from doing so. Nothing prevents a future Congress (and a like-minded, or veto-overridden President) from abolishing the program, ending benefits immediately, and redirecting payroll tax revenues into the pockets of the most job-creating billionaires the government can find. Likewise, nothing prevents a future Congress from deciding to bolster the trust fund with general fund revenues funded by a new soak-the-rich tax. And nothing prevents the government from reducing the overall public debt by essentially reducing the trust find size (cancelling or forgiving some of the Treasuries in the process), and reducing benefits accordingly.

Of course, all of these things would take an act of Congress to pull off. And there is not, at the present time, sufficient political support in Congress or among the electorate to defund the program--it isn't called the third rail of US politics without a good reason, as the governor of Texas is starting to discover. Social Security is immensely popular, and no generation has a desire to be the generation that pays into the program but gets nothing out of it.

So why do so many conservative politicians speak of Social Security as though its demise is imminent, and as though the post-Baby Boom generations are going to find an empty cupboard when it is their (our) turn to retire and collect benefits? And why, when the program was running demographic surpluses, were they happy to go spend the money on other things (like tax cuts), but now seem to regard the upcoming pig-through-the-python as an insoluble problem?

The questions are rhetorical. The answers--are left as an exercise for the reader.

The unanswered austerity question: What level of debt is ideal?

2011-08-08T14:17:00.000-07:00

Right now, a big chunk of the political class in the US, including the President, is in the mood for a little austerity. The public debt is just too high, so sayeth the punditocracy. Some go far as to propose various flavors of "balanced budget amendment", though many such proposals contain other terms (such as requiring supermajorities to raise taxes) that many consider objectionable. Ignoring salient issues such as the seriousness of deficit hawks (do they really want to lower the public debt, or simply oppose the spending desires of the other party, but don't mind at all spending public funds on their own priorities) and how do we get there, there's a significant question that hasn't really been discussed with regard to the deficit:

Where should it be, anyway?

Should it be zero, forever?

Should it be zero over a long-term time window (several decades), but permit fluctuations as necessary to deal with short-term economic cycles?

Should a long-term deficit be maintained, albeit at a lower fraction of GDP than we currently have?

Should the permitted deficit be dependent on inflation-adjusted interest rates--in other words, if the bond market thinks the debt is too high, then its too high? (And given that despite Friday's S&P downgrade, interest rates on Treasuries remain absurdly low--does the market really conclude that the US poses an unacceptable credit risk)?

Should the US government actually attempt to have a surplus? (And if one assumes that the dollar remains a fiat currency which the US can create or destroy at will; what would the point be of the US having a surplus in its own currency?)

Should Congress be required to use PAYGO accounting--appropriations and taxes need to be balanced, albeit not in the same fiscal year?

In other words, what is the endgame of austerity? And what is the justification--economic, political, moral, whatever--for that position?

Simply assuming that it's good for you, without discussing why or in what dose, strikes me as a major opportunity for mischief.

A tale of two stimuli

2011-07-28T06:55:00.000-07:00

In response to the Great Recession, the Obama Administration prepared a stimulus package: The American Recovery and Investment Act injected nearly $800 billion into the US economy, through a combination of tax reductions directed towards the lower income brackets, and accelerated funding for numerous infrastructure projects. Many economists insisted that the amount of stimulus was too low, but that was the amount the political process could deliver. There is ample evidence that the ARRA did help arrest the job losses resulting from the 2008 crash of the financial markets, but it did not restore unemployment to pre-crash levels.

In response to the budget surpluses of the late 1990s, as soon as George W. Bush got into office, another stimulus act was passed--the so-called "Bush tax cuts"--a $3 trillion reduction in the federal income tax, with the lion's share going to wealthy taxpayers. One year after the Bush cut was passed, the country experienced a minor recession (mainly caused by corruption and extravagant speculation in the equity markets for high-tech). Then 9/11 happened, and the US marched off to war to the tune of another $1.2 trillion. The Bush Tax Cuts, set to sunset in 2010 (done so they could be passed under reconciliation rules and avoid a Democratic filibuster), have been extended once, and many in Congress are angling for their extension again. The Ryan Budget, voted on by the House of Representatives, would have doubled down on the tax cuts, lowering rates even more--this in a budget bill which was intended to lower the deficit.

Two different theories of how the government can goose the economy--one based on Keynesian economic principles; one based on supply-side economics. Neither has had much demonstrable success--we're still in a recession, after all--but the response of the political class to the two programs is wildly different. The ARRA is regarded by much of the body politic to be a failure; a squandering of assets that ought to never happen again--and there even periodic proposals to rescind ARRA funds not yet dispersed. On the other hand, the political class takes as an axiom that the Bush tax cuts do have a stimulating effect--the moribund economy notwithstanding. Attempts to raise revenue as part of a deficit-reduction package is opposed on the grounds that We Can't Raise Taxes During A Recession--and the "Laffer Curve" theory of deficit reduction (that lowering tax rates will increase revenues to the additional economic activity stimulated by) seems to be earnestly believed by many, even though at the current tax rates, it's patently ridiculous.

Why this double standard exists is left as an exercise for the reader.

If users prefer rail to bus (or vice versa), what should be done about it?

2011-02-15T16:01:00.000-08:00

Jarrett, writing once again on the theme of bus-rail differences (in preparation for a new book he's working on), writes an article on sorting out the rail-bus differences, along with a followup. In the series, he takes a list of (perceived) differences between bus and rail that were posted at The Infrastructurist, and sorts them into three categories:

Intrinsic differences: Real technical differences between bus (including trolleybus) and rail (including, it appears, things like monorails and rubber-tire metros);
Misidentified differences: Differences which are related to propulsion rather than guideway type, or differences which arise from how specific lines are implemented in specific systems
Cultural feedback effects: Difference which arise from a result of cultural perception, law, or custom.

I won't repeat the list or the analyses here; go read the articles for those details. However, there is a forest that is being missed for the trees. Jarrett, I'm sure, knows this, but it merits pointing out. The discussion of "cultural feedback effects" vs real vs miscategorized differences is important and useful, but there's a bottom line being danced around. That is:

1) There seems to be a quantifiable and measurable preference for rail over bus, at least in much of the developed world.

2) This preference may or may not be rational, may or may not be alterable (to the extent that planners ought to try), and may be conflated with issues dependent on local circumstances or practice, or who knows what else. (True apples-to-apples comparisons are often hard to make).

Given all of that, what should we (transit advocates, planners, decision-makers, or anyone else who cares about this) do about it, whether in planning individual lines or entire systems? Specifically:

When and where should planners and decision-makers include modal biases in their forecasts (i.e. "a light rail line will attract X passengers per day, a BRT line will attract Y") and how much weight should these things be given?
To what extent should transit agencies, et al, attempt to change these views?

There are plenty of schools of thought on the issue. One one hand, there's a school of thought that says that if reputable data (and proper decision-making requires access to good data) demonstrates a modal bias, that should be reflected in any subsequent analysis, and not colored by political considerations.

There's another school of thought that holds that such biases ought not be considered, especially if they are likely to be irrational (i.e a survey states that 20% more riders will ride on rail than on an equivalent bus line, and the stated reason for that preference is that busses are slow and full of drunks), and that only good "hard" reasons for one choice or another should be considered, such as cost or technical parameters, and that "illegitimate" reasons for a preference ought to be given no weight. (This view is especially common when the reasons involved can be demonstrably reduced to racism or other forms of prejudice, which good public policy ought to oppose).

Some go so far as to suggest that modal bias (unjustified by tangible differences) is a problem that transit agencies ought to try and solve.

But these questions are ultimately political ones--decision-makers need to take all relevant factors into account. I tend to favor providing as much quality data as possible to decision-makers, and letting them handle the politics. (Not that they will necessarily do a good job here, but that is their job...) And while many non-intrinsic differences may be irrelevant in the abstract, they are often quite relevant in the context of a particular agency or system--if rail solutions gets signal priority at grade crossings as a matter of law whereas bus does not, or if a particular agency is not willing to add a new type of rolling stock to a fleet as part of a system expansion, these are important factors to consider. If there are changes for the better in the wider environment (cultural, regulatory) that can be made, then plan for those; but transit systems have to exist in a particular place.

And difference which are specific to that place can frequently be just as important as those differences which are universal.

The public employees that conservatives love

2011-02-10T23:45:00.000-08:00

This article was originally submitted as a comment in response to an article thread posted in The Daily Dish last December. It was not chosen for publication there, so I'm belatedly writing it here instead edited slightly for article format, given the recent prominence that public employee unions have had here at DHT.

With all the discussion on the problems of the nation's educational system, and the amount that factors such as teacher compensation systems, school administrations, teachers' unions, and the culture at large have on our underperfoming schools--I think it's worthwhile to draw a parallel between teachers and another class of educated public sector professionals. This profession is one which is ubiquitous, typically ran at local levels of government, generally unionized, considered to be vital to a prosperous civilization--and one which is also frequently subject to heated public disputes about its conduct and competence, into which public employee unions are frequently drawn. It is also a profession that, unlike teachers or transit workers, is generally beloved by the conservative side of the political spectrum.

I speak, of course, of police officers.

The Thin Blue Line

Big-city newspapers are filled with accounts of incidents where a cop has an unpleasant encounter with a member of the citizenry (up to and including deadly force). In many of these encounters, the pretext for the police's conduct is found to be questionable, frequently resulting in community outrage--and the cop in question is invariably protected, seemingly no matter the circumstances, by the local police union. This is especially the case in places (such as Portland) where the civilian government overseeing the cops generally does not tolerate police misconduct. But the same behaviors which many on the political right deride in many public professions, particularly in teaching--workplace rules that make it difficult to fire bad teachers, seniority-based promotion and retention policies, and a workforce allegedly more interested in professional solidarity rather than in public service--are routinely praised when observed in law enforcement.

Law-and-order politicians and activists are often more than willing to sweep abuses of power aside on any number of grounds: the perp had it coming, officers have a tough job, etc. Praises of the the "thin blue line" are frequently sung. Many of the excuses which prompt calls of "cry me a river" when uttered by teachers (deplorable conditions, insufficient support from higher-ups) find a sympathetic ear when invoked by the police. And to be fair, many liberals who are quick to denounce abusive cops are in many cases far less eager to denounce bad teachers--instead blaming the environment, the parents, a lack of funding, etc. for failings in the classroom.

Geese and ganders

Other similarities exist between the police and the public schools. Both are professions, jobs requiring college degrees, and lots of professional judgment on the part of practitioners. Both careers involve extensive dealings with the public, including many members thereof who don't appreciate the service. Both careers also are challenging to manage--the quality of an individual practitioner cannot generally be measured with simple metrics, and attempts to do so frequently produce undesirable results. And both professions pattern themselves after similar institutions, namely the armed forces and the academy.

Law enforcement in the US is modeled in many ways on the military. Command structures and ranks are military in origin, and many departments include paramilitary tactics as part of their training (whether warranted or not). It's not uncommon to hear officers working bad neighborhoods describing the environment as a "war zone". On the other hand, the severity of the discipline is far less in civilian law enforcement (Can you imagine a commanding officer trying to discharge a problem soldier being overruled by an arbitrator?)

Likewise, public education likes to fashion itself in the robes of academia--the teaching staff of a school is called the "faculty", and concepts such as tenure and academic freedom are lifted wholesale from the university context, despite the fact that college professors are generally not unionized (and thus are not protected by collective bargaining arrangements) and public schoolteachers aren't typically engaged in research programs which might be controversial and subject to political interference, the justification for tenure in higher education in the first place.

I think that a useful political compromise might be this: What is sauce for the goose ought to be also sauce for the gander. What's good for teachers ought to be also good for cops. If someone suggests that we should try to bust teachers' unions and/or abolish other personnel practices which are (arguably) more appropriate for factory workers rather than skilled professionals; ask them how they feel about doing the same to the local police force. If someone says that teachers are overpaid, ask what they think of the salaries of cops.

And vice versa.

More on public employee unions

2011-02-09T01:11:00.000-08:00

A few weeks back, DHT covered an article by proud leftist blogger Freddie de Boer, which suggested that the "true" political left in the US was largely excluded from the mainstream professional blogosphere. Freddie proposed that a way of distinguishing true leftists from "neo-liberals" was their position on organized labor issues, and according to him, quite a few bloggers (such as Matt Yglesias) whose petitions were often adversarial to labor fail to qualify. The article prompted much debate, including a defense from Yglesias.

Now, another prominent blogger--this time the libertarian-leaning Will Wilkinson of The Economist, has stuck a stick in this hornets nest. The title of Will's opus is swift and to the point: Government workers don't need unions. Will drags an old FDR quote out of the attic to bolster his point ("The process of collective bargaining, as usually understood, cannot be transplanted into the public service"), and makes essentially the following arguments.

Private labor/employee relationships are different than public ones, as the former involve two parties fighting over the surplus from some economic activity, whereas public sector workers are bargaining against the public good.
Many public sector workers don't need collective bargaining to protect their interests, as they often have civil service protections; and are found in such large numbers as to hold significant political power. (I might add that many public employees hold jobs which cannot be easily outsourced; and that public-sector administrators and their elected-official bosses are generally under more pressure to deliver services than make money).
Oh, and they have the Democrats under their thumb--making Republicans appear to be the economic champion of the underprivileged (who by definition are neither wealthy, nor holding high-paying government jobs).

I've commented before on the tenuous relationship between organized labor and advocates for robust public services; quite a few transit bloggers I know are quite hostile to the local transit union. However, Wilkinson's article contains several points which need firm addressing.

Regarding his first (in the list above)--essentially what he is saying is that in public-employee bargaining, we the taxpayer are management. (A better analogy might be that the public at large are shareholders, and public officials are management). That certainly changes the motivations of many people involved; it's not unsurprising to find those who don't care about relations between some corporation and its unions (or who even hold a union card in the private sector), but get outraged at media reports of highly-paid public employees who allegedly loaf on the job. However, it ought not change the moral calculus one bit. If you believe that jobs ought to pay a "living wage", it should not matter if the employer is a private enterprise or a public agency; nor should the public/private distinction matter if you are a firm believer in the premise that jobs should pay no more or less than what the market will bear.

Who's got the power?

Will is correct when he observes that public employees often enjoy greater bargaining power than their private sector counterparts. The best evidence of this is their mere existence. Many private sector unions (and indeed, entire industries) have been thoroughly smashed over the past three decades since Reagan first took office. A great and somewhat unfortunate irony of labor relations is that in the industries where unions would have the most benefit, where the workers suffer the greatest levels of mistreatment and exploitation, they are mostly likely to be ineffective or missing altogether--as these are the industries where capital and management hold the strongest hands. Conversely, where labor is "needed" the least--those markets where workers enjoy good wages and working conditions, are the areas where labor is likely to be strongest. Part of this is due to the presence of the unions--their job, after all, is to win a better deal for workers--but part of this is because, as Will notes, the effectiveness of labor depends on its economic strength, not on any moral concern. In those industries where work can easily be migrated elsewhere, or where workers are interchangeable, or where production can easily be stopped without damaging the interests of capital, labor does poorly. Where workers have specialized skills, cannot easily be outsourced, or where work stoppages pose a serious threat to the boss's bottom line, labor fares well. Strong unions grow stronger, weak unions get busted.

While Will's suggestion that maybe public employees ought to go away would serve to address one side of this inequity--the alleged overcompensation of public employees at taxpayer expense--he doesn't have any suggestions at all for how we might address it the other side of this phenomenon, and lift low-wage workers out of poverty. Nowhere is the suggestion that coupled with attacks on the public unions, we ought to encourage and protect and foster private-sector unions, to help farmworkers and WalMart greeters and waitresses get off the minimum-wage treadmill. (Or as an alternative to strong unions, find other ways to help improve their lot).

The privatization card

The bargaining power of public employees is not absolute, however; as anti-union public officials have several weapons in their arsenal, one of the most effective being privatization. One of the key reasons that many conservatives favor privatization of public services (including arrangements where operations are contracted out to private operators while control remains in the hand of the public), is that doing so turns public employees into private employees. Adding a private operator to the mix introduces another hand into the taxpayer wallet, but it is often effective in reducing wages, as private operators are insulated from the political pressures (and civil service regulations) which hamstring public administrators. This is especially true for those services (including public transit in much of the country) which are viewed as "welfare", and have tenuous political support to begin with.

We see this a lot in the debate on public education. While there are valid concerns that organized labor (which seeks to promote job security in addition to good pay and working conditions, and is thus frequently opposed to anything that might make it easier to fire teachers) opposes many sort of useful reforms, I suspect that a big part of the push for privatization isn't out of a desire to make education better, but to make it cheaper--and return the windfall to taxpayers. (There are other factors as well that have little to do with economics; including a desire that many have for taxpayer-subsidized religious instruction).

Privatization has many defenders, including many parts of the media that consider it axiomatic that private agencies, motivated by profit, are inherently more efficient than public ones. I'll agree that profit-focused agencies are better at making money; but they're not necessarily better at providing service. There are countless examples of private companies (acting in countless industries--banking, telecommunications, and health insurance immediately come to mind) which seem to excel at nickeling and diming their customers to death. Unsurprisingly, many of these industries are oligarchies, where the crucible of competition doesn't exist in any meaningful form.

Labor and political activism

Will also seems to consider it untoward that public employees attempt to better their lot via political activism (including the support of labor-friendly politicians), rather than solely seeking concessions at the bargaining table. The prospect of elected officials owing patronage to unions is frequently denounced as corruption, under the theory that public officials have a fiduciary duty to the public to turn the screws on the government workforce as tightly as they can. However, many conservatives seem far less bothered by the same sort of arrangements when rich people do it; and that it's perfectly legitimate for the Koch brothers or Richard Mellon Scaife to pour hundreds of millions of dollars into the political process to try and elect politicians who will be friendlier to their business empires. It ought to tell you something that the Citizens United decision is largely praised by conservatives and loathed by liberals, despite the fact that its provisions also apply to labor--both sides know perfectly well who has the bigger bankroll at the poker table.

With regards to the impact on the fortunes of the various political parties, Will's observations may well be true--quite a few of the country's downtrodden seem to identify more with the GOP with the Democratcs--but it's worth asking why that ought to be. Why should a poor person's livelihood be more threatened by a bus driver or school teacher making $50k a year, than by the multimillionaire Davos-hopping CEO who just got a bonus for sending good private sector jobs overseas? While cultural and racial politics are likely a big part of it, the observation in the last paragraph (who has the most money to spend on political messaging) probably has something to do with it as well.

Some final thoughts

As noted above, those of us involved in public-service activism frequently find ourself in adversarial situations with public employee unions. Many of the government agencies we deal with lack plenary taxing power, and thus a direct conflict exists between the amount of service which can be provided, and the wages and benefits paid to the workers who provide the services. It's tempting to pile onto the public employee unions and tell them it's their turn to take one for team progressive. However, one question must be asked:

What would happen were major concessions to be won from public employees? Would quality of service really improve? Would class sizes shrink, bus frequencies increase, potholes get filled more quickly, and the folks at the DMV start to smile?

Or would the savings instead be "returned to the taxpayer", often in a form (such as broad-based rate reduction) that distributes the lion's share of the windfall to the wealthy, and the same class sizes and bus headways maintained--only now staffed with teachers and bus drivers who are more likely to come from the bottom half of the barrel?

Four decades ago, when unions had broad market power and were producing inflationary spirals that threatened the economy, attempts to curb said power might have actually done some public good. But in today's economic climate, such complaints are tantamount to fretting about mosquitoes while being chased by a hungry bear. The growing economic disparity between rich and poor is the real problem facing the US today. Taking shots at public employees will do nothing to narrow this gap, and might well widen it by eliminating a significant sector of what is left of America's middle class.

Quote Of The Day

2011-02-08T20:54:00.000-08:00

From Conor Friedersdorf, substituting for Andrew Sullivan at The Atlantic:

The average suburban homeowner is a vocal proponent of property rights until the day when a nearby landowner wants to build an apartment complex on his property. Then the right not to live near renters is treated as sacrosanct.

Random thought for the day

2011-02-04T14:57:00.000-08:00

Originally something I posted on a friend's Facebook page, but worth sharing here (and edited slightly):

I've always been fascinated by the way that some conservatives, particularly in the US, eagerly embrace things like social Darwinism, but detest the real thing.

I've long been flummoxed by how distributed intelligence (i.e. "the market") is trumped as the only way to manage something as complex as the economy, but then it is asserted that the Universe itself--something infinitely more complex that mere economics--can only arise due to the actions of a Creator.

Maybe we should just put God in charge of Wall Street. But given the things that Jesus had to say about money and wealth, I'm not sure our titans of finance would like the result.

Labor and the Left

2011-01-19T00:15:00.000-08:00

This past Saturday, longtime (albeit retired) lefty blogger Freddie de Boer came out of his self-imposed retirement to lament a paucity of "true" leftists in the professional, "establishment" blogosphere. Many professional establishment bloggers eagerly took the bait, and some who consider themselves progressives took a bit of umbrage (among them Matt Yglesias and Kevin Drum). Some debate focused on the nature of establishment blogs--to me, they're just another establishment medium, and noting that views outside the Overton Window are not well-represented in establishment media is stating the obvious. There aren't many guys wearing Harley-Davidson jackets and riding leathers attending black-tie events in Georgetown, either. And certain viewpoints, such as real honest-to-goodness socialism (as opposed to fake "socialism" of the kind that allegedly ensnares the entire Democratic Party) are simply not permitted to be held by Very Serious People.

Even the tamer progressives who are so permitted, generally have to couch their arguments in the language of equity. The sort of leftist rants commonplace elsewhere in the West, wherein the rich are held to be dirty rotten scoundrels who deserve to be taxed through the nose and are lucky that they don't get worse, are simply excluded from "serious" political discourse. On other hand, equivalent arguments on the right--that the poor are lazy unworthies who don't deserve the pittance they do get from the government, are far too commonplace in our political conversation. And many right-wing ideas that were dismissed as kookery as recently as a few years ago, now get mainstream attention. (In some cases, the attention is mostly ridicule, but if your a political agitator, it's better to be ridiculed than ignored).

Of course, there are plenty of trade unionists, anti-corporatists, socialists, communists, and other Haters of Baby Jesus And Betrayers Of America™ in the wider blogosphere for your reading pleasure. But you won't find them drawing paychecks from the likes of The New Republic.

The dastardly neoliberals

What was more interesting, I think, was the debate on the left's relationship to organized labor. Freddie pounded a stake in the ground, stating that any progressive worthy of the term ought to, a priori, support organized labor in the US. Many of the aforementioned A-list bloggers frequently take positions critical of labor; and its common on the left to brand those who fail to toe this line as "neoliberals"--a term, like "yankee", is frequently intended to be an insult. Matt Yglesias, in particular among the blogerati, has been the subject of this line of criticism. Yglesias defended himself on the charge of insufficient progressivism, noting that many labor unions (particularly in the public sector) frequently block or oppose reforms that would benefit the poor as a class, but which would reduce their own members' pay or benefits.

This is, of course, not a new debate. Many bloggers on the transit beat, yours truly included, have periodically complained about transit unions, especially ones with compensation packages that are far more generous than one finds for equivalent-skilled positions in the private sector. I wrote over at Portland Transport, on the subject of TriMet's relationships with its union:

This is a particularly nasty fault line in progressive politics in the US--there seems to be a growing rift between many social service advocates and public employee unions. I can think of quite a few well-known transit bloggers and writers, dedicated progressives all of them--who loathe their local transit union. (One of these activists made an interesting observation--the cities with the best transit tend to have the strongest transit unions; whereas the cities which only run low-quality social service transit are more likely to have outsourced their operations, often to non-union operators). And as more and more private-sector jobs are outsourced and more private-sector unions busted, public employee unions are finding themselves more and more isolated--whereas in the past, the passengers on the bus were often union workers as well; a larger share of bus and train passengers are non-union white-collar or service workers.

A more thorough discussion of this occured at Ryan Avent's blog, wherein Ryan echoed many of Matt's criticisms of public employee unions. Ryan writes:

It’s also interesting to me that the alternative, “true” lefty persuasion is one dedicated to the preservation of labor rights. This is an ideological position that doesn’t come naturally to a lot of young left-leaning people for a number of reasons. One is that they look at the empirical evidence and disagree, to some extent, with the notion that the destruction of labor was a cause, rather than a consequence, of broad structural transformations in the economy. (But that probably strikes Freddie as the kind of bullshit an on-the-payroll neoliberal would say.) Another is that younger individuals have had their formative ideological experiences in an era in which labor strength is concentrated in sectors that are either public or dependent on public largesse, and these unions often place themselves squarely in the path of reforms sought by left-leaning writers. I’m sure it was easier to be sympathetic to labor when it was winning limits on truly heinous business practices rather than fighting against merit-based pay for excellent teachers.

In the comments, I noted the existence of what I will call the trickle-over theory, by analogy with trickle-down: This theory, frequently cited by public employee unions as to why they ought to receive the pay and benefits which they do, is that high(er) public-sector wages will result in higher wages in the private sector as well. There are several grounds to question this theory: many public sector jobs have no private sector equivalent--high pay for bus drivers is not likely to drive up wages for electricians, after all; public sector jobs are far less susceptible to things such as outsourcing; and public sector labor arrangements frequently make it difficult if not impossible for outsiders to get such jobs. And for many such jobs at municipal levels of government, the relative unprogressive nature of the tax structure often means it's the working poor socked with the bill for all of this. When it comes to public sector unions, all of us, in a sense, are management.

Ryan continues:

I suppose I see organized labor as a means, not an end. Some traditional leftists believe that a return to widespread unionization will mean a return to the (in some ways) more egalitarian world that went with it. My sense is that neoliberal writers tend not to agree that unions are an effective means in this way. But that doesn’t mean they’ve changed their view of the desired ends.

A commenter, though, makes an interesting and important point:

I think the problem is the absence of a countervailing power, as J.K. Galbraith called it. Unions do other things besides control the labor market; they are political actors that counter the corporate agenda. Neoliberalism may be correct from a policy perspective, but it has no base of action. It leads to a Democratic Party of individuals fighting a GOP composed of churches and powerful corporate entities with no limits on their spending.
So I suppose I’d say that neo-liberals need to construct a new civil society that fits within their ideology.

Ignoring corporations, which can take of their own, the importance of the rise of the religious right in the GOP camp cannot be understated--it gives conservatives a (somewhat) dedicated block of voters who can be easily mobilized to turn out and support right-wing causes. And how this was pulled off is fascinating--decades of theological writings and pronouncements holding that the corporate agenda is in fact not only compatible with, but required by, Christian doctrine--never mind what Jesus himself had to say on the subject. Labor unions long served as the organizing focus for Democrats--and still do--but the number of voters they can get to the polls is likely on the wane. Coming up with social structures which can motivate progressives (and which don't require the presence of charismatic leaders such as Obama on the head of the ticket), is a key problem that the left needs to solve.

Meanwhile, across the pond

While drawing inferences on the politics of other countries and applying them to the US is risky, it's intuitive to look at what's going across the pond. In the UK, the two progressive constituencies discussed here each have their own political parties: Labor has Labour (we all know how much Englishmen love u's), and neoliberals have, for better or worse, the Liberal Democrats. The analogy isn't exact--Labour has moved considerably to the right since its days as a de facto socialist party, and includes some socially conservative elements that tend to vote Republican in the US--but it's close. And the two parties don't like each other much; after the recent parliamentary elections, in which no party got a majority, the Lib Dems elected to form a coalition with--the Conservatives, who have responded to Britain's economic woes with a broadly-unpopular austerity program which critics charge imposes most of the pain on the poor. And Nick Clegg's party has suffered tremendously for it in the polls; far more so than have the Tories.

It should be noted that the Overton Window in the UK, like elsewhere in Western Europe, is considerably further to the left. (One piece of evidence is that most European nativist political parties tend to support pro-labor economic positions, unlike the Randian social Darwinism found within US social conservativism). So take this all with a grain of salt.

The future of labor

What the future of organized labor will be in the US, is hard to foresee. Many predict it will continue to wane, undermined by a race to the bottom against a rising global power which, despite its history of communism (and its continuing nominal embrace of such), has morphed into a mercantalist state which keeps its own labor force strictly in check. Others have predicted that the branch will finally snap, and that a new populist movement of some political stripe will arise and fundamentally alter the economic order. (The Tea Parties have demonstrated quite a few signs of independence from and frustration with the GOP establishment, and have an anti-elitist streak a mile wide--one which so far has been focused on "cultural elites", a cohort presumed to be liberal). As the US faces its own public debt crisis, who suffers and how much will likely become a more dominant theme in domestic politics.

In many ways, the relationship between labor and the broader left strikes me as similar to the relationship between a basketball team and a mercurial star player--one who is tough to guard, scores points in droves, and draws crowds, but is a pain in the ass in the locker room and who isn't well liked by many of his teammates (who frequently have their own agendas). I don't mean this analogy to be insulting at all, but it illustrates well the contradictions and difficulties inherent in the relationship. And it's a broader problem for the left in a system such as ours--where raising the necessary capital (political and financial) to be a contender frequently requires compromising principles and desires, and dealing with issues (and people) that might otherwise be best avoided.

The good news, is that the most powerful labor leader in the US, AFL-CIO head Richard Trumka, seems to understand the broader issues. He seems to understands that labor politics must uplift the poor and working classes as a whole, and not just those with union cards. He seems to understand that for labor to thrive, the fundamental rules of the game must be changed, and not just tweaked. And he seems to understand that this is a long game.

And to address the dichotomy posed by Freddie: the differences between "neoliberals" and the "pro-labor" left aren't as important as the differences between the boarder progressive agenda and the plutocracy. Much of the substance of this debate is about which various factions of the working class are entitled to the bigger share of the crumbs.

Personally I'd prefer working on getting a bigger slice of the pie.

Oh, and Freddie? Don't stay retired too long. You're still at the top of the game, and whatever you can contribute, the country needs your voice.

[ed: Fixed URL]

A pound of meat in a five pound box

2010-12-02T13:00:00.000-08:00

Image courtesy Wikipedia

Imagine yourself going to the meat counter to pick up a pound of hamburger. (Vegetarians, bear with me on this one). Anyway--you place your order with the butcher, and he comes back and hands you a container that weighs as much as a small newborn.

"Excuse me... I asked for a pound of the ground chuck", you point out.

"That is a pound", he said, pointing to the label. Sure enough, the printed label states that the meat weighs a pound. He whispers, "actually, it's about a half an ounce over--but I only charged you for a pound".

You examine the box, pick it up again, and say to yourself, "this has got to weigh five or six pounds." Noting that the box is unusually sturdy, you ask the butcher the obvious question--"if there's only a pound of hamburger, how much does this box weigh?"

"The box? Oh, it's five pounds."

"Five pounds?"

"Yeah. Protects the meat in shipment. New joint USDA-NTSB regulations. Has the buff strength of a locomotive, I hear."

"What for? I'm gonna throw this stuff on the grill as soon as I get back home!" you protest.

"Don't ask me, pal--I just work here. I don't make the rules; I just do what I'm told. Anything else I can get for you today?"

Weight Ratios

This obviously far-fetched scenario is intended to illustrate the concept of a weight ratio. The weight ratio of a container or vehicle is the ratio of the vessel, divided by the weight of whatever it is being transported or stored--whether it be a pound of ground beef, or 150 pounds of human being. The idea of using a 5-pound container to transport a pound of meat is obviously ridiculous.

But in the passenger transportation field, a 5:1 ratio--five pounds of container for every pound of person, is actually quite unremarkable. Non human-powered vehicles need to transport themselves; requiring motors of some sort; and they also need a power source--fuel, batteries, external power--both of these things add significant weight. We also expect them to travel at speeds at which the occupants may be endangered by a collision if not adequately protected, to be weatherproof, and to have other creature comforts that don't make the journey unbearable for the persons riding them. And we expect them to be flexible in the number of passengers they can carry, and to be capable of carrying luggage or other freight.

As a result, unless one is riding a bicycle, a person's typical ride will weight in at several times what the person weights.

Typical values

Let's quickly look at typical weight ratios involved in transportation; first including self-propelled, fully enclosed vehicles. We'll assume people weigh 150 pounds (the average adult weight is actually a bit higher) in all our calculations. It makes the math easier, and I'm lazy. While I've generally tried to incorporate SI units in my posts, I'll neglect that courtesy this time around, also because I'm lazy.

For passenger cars, there's quite a wide variety in both weight and passenger capacity. Many larger cars and SUVs weigh two tons or more; and it's not unheard for people to commute in vehicles such as a Ford F350 pickup, which approaches 5 tons. If we assume a typical large car, weighing at two tons, and a single occupant, that gives us a weight ratio of about 27:1. Most subcompacts (i.e. Honda Civic couples, Mini Coopers) check in at about 2500 pounds, for a ratio of 16.7:1. A SmartCar Fortwo, the smallest production car you'll commonly find in the US, has a curb weight of 1600 pounds (and seats only a single passenger); for a ratio of just under 11:1. If you carpool, the weight ratio drops dramatically--four commuters in a Civic will produce a weight ratio of just over 4:1. These weights all exclude fuel, although cars are heavy enough by themselves that there is seldom a need to consider wet vs. dry weight.

Public transit vehicles vary widely with occupancy, but not so much between vehicles. A good rule of thumb for a FRA-exempt large transit vehicle (a 40' bus or larger, or a streetcar, LRV, or high-platform metro train) is that it will weight 1000 pounds per linear foot--this rule works surprisingly well for back-of-the-envelope calculation of weights. Two other rules of thumb which also work pretty well for many transit vehicles is a design-load passenger capacity of 1.5 passengers per foot, and a crushload capacity of 2.5 passengers/foot. Plugging in our 150-pound weight estimate, this reveals that many transit vehicles have weight ratios of about 4.4:1 at design load, 2.7:1 at crush loads. That said, transit vehicles do rather poorly at typical social-service-route loads--if there's 10 people on a 40' bus (weighing in at 20 tons), that's the same weight ratio as a single rider in a large car. (Fortunately, as discussed below, the bus has a higher per-passenger fuel economy than the car, even n this dismal case).

What about two-wheelers? Motorbikes typically have wet weights (weight of the bike plus fuel and fluids and battery) ranging from 300 pounds for a 150cc standard up to 600 pounds or more for a big fat Harley cruiser. These numbers correspond to ratios of 2:1 and 4:1 respectively. On the other hand, decent bicycles can be found weighing 20 pounds or less (and people will spend tons of money to get down to 15 pounds)--now we're talking ratios under 1:5, or 0.2:1.

What to make of all of this?

Weight ratio has a direct impact on the fuel efficiency of a given mode--though the effect isn't quite as dramatic as one might expect--a typical motorbike has a fuel economy in the range of 2x-4x a typical passenger car; for instance--a much smaller multiplier than raw weight ratio would predict. Likewise, transit vehicles actually do better on energy efficiency vs autos than weight ratios would predict; a full 40' bus will have better energy use per passenger than a full Honda Civic. (Many transit critics claim busses are less efficient than cars based on average occupancy--most bus agencies have runs or entire routes which are far from full; however in that case, the marginal cost of an additional passenger is almost zero). While a 40' bus has a weight ten times or more a typical car, it doesn't have an engine ten times as powerful.

However, excluding the case of the bicycle (or of walking, which has a weight ratio of essentially zero), even the best examples of motorized transport have ratios greater than 2:1--for every pound of passenger to be moved, at least two pounds of vehicle must be moved. And this represents a whole lot of energy which is wasted, every day.

A blog post by Brad Templeton suggests that the wave of the future might be in "ultralight vehicles" (not to be confused with ultralight aircraft)--self-powered vehicles designed for commuting applications, which weigh more than a bicycle but considerably less that a modern motorcycle. Mopeds come close to this goal, generally weighing no more than 200 pounds or so. Brad seems to be thinking of some sort of self-stabilizing, motorized bicycle or tricycle with a fiberglass shell (a design which in various forms has been around for years).

There's also lots of discussion of designing lighter large transit vehicles; as it is with larger vehicles that one is more likely to be able to pull out weight without sacrificing things like structural stability. Prototypes busses and trains weighing half of what conventional vehicles weigh have been shown, although many of these do not yet meet relevant safety standards, and such vehicles do not seem to yet be in production, let alone in widespread use. (For exclusive-ROW closed BRT/LRT systems, waiver of these standards might be a possibility).

But the bottom line is: The world is entering an era (and may be there already) in which energy is increasingly expensive to produce. That transportation of people frequently requires that the vehicle weighs several times what the passengers weigh--that we need to haul so much deadweight around to go somewhere--is a Big Problem. And solutions to this problem will be increasingly important in the future.

The Flashing Red Lights

2010-11-29T22:23:00.000-08:00

Picture, in your head, a transit bus. Now picture in the other side of your head, a garden-variety yellow school bus.

TriMet bus (courtesy Wikipedia)

What are the differences--vehicle-wise--between the two? For one thing, the school bus will likely have a single boarding door (ignoring emergency exits, the locations and usage of which are drilled into the brains of school-age children round the country) and a coach-style seating configuration, whereas transit busses typically have two doors (one for entry and one for exit), if not more, and a whole lot of standing room. At a given stop, either people get on or get off the school bus, but seldom both--whereas simultaneous entry and egress is the norm on transit. School busses don't have fare collection infrastructure, and are sturdily built but infamously uncomfortable--it's been often suspected that much aversion to public transit (especially the rubber-tired sort) in those unfamiliar with it derives from unpleasant experiences on the big yellow bus as a child.

A school bus (courtesy Wikipedia)

But the difference I want to discuss is on the outside of the bus, not on the interior. School busses are equipped with flashing red lights, with which they can halt traffic when they stop to pick up or let off passengers. Public transit is not so equipped--while some public transit agencies (including TriMet) nowadays drive busses with flashing "yield" signs on the back, traffic still goes whizzing on by when one is stopped at the curb.

A safety feature?

Stop arm (courtesy Wikipedia)

What is the reason for this dichotomy? The obvious answer is for the safety of children--many of whom are too small for motorists to clearly see, or not well-versed in the art of safely crossing a street. However, there are a few holes in the safety argument. The relevant law in the state of Oregon is ORS 811.515 (12), which states:

12) Bus safety lights shall only be operated in accordance with the following:

(a) The lights may be operated when the vehicle is stopping or has stopped for the purpose of loading or unloading students who are going to or from any school or authorized school activity or function.

(b) The lights may be operated when the vehicle is stopping or has stopped for the purpose of loading or unloading workers from worker transport buses.

(c) The lights may be operated when the vehicle is stopping or has stopped for the purpose of loading or unloading children being transported to or from religious services or an activity or function authorized by a religious organization.

(d) The lights may be operated when the vehicle is stopping or has stopped in a place that obstructs other drivers’ ability to see the bus safety lights on another vehicle.

(e) Notwithstanding any other paragraph of this subsection, the lights shall not be operated if the vehicle is stopping or has stopped at an intersection where traffic is controlled by electrical traffic control signals, other than flashing signals, or by a police officer.

(f) Notwithstanding any other paragraph of this subsection, the lights shall not be operated if the vehicle is stopping or has stopped at a loading or unloading area where the vehicle is completely off the roadway.

The first thing to note is that two other categories of busses--worker transport vehicles (provided by an employer to transport workers to and from work) and church busses (provided by a religious institution to transport parishioners)--also are permitted to operate safety lights (as the law calls them)--though church busses require a special permit to do so (see ORS 818.260 for more info on that). Neither of these categories applies exclusively to children, and worker transport busses, by definition, are likely to only be used for transporting those of legal working age (adults and adolescents). On the other side of the coin, Portland Public Schools contracts with TriMet to provide transport for high school students (who are provided with a bus pass good through the school year)--and despite being used in this role, TriMet busses are not entitled to operate safety lights. Similar arrangements are found in many other large cities, and many employers provide bus passes to their employees; a fact which doesn't make the local transit agency's busses "worker transport busses" either.

In short, while safety is probably a good guess, and probably a big part of it--it isn't the whole picture. My suspicion is that this dichotomy in law is not due to any sinister forces or anti-transit conspiracy; but simply due to different codes of law evolving over the years.

Should transit vehicles have flashing lights?

Which brings us to the obvious question: Should transit busses be equipped with flashing lights, assuming the law were amended to permit this? Several advantages to the agency and its riders would immediately come about:

Less concern with having to merge back into traffic after the stop is complete. It's long been observed that pullout-stylet bus stops are not there for the benefit of the bus or passengers, but for motorists who get to whiz by a stopped bus rather than being stuck behind. Pulling out of traffic to stop naturally requires pulling in to traffic to continue the journey. Even though busses in many jurisdictions have the right of way over cars in completing this maneuver; if the bus stop precedes a red traffic signal, it's often the case that the lane is full of stopped cars. Were the bus to stop all traffic, it would then have an empty road in front of it when it continues. (This is one advantage that the Portland Streetcar has over busses, at least where it currently operates--cars are seldom blocking it when it leaves a stop, as they are all stuck behind).
A better pedestrian environment. Many transit users have experienced the frustration of needing to board a bus which stops across a busy street--and watching their bus come and go while they wait for the crosswalk signal to change. Schoolchildren do not suffer from this problem--they simply wait on the opposite side, and when the bus comes and stops traffic, then they cross and board.
More convenient bus-bus transfers, for the same reason. Many transfers occur at busy intersections where bus lines intersect, and getting from one line's stop to the other requires crossing said busy intersection.

Of course, the political difficulty is that motorists will be inconvenienced by this--and there are no doubt many roadhogs out there who tolerate school bus laws because they have children themselves, they have far less sympathy for transit users. Likewise, I expect traffic engineers to start screaming bloody murder were this idea to be advanced. (And it wouldn't surprise me to learn that longtime bus passengers might resent this as a nanny-state intrusion, just to be ornery). And were this crazy idea to become law, I'd happily exclude places like the Portland Transit Mall, for obvious reasons.

It's worth noting that the dedicated "school bus", complete with flashing lights, is a predominantly North American phenomenon. In much of the rest of the world, children take public transit (as there is a far greater likelihood of finding usable public transit for them to take), and like public transit here, the vehicles ~~have~~lack the ability to stop traffic.

But if a protected pedestrian environment is appropriate for children, workers, and churchgoers whose rolling stock happens to be owned or operated by the school district, employer, or parish in question--why is it not appropriate for the rest of us, including those children, workers, and churchgoers whose rolling stock is owned/operated by a transit agency instead?

And who knows--maybe this is an idea that will catch on overseas.

Stop me if you've heard this one before

2010-11-04T15:11:00.000-07:00

Many cultures view history as cyclical. US politics in the past century or so certainly has its interesting parallels...

It was the year 1932.

In the aftermath of a major economic crisis [The crash of 1929 and the Great Depression], a new activist President was elected to office [FDR]. A former governor, and excellent communicator, and a skilled politician, this new President swept aside the old economic order which had long dominated the political discourse [strict balanced budges and tight monetary policy] and which seemed unable to deal with the circumstances of the time, and replaced it with a new one [Keynesian economics], and in the process built a political dynasty which would endure for a generation. This president would be succeeded by his vice-president [Truman], who would continue much of his predecessor's policies. A major global conflict [World War II] would be won, and the US would enter yet another war [Korea] to defend an ally [South Korea] from invasion. But cracks would start to appear in the political coalition when the predecessor enacts policies that infuriated parts of his base [integration of the military].

A moderate of the other party [Eisenhower] would be elected to the Presidency. This moderate would continue many of the policies of the dominant party, and as a result be despised by many of his party's base [Birchers, anti-Communists]. The country would nonetheless enjoy a decade of prosperity, and at the conclusion of the moderate's second term, his vice-president [Nixon] would run for office--and lose, in a close election, to the scion of a powerful New England political dynasty [JFK].

The next decade would be a decade of turmoil, as a national tragedy would strike [JFK's assassination], the country would get involved in a long, drawn-out war for dubious reasions [Vietnam]. The president would enact policies which were widely praised as reforms by many [Civil Rights, Great Society], but which would outrage the opposition--and many of the dominant party's own base. The political coalition which had dominated politics for a generation would further disintegrate, with many members of the coalition defecting to the other party [Southern Democrats], and the President [LBJ] would be publicly repudiated by his own party. A longstanding politician from the party [Humphrey] would run for the presidency and lose to a skilled politician widely hailed as a reformer [Nixon].

The defeated party would quickly be dominated its more extreme factions [anti-war movement] , which would mount a challenge to the party establishment and take over much of the party machinery. Members of this energized faction would hold rallies around the country and dominate the political discourse. Meanwhile, the President's party leaders would outrage many of his base [conservatives] by continuing the policies of his predecessor [economic liberalism], and enacting widely unpopular policies [price controls] in order to deal with challenging economic conditions [rising inflation]. The President's first term was also noted for a highly controversial economic reform [abandonment of the Gold Standard]. The midterm elections would be disastrous for the President's party [the GOP], particularly in the House, as the energy of the other side's fired-up base, along with a general disillusionment among the rest of the electorate would produce significant gains for the opposition. The President's party would do better in the Senate however.

The "extreme" faction within the opposition party would continue to do battle with the party's establishment, resulting in the nomination for President of a candidate widely considered unelectable [McGovern]. Despite a major economic crisis [1973 oil shock], the President would be easily re-elected. In his next term, the US would be forced to end its longstanding overseas war [Vietnam] on less-than-victorious terms. A major scandal [Watergate] would result in the President's fall from grace, and his replacement, a gaffe-prone elder statesman of US politics [Ford], would be easily defeated in the next election, by an idealistic governor from the other party [Carter]. However, the new President would lack the support of the party's establishment, would be regarded as politically ineffective, and would be continually dogged by continued economic malaise [stagflation], as well as a major foreign-policy humiliation [Iran hostage crisis], and would only serve one term in office. His defeat would mark the sharp end of the political dynasty which had long reigned.

[breather]

It was the year 1980.

In the aftermath of a major economic crisis [Numerous oil shocks and stagflation], a new activist President was elected to office [Reagan]. A former governor, and excellent communicator, and a skilled politician, this new President swept aside the old economic order which had long dominated the political discourse [Keynesian economics], and which seemed unable to deal with the circumstances of the time, and replaced it with a new one [supply-side economics, large-scale deficit spending], and in the process built a political dynasty which would endure for a generation. This president would be succeeded by his vice-president [George H.W. Bush], who would continue much of his predecessor's policies. A major global conflict [the Cold War] would be won, and the US would enter yet another war [Iraq I] to defend an ally [Saudi Arabia] from invasion. But cracks would start to appear in the political coalition when the predecessor enacts policies that infuriated parts of his base [raising taxes].

A moderate of the other party [Clinton] would be elected to the Presidency. This moderate would continue many of the policies of the dominant party, and as a result be despised by many of his party's base (progressives]. The country would enjoy a decade of prosperity, and at the conclusion of the moderate's second term, his vice-president [Gore] would run for office--and lose, in a close election, to the scion of a powerful New England political dynasty [Dubya].

The next decade would be a decade of turmoil, as a national tragedy would strike [9/11], the country would get involved in a long, drawn-out war for dubious reasions [Afghanistan, Iraq]. The president would enact policies which were widely praised as reforms by many of his allies [financial deregulation, Medicare Part D], but which would outrage the opposition--and many of the dominant party's own base. The political coalition which had dominated politics for a generation would disintegrate, with many members of the coalition defecting to the other party [blue-collar whites], and the President [Bush] would be publicly repudiated by his own party. A longstanding senator from the party [McMain] would run for the presidency and lose to a skilled politician widely hailed as a reformer [Obama],

The defeated party would quickly be dominated its more extreme factions [tea party movement] , which would mount a challenge to the party establishment and take over much of the party machinery. Members of this energized faction would hold rallies around the country and dominate the political discourse. Meanwhile, the President's party leaders would outrage many of his base [progressives] as well as the opposition by continuing the policies of his predecessor [pro-business politices], and enacting widely unpopular policies [the stimulus] in order to deal with challenging economic conditions [rising debt, Great Recession]. The President's first term was also noted for a highly controversial economic reform [HCR]. The midterm elections would be disastrous for the President's party [the Democrats], particularly in the House, as the energy of the other side's fired-up base, along with a general disillusionment among the rest of the electorate would produce significant gains for the opposition. The President's party would do better in the Senate however.

...and that's where we are today.

Quite a few pundits are convinced that the GOP will indeed nominate Sarah Palin for the Presidency in 2012. Peter Beinart has already called Palin the new McGovern, and the GOP unity which was exhibited prior to the election is already starting to crack, as the Tea Partiers and the GOP establishment do battle over the agenda of the 112th Congress. (Never mind that Dems still control the Senate).

Of course, if this cyclical history continues, it implies that Obama is NOT the "liberal Reagan" (who in turn was not the "conservative FDR"), but the Democrat's Nixon. Some parallels are apparent--many conservatives utterly distrusted Nixon for his economic policies. Of course, comparisons to Nixon may seem outrageous to Obama supporters (including myself), as Obama has--so far at least--not had a whiff of scandal during his administration, and we all know what happened to Nixon. (Still, the Biden/Ford comparisons are tempting... :)

But if this continues, a few other questions:

* Who will be the "conservative Carter"? The obvious candidate for that is Mike Huckabee, an earnest (and devoutly religious) Southern governor, who has serious issues with much of his party's establishment.

* And if Obama is not the next "liberal Reagan"--a likely possibility, as it seems the country isn't ready for a steadfast fire-breathing liberal in the White House--who is?

Federal Funding Fun and Games Revisited

2010-11-03T00:25:00.000-07:00

Back in July, I ranted about the current system of transit funding in the United States, wherein local projects generally depend on an injection of cash from Uncle Sam for viability--money that was, of course, originally sent to Washington by local taxpayers. To summarize the prior article, the presence of the US government as middleman produces several distortions in the funding process.

Federal money is viewed as "free". While it isn't free in a strict sense, it is "free" in that it is completely disconnected from federal taxes collected. Much like widening a freeway causes it to attract more cars (or improving a transit line attracts more riders), government agencies passing out "free" money causes it to be overconsumed....
...and often times, the point seems to be dining at the federal trough, rather than improving transit outcomes.
And given that, there are incentives for costs to be escalated in order to increase the federal match--lest the money go to some other jurisdiction.
The process of determining who gets what can be overly political. Some projects get funded via earmark, and those that go through regular appropriations have to jump through oodles of (expensive) red tape to prove their worth. And different types of projects are more likely to be funded depending on who occupies the White House

Given all the brouhaha over various expensive local projects such as the Columbia River Crossing (CRC) and Milwaukie MAX, both of which have price tags well north of a billion US dollars, and not to mention the brouhaha over completed local projects (such as WES) widely regarded as boondoggles, let me add a few more reasons to the list.

The difficulty of achieving Federal funding makes delaying or descoping projects difficult. Both CRC and MLR are attracting a lot of controversy due to their high price tags, given the recession. A plausible argument is that We Should Be Saving Money In A Recession--an argument which is more plausible given the large public debt at all levels of government. (We'll ignore for now the Keynesian ideal that spending on infrastructure is a good thing to do in a recession--which is one argument for federal funding, in that the Feds are the only layer of government capable of counter-cyclical investment, assuming there exists the political will to do so.) However, there's a problem: Major capital projects which require handouts from Washington (and Salem) can't easily be delayed--they can only be killed. (They can be restarted, of course, but doing so often requires starting over from square one). If things don't happen on schedule, the money disappears--and there is generally no promise that it will be restored in future appropriations. (This argument is a favorite of the CRC committee--which loves to assert that if the project scope is changed, the project will never get built, because Uncle Sam will spend his money elsewhere.)
On the opposite side of the coin--this makes it easy for hostile politicians to kill worthwhile big-ticket projects. New Jersey governor Chris Christie cancelled the ARC project--decades in the making--with a stroke of his pen; consensus is that a new tunnel between Jersey and Manhattan will require additional decades to resurrect, should a political consensus to do so arise.
The current rules excluding operational costs from Federal funding have long been a source of contention.
Finally, FTA rules require agencies to live with their mistakes. Jarrett tweeted a reasonable question upon learning that Measure 26-119 failed, wondering if TriMet might plug the budget hole by killing WES--a service that has had extremely low ridership but at a high operational cost, and which has given the agency a bit of a black eye. Ignoring the local politics, it would make sense--except that then the FTA would then likely demand a refund of the money paid to help fund the project. Even if TriMet were to "suspend" the service--shutting it down until conditions improved, it wouldn't matter. (And no, the FTA wouldn't then return the money back to TriMet were the service to re-open under better economic conditions).

Poop, and your water bill

2010-10-16T13:11:00.000-07:00

This is the first post (excluding announcements and such) that I've written in quite a while, and I must apologize. Parts of this post are rather... crappy. No, not the quality (which I leave to you to decide), but the subject.

One issue many metropolitan areas face, especially those (such as Portland) which are constrained by geography or law, is the wailing and gnashing of teeth that occurs when areas which were previously rural, become urbanized. Much of this upset is understandable--people who are able to afford to do so often live in a place which suits their preferred lifestyle (good or bad), and react strongly when someone proposes upsetting their apple cart. Annexation by a city and upzoning, two things which frequently happen as urban areas expand, are particular sources of upset. Some objections are rooted in fears and feelings of the unknown--a natural action when one's home is perceived to be under threat.

But many objections are financial. Cities generally levy higher taxes, and many rural and suburban-fringe dwellers don't care one whit (or may view as hostile) urban services such as sidewalks, stricter code enforcement, parks, libraries, and the like. (And in some cases, free-riding on the nearby city is possible). This post discusses one common financial objection to urbanization, along with ways to mitigate it. The objection?

The sewer.

What goes in, must come out

Image courtesy Wikipedia

I live in the city of Beaverton. My parents live in the Hamlet of Beavercreek, just outside the urban grown boundary and just south of Oregon City. In any given month, my water bill is twice what theirs is on a per-gallon basis.

Why?

It isn't due to different prices for H2O; or because the local water officials here are incompetent. (Indeed, their water provider, Clackamas River Water, has a knack for getting in the news for all the wrong reasons).

It's because I (and other city-dwellers) don't just get charged for the water that comes into our homes--we also get charged for the water that comes out.

The City of Beaverton water and sewer department charges an US$8/month base fee for most users, plus $2.22 per unit of water. (One unit = 100 cubic feet = 748 US gallons = 2831.5 liters, for those keeping score at home). But that's not all. The sewer rate is nearly $25 per month plus $1.50 per unit of water consumed, though only water use in the winter months is actually measured (based on the assumption that much water consumed in the summer is going on the lawn, not down the drain). But wait, there's more! There's also a surface water fee, for the storm drains and downspouts, based on the size of the footprint of the buildings and pavement on the property. Each 2640 square feet (or fraction thereof) of impervious surface costs $6.75.

Mom and Dad? They only pay for their water supply. Their sewage disposal needs are served by a septic tank in the backyard (they live on a 1/2 acre lot). Every five years or so, they have to pay for a honey truck to come out and pump out the tank (and occasionally endure tasteless remarks from the driver concerning the contents thereof), but other than that, it's free to them. The downspouts on their house, rather than leading into a storm system, lead into the garden. The streets in their neighborhood have a glaring excess of potholes--but a notable absence of manholes.

As they live on a 1/2 acre lot (in a subdivision which was built prior to Oregon's pioneering land use law in the early 1970s), this arrangement is probably satisfactory from an environmental point of view. Given that their neighborhood is located at a lower elevation than the nearest sewer line, it seems highly unlikely that sewers will be installed anytime soon. Unlike pressurized supply lines, which can be routed up hills, sewage pipes depend entirely on gravity (or on pump stations) for their flow. Sh*t decidedly does not roll uphill.

Fair?

But the big question which I now pose is: Is this arrangement equitable? I'm not complaining about my bill--one thing I think is generally a good public policy is to eliminate externalized costs. I, and other city residents with similar billing arrangements, are being charged for our contributions to the problem of sewage disposal, and the particulars of that arrangement--the more water you use, the more crap you're likely flushing down the toilet, therefore the more you pay--are entirely satisfactory. And sewer and storm infrastructure is expensive to build, install, maintain, and operate.

Instead, the question I ask is this: Should rural (and semi-rural) homeowners be exempt from paying sewage disposal costs? Obviously, they aren't "contributing" to the amount of stuff that goes into the sewers--and as noted above, there are many rural neighborhoods where installing sewers would be prohibitively expensive (and are low enough density that it isn't necessary). On the other hand, this arrangement creates an incentive to resist sewer installation when property on the fringe of a city becomes urbanized: from the point of view of a homeowner, a sewer connection is almost entirely a liability. The primary benefit of sanitary sewer systems--a clean water supplies--is enjoyed by everyone within a community, not just those hooked up to the sewer. And when excess numbers of septic tanks start resulting in polluted water supplies, it can get very expensive very quickly, as folks in east Multnomah County discovered some years ago.

A better way

So here's a quick and dirty proposal.

All homeowners (and commercial customers as well) who are supplied potable water from utilities, ought to pay a waste disposal fee based on their wintertime water consumption--regardless of of how they dispose of toilet waste. (Differing arrangements ought to apply to agricultural and industrial water users, and those getting water from on-premises wells might be exempted as well--as might sufficiently low-density properties well outside of any urban area).
Proceeds from waste disposal fees would be then dispersed to sewer and stormwater districts as appropriate to fund operations.
In addition, some portion of the fees would be held in reserve to pay for expansions to sewerage systems, including covering the cost of residential conversions. This last item is important--in exchange for paying a waste disposal fee on the same terms as urban residents, rural and suburban residents would no longer need to worry about an unexpected four-figure bill for conversion of their home to sewer service. Other than a backhoe in the backyard, being hooked up to a sewer system would become a non-event for homeowners, rather than a potential financial catastrophe.

Of course, many rural homeowners, especially in remote places where the chances of a sewer being installed are zero, aren't likely to like this proposal. However, their water bill isn't lower because they are more self-reliant or more efficient in their water consumption--their bills are presently lower because they are being allowed to externalize their costs. At very low levels of density, this is acceptable, much like a glass of wine at dinner won't pickle anyone's liver. But too many septic tanks in a given area, much like too many drinks in one evening, and and problems start to arise.

(Were I more cynical than I am, I might suggest that one of the primary benefits of a rural lifestyle is the abundant opportunities to externalize costs at a scale which would be intolerable in the city. Were I more charitable than I am, I might respond that rural communities often lack a critical mass of both capital and personnel to deal with these issues as efficiently as cities can).

To summarize. Disposal of sewage waste is a social problem, not an individual one. The preferred means for dealing with large amounts of the stuff is a large-scale communal system. The benefits are social as well--being hooked to the sewers confers little benefit on an individual homeowner, but having homeowners hooked to sewers confers a significant benefit to society at large. The current arrangement permits costs to be externalized, and creates a strong incentive for homeowners to resist the preferred solution (sanitary sewer systems) for urban environments. Thus, it strikes me as more equitable for everyone to be charged on the same schedule for sewage disposal and treatment, regardless of the particulars of their home's plumbing. Homeowners should pay a higher bill for flushing the loo more; but not be penalized simply because they happen to have a sewer connection.

The state of affairs we have today, essentially, constitutes a subsidy to rural areas at the expense of urban ones. (One of many such subsidies that could be written about).

Sorry about that, Mom and Dad.

About that new gig...

2010-10-13T23:42:00.000-07:00

Some of you may have already read this, but I've a bit of an announcement to make. Chris and Bob over at portlandtransport.com, a blog I've participated in quite a bit over the years, have invited me to become a contributor there--and to become a director of the nonprofit which operates portlandtransport.com. My inaugural post there is here; it pretty much makes the same announcement--and then briefly discusses the Oregonian's opposition to measure 26-119, a tax levy which would provide TriMet with $125 million to improve operations.

So what does this mean for DHT? To tell you the truth, I'm not sure yet. When this blog started, it wasn't intended as a transit blog, but that's what it turned into. I'll probably continue to write about transit topics here, especially when it gets overly speculative, political, or disconnected from the Portland, OR context. As portlandtransport.com is a 501(c) nonprofit corporation, a few sorts of political commentary are out of bounds there--particularly where endorsement of candidates is concerned. OTOH, I may resume more blogging on general political topics--some of which, such as the current state of the US economy and the direction of the political winds, cast a long shadow over technical issues such as transit. (I can imagine a future in which the US invests greatly in transit in response to rising petroleum prices and temperatures; I can also imagine a future in which an austerity consensus takes hold, and little investment is done on anything. And I can imagine a few other scenarios even less pleasant than that).

Most of the regular readers here are also readers of PT; but if you aren't, come on over! There's a much livelier peanut gallery over there than here, but it's still a place where the comments are frequently as interesting as the content. One longstanding disadvantage of the blog format is that as blogs get popular, the comments section tends to decline in quality; some of the best political blogs either employ a small army of moderators (538 at the NYT), have useless comment sections (i.e Yglesias or 538 prior to the NYT move) or have disabled them altogether (i.e. Sullivan).

At any rate, portlandtransport is a great place to talk transit, and it's an extremely well-run site. I just hope that I can uphold the high standards that it has exhibited over the years.

Wish me luck!

Blogcation

2010-10-03T00:37:00.000-07:00

Just a quick note...and a bit of an apology. It's been several weeks (nearly a month) since the last posting. I've been on a bit of a blog-cation, I suppose--mainly due to simply being rather busy in Real Life. My wife's starting up a new career, the kids are back in school, and my own job has been a bit busy of late. (In this economy, it is quite nice to have one...)

I do want to reassure everyone that I'm fine, however, and intend to resume blogging (with real content :) shortly. Just needed to decompress for a while.

On Markos Moulitsas' "American Taliban"

2010-09-01T15:21:00.000-07:00

Today (September 1) is the official release date of the new book by Markos Moulitsas (the founder of the influential liberal blog Daily Kos), entitled American Taliban. Many reviews (and reviews of reviews) have been penned about it, and the book has spawned an interesting debate. It is this debate which I find more interesting.

First, the book itself. I have yet to read the whole thing, though I've read excerpts of it. This is an odd admission to make in a review; though the details of the book aren't really relevant to the point I wish to make. I'll happily stipulate that it's a political hit job, an inflammatory broadside akin to Goldberg's Liberal Facism or Levin's Liberty and Tyranny or any number of works by Ann Coulter; albeit from the other direction. Were one interested in a rigorous analysis of the contemporary American right, or a treatise on public policy of any sort, this book would be a poor choice, just as the aformentioned right-wing polemics aren't likely to impart any useful knowledge on American liberalism. The political right wing is reduced to a caricature, subjected to a good dose of reducito ad absurdum, and linked politically and ideologically to a faction which American conservatives publicly loathe. This is, of course, the same trick pulled by the aforementioned conservative authors, who attempt to tie modern progressivism to totalitarianism--a claim that any liberal would reject as ridiculous.

As scholarship, American Taliban is trash. Even if there are ideological similarities between various factions of the US right and Islamofascists, these links aren't explored in any depth with any rigor. Much of the commentary is reminiscent of the old joke about Mother Teresa being akin to Hitler because both have a mustache. The book is yet another example of peeing in the pool of public discourse, and I strongly suspect Kos would agree.

But you know what?

The pool of US political discourse has long been a sewer where intelligent conversation and honest advancement of ideas doesn't stand a chance. And the color of the shit and piss in this pool--a few Michael Moore flicks nonwithstanding--is a deep bright hue of red.

And you know what else?

This peeing in the pool--appears to be working. The Republican base is riled up, eager to vote out (at any cost) an opposition it considers fundamentally illegitimate. The Democratic base is not. Many are predicting a bloodbath for Democrats in November, and policy (other than the calculus of "its the economy, stupid"--a Democrat is in the White House, therefore the current state of the economy is the Democrats' fault; regardless of its genesis). Many claims that are utterly ridiculous (such as those concerning Obama's religious beliefs or birth citizenship) are nonetheless treated in the media as legitimate topics of public debate, whereas many leftist political themes are regarded as off-limits. The Overton Window in US politics is pegged hard to the right--a political environment which makes it hard for progressives (even "honest brokers" such as liberal columnist Jamelle Bouie who panned Kos's book) to operate. And much of the criticism of the book seems to advance the notion that while wallowing in the mud is acceptable (and expected) behavior for conservatives, liberals ought to exhibit (and be held to) a higher standard of discourse--yet another manifestation of the current location of the Overton Window. It says here that standards of discourse ought to apply equally to all political factions and ideologies, and if one side routinely flouts them, then the other is entitled to do so as well. While many are fond of pointing out religious instructions to "turn the other cheek", such advice seems to fly in the face of modern political science and game theory.

As Bouie notes, Kos is a political operative and activist--not a journalist, scholar, or policy wonk. His book deserves analysis for its political merits, as well as its intellectual ones. Were the swimming pool clean and nicely chlorinated, complaints about the tone and tenor of American Taliban would be more on the mark--lobbing rhetorical grenades into a polite and civil discourse may well be denounced as intellectual terrorism. But the current intellectual climate is a war zone, not a city at peace; and I have a very hard time criticizing Moulitsas for deciding to come out of the foxhole and start shooting back.

One of my fondest desires is a political climate where content-free polemics and talk-radio rubbish, regardless of which side of the political spectrum, are widely denounced and ultimately ignored; and where ideologies debate on the merits of their ideas, not on their ability to hurl insults. But that is not the world we live in. In the world we live in, unfortunately, leftist bromides such as American Taliban are probably necessary, if for no other reason than to nudge the political discourse back to the the center, which is where more enlightened intellectual debate can hope to thrive.

After all, sometimes the best way to get your neighbor to stop peeing in your pool is to start peeing in his.

A new blog is born

2010-08-28T00:37:00.000-07:00

This blog has been in existence for almost a year and a half now (and actively maintained for over half a year)--so it's time to announce the latest addition to my blogging empire. :)

the unpolished apple is a new blog covering public education from the point of view of a public school parent. Whereas this blog focuses on transit issues (with a few other political forays), the apple will focus on education.

The two topics have some similarities which are worth noting. Both are functions commonly provided by the government in the US (and elsewhere in the developed world), the structure of which is a hot subject of debate in this country. Both public transit and public schools are also ground zero for discussions of organized public-sector labor, a topic which is becoming hotter as the economy gets tighter.

A few differences, though, at least for me. I'm a transportation nerd, so this blog is a bit of a hobby. I'm not an education nerd--I don't have a love of (or expertise in) education theory. So the apple will quite a bit more, pardon the term, consumer-focused than this blog--which tries to examine transit from all perspectives.

Go check it out!

Noticed on Twitter this morning:

2010-08-27T10:47:00.000-07:00

Interleaved among the various tweets on politics, basketball, and other things I like to follow, were the following messages:

pdxcommute

Can't believe I just saw a No 9 #trimet bus hit and run a parked car on NE Skidmore. #transitfail

Followed by:

trimet

. @pdxcommute The incident was not a hit and run. Operator informed Dispatch and investigation is underway. #trimet

Followed by one more tweet from Joseph Rose:

pdxcommute

.@trimet ok. Thanks. It appeared that way. Operator didn't leave note on parked car she damaged. She just left the scene.

Interesting. It appears that standard TriMet procedure for a minor accident (involving possible property damage, but no disability to the bus or injury to anyone) is to notify dispatch and carry on. I am assuming that the notification to dispatch included the plate number of the struck vehicle, and that TriMet will be contacting the vehicle owner concerning settlement of any claims.

While I can understand the reason for this procedure--it's not good to delay a busload of commuters for a minor incident--is this legal?

ORS 811.700, which relates to the duties of drivers involved in collisions, says:

811.700. (1) A person commits the offense of failure to perform
the duties of a driver when property is damaged if the person is
the driver of any vehicle and the person does not perform duties
required under any of the following:
  (a) If the person is the driver of any vehicle involved in an
accident that results only in damage to a vehicle that is driven
or attended by any other person the person must perform all of
the following duties:
  (A)   Move the vehicle as soon as
possible off the roadway and to a suitable location. As used in
this subparagraph, 'suitable location' includes but is not
limited to an exit ramp shoulder, a frontage road and a cross
street that is not a main highway. 
  (B) Remain at the suitable location until the driver has fulfilled all of the
requirements under this paragraph.
  (C) Give to the other driver or passenger the name and address
of the driver and the registration number of the vehicle that the
driver is driving and the name and address of any other occupants
of the vehicle.
  (D) Upon request and if available, exhibit and give to the
occupant of or person attending any vehicle damaged the number of
any documents issued as evidence of driving privileges granted to
the driver.
  (b) If the person is the driver of any vehicle that collides
with any vehicle that is unattended, the person shall immediately
stop and:
  (A) Locate and notify the operator or owner of the vehicle of
the name and address of the driver and owner of the vehicle
striking the unattended vehicle; or
  (B) Leave in a conspicuous place in the vehicle struck a
written notice giving the name and address of the driver and of
the owner of the vehicle doing the striking and a statement of
the circumstances thereof.

(c) If the person is the driver of any vehicle involved in an
accident resulting only in damage to fixtures or property legally
upon or adjacent to a highway, the person shall do all of the
following:
  (A) Take reasonable steps to notify the owner or person in
charge of the property of such fact and of the driver's name and
address and of the registration number of the vehicle the driver
is driving.
  (B) Upon request and if available, exhibit any document issued
as official evidence of a grant of driving privileges to the
driver.(2) Moving a vehicle as provided in subsection (1)(a)(A)
of this section does not affect any determination of fault or
liability for the accident.

(3) The offense described in this
section, failure to perform the duties of a driver when property
is damaged, is a Class A misdemeanor and is applicable on any
premises open to the public.

The portion of the law that applies to striking a parked and unattended car is 1(b), which requires that the driver either "locate and notify" the owner of the vehicle, giving contact information, or leave a note providing those details. Whether or not informing a dispatcher and permitting him to do so rather than stopping and doing it yourself, is a permitted substitute, I don't know. (Certainly it falls within the spirit of the law, but as far as the letter of the law goes, IANAL). There doesn't appear to be any exemption for transit operators, other professional motorists, etc. However, ORS 809.404 does say the following:

809.404 Disqualification from holding commercial driver license. (1) The Department of Transportation shall suspend a person’s commercial driver license or right to apply for a commercial driver license if the person is disqualified from holding a commercial driver license under this section. A person is entitled to administrative review under ORS 809.440 of a suspension under this section.

      (2) A person is disqualified from holding a commercial driver license if the person has two or more of any of the following in any combination:

      (a) A record of conviction for driving while under the influence of intoxicants under ORS 813.010 and the person was driving a motor vehicle or a commercial motor vehicle at the time of the offense.

      (b) A suspension of the person’s commercial driver license under ORS 813.410 for refusal to submit to a test under ORS 813.100 and the person was driving a motor vehicle or a commercial motor vehicle at the time of the offense.

      (c) A suspension of the person’s commercial driver license under ORS 813.410 because the person submitted to a breath or blood test and the person’s blood, as shown by the test, had 0.04 percent or more by weight of alcohol and the person was driving a commercial motor vehicle at the time of the offense.

      (d) A record of conviction under ORS 811.700 or 811.705 of failure to perform the duties of a driver and the person was driving a motor vehicle or a commercial motor vehicle at the time of the offense.

Given the consequences of hit-and-run for professional drivers, I would assume that all the i's are being dotted and all the t's crossed in his particular case--and that the procedure has been cleared with lawyers.

But to quote the epic poet Homer:

"D'oh!"

Update: Joseph Rose, who was apparently on scene and witnessed (and recorded) the incident, has video and commentary at the Hard Drive blog.

Micro-routes

2010-08-25T19:14:00.000-07:00

Detailed route map of 15-Belmont/NW 23rd, prior to service cut. Courtesy of TriMet.

By now, Portland readers have probably heard quite a bit about the controversy surrounding TriMet's sudden decision to eliminate the NW Thurman branch of the 15-Belmont/NW 23rd line, due to stated safety concerns. Residents along the affected stretch of Thurman are understandably upset about no more bus service (for some, the cancellation means a 3/4 mile hike to the nearest bus); and some have suggested that this is little more than a PR move, not a legit safety issue--as busses have been running this route for a long time without any major incidents.

I have serious questions about the lack of notice given to the public--it wasn't cool. If this was done on advice of TriMet counsel, they should definitively say so. (On the other hand, I wondered over at portlandtransport.com if this might be a stealth service cut designed to save money; as TriMet appears to be simply routing all 15s on the Montgomery Park branch instead, it appears this is not the case--service hours are not being reduced). TriMet appears to have gotten the message, and has announced plans to re-open the line starting Monday. (If it isn't obvious, this post has been in the works for a few days...)

But this post isn't about the Terrible Thurman Truncation of '10. It's about a possible solution to this problem, and to other problems, such as discussed in this post.

A possible solution: A "micro-route"

Over in the same portlandtransport.com thread, I made the following suggestion:

My proposal would be to create a new line, which starts at PGE Park (where one can transfer to MAX or one of several other bus lines), takes 18th/19th to Thurman, and then heads up into the hills to the turnaround. And operate it with the paratransit vehicles. This line would be a short enough line that you don't need a full 40' bus, and the smaller vehicles, I would think, would alleviate the safety concerns. And add service to 18th/19th.

The details of the proposal don't matter much here--the 18th/19th routing and the PGE Park connection are features designed to provide service on a currently un-served street, and a connection to MAX; on further reflection a route down Everett/Glisan to Union Station might work better, simply because that routing provides a place where busses and drivers can take breaks. (There's no room around PGE Park to park a bus for a spell).

30' busses (courtesy Wikipedia)

By "paratransit vehicles", I mean vehicles smaller than the standard 40' models used for the bulk of TriMet routes. The agency has about 50 30' busses, such as those shown to your right, and over 240 minibusses used for the LIFT paratransit service. (Reportedly, there exists a 2400 series of busses are smaller than 30', though these don't appear to be in service any more). Use of such rolling stock on the 15--a widely used frequent service route--would be inappropriate, but for a very short route, it's likely that a smaller vehicle will have more than sufficient capacity--and be able to execute the turnaround on Thurman safely and legally.

Hence the micro-route,

What is a micro-route?

A micro-route is a route which is shorter than standard routes. Micro-routes will often have the following attributes:

Short overall length, with a round trip time of an hour or less (and often a fraction of an hour). A practical limit on standard bus service is no more than two hours or so from one end of the line to the other, with layovers at either end. With longer routes, reliability suffers, and you start running interfering with the driver's breaks. One-hour-each-way routes with a branch or loop (or both) at one end, such as the 15, are also common--the 15 lays over at Gateway TC but not at Montgomery Park. With a micro-route, on the other hand, the route is run multiple times between breaks. A bus running a Thurman/Union Station route could probably run the entire route 4-5 times in a two-hour span.
Difficult geography which makes the use of full-size busses impractical. This can be narrow roads, steep hills, tight turns--or politically-powerful NIMBYs terrified that a 40' bus rolling past their driveway is going to bring about Armageddon. (Don't laugh).
Connection to a transit center, both to provide a layover point, and due to attribute 1, it is expected that many riders of the micro-route will transfer. Scratch that--it is expected that most of the micro-route riders will transfer; many micro-routes function as de-facto shuttle services.
A reasonably predictable and continuous load pattern, so that passenger capacity isn't an issue (or if it is, can be dealt with by modest increases in frequency). This is especially important for minibuses, which may not be configured to permit standing room.

Examples of such systems

Green public light bus (Wikipedia)

Hong Kong is an example of a city where such arrangements are commonplace. In Hong Kong, in addition to the regular bus service, one encounters minibusses known as public light busses. These busses come in two colors, green and red. The red public light busses operate like jitneys or share taxis, and aren't relevant to this post, but the green ones operate fixed schedules just like regular bus service, simply with smaller vehicles. Hong Kong bus operators also operate some of the "franchised" (full service) lines with two different vehicle sizes, with double-decker busses serving the busier routes, and 40' single-level busses serving he smaller and shorter ones.

In both cases, these smaller types of busses serve generally short routes, connecting (for example) a transit center or marketplace (these things generally come together) with a housing estate (a common term for a large apartment building or other residential complex) or a small village communtity, both of which are abundant in the rural parts of the region. The service that they often run is shuttle-like in nature, in that there are two distinct clusters of stops (often a single stop) on either end of the route, without much in between. The primary franchised bus lines generally serve provide bidirectional service along a linear corridor, just like the vast majority of the bus lines in Portland do.

Where might such service work?

Besides Thurman, where the motivating factor is a geographical limitation, where else might similar types of service work in the Portland area?

Office park circulators. One big issue with suburban office parks is that they are difficult to serve with traditional transit service. They are often spread out over a large area, have tons of parking lots, and may contain streets that are difficult for large busses to maneuver on--and serving them adequately with mainline bus service often requires deviations which are annoying to the bulk of the riders, and inefficient to the agency. The Cornell Oaks subdivision mentioned in this post (currently served by the 67 but not for long) is an extreme example of this, but many other examples abound. Certain runs of the 43-Taylors Ferry, which nominally runs from downtown to Washington Square, venture west of the Square to run around the various industrial parks along SW Nimbus Avenue in south Beaverton, in a circulatory fashion. This little jaunt has nothing to do with the primary corridor served by the line. So, given that--why not disconnect it from the 47 and instead run a circulator service from the mall to the various office parks strip malls, and other commercial centers immediately surrounding it? In addition to the high-tech businesses on Nimbus, it could also serve the strip malls and big-boxes on Cascade Avenue, the Tigard Medical Mall and Lincoln Center on Greenburg, and even venture over to the Tigard Triangle to hit Costco, Freddies, and the like. (Many of these retail outlets employ low-wage workers who would benefit more from improved transit than would high-tech office workers along Nimbus).
Shuttle service. Many shuttle service connecting transit corridors with off-corridor destinations already exist, albeit provided by folks other than TriMet. The shuttle from PCC-Sylvania to Barbur TC is one example--you can take the 44, but the shuttle provides additional frequency. (You have to be affiliated with PCC to use it, however). But there are other examples of major destinations with inadequate transit service. Meridian Park Hospital, for instance, is a major full-service hospital surrounded by the usual assortment of clinics, doctors offices, and other ancillary medical services--but other than two 76s per hour, doesn't get any transit service. Kaiser Sunnyside Hospital is in a similar situation--although the Green Line terminates a short distance away, the pedestrian exprience in the area is unpleasant, and the nearby bus services (155, 156, and 157) are all astonishingly infrequent. Most other major Portland hospitals (OHSU, Emanuel, Good Sam, St. Vincent, Adventist) have one or more frequent service lines passing by the front door.
Other geographically difficult areas. Portland is perhaps fortunate, compared to cities such as San Francisco and Seattle, in that early city planners didn't ignore topography when creating the street grid--Portland has no local equivalent to Lombard Street in SF or Broad Street in Seattle. As a result, most of the area is reachable by bus, and the areas which aren't are in many cases not sufficiently inhabited to merit bus service. But there are a few places which come in mind. Were the Lake Oswego Streetcar project to be built, a line connecting it (in Riverdale) to Lewis and Clark College might be useful; but the most direct route up the hill is bus-unfriendly.

A few other notes

I probably should add that the suggestions made above, are made as examples as much as anything--whether or not these would be productive lines (or be of sufficient importance to be funded in a limited-funding environment) is questionable. TriMet has, I'm sure, considered many of these ideas. Certainly, I wouldn't advocate cancelling any existing services in order to provide these. But in the future, if gas were to become expensive and transit to become a first option for more resident, many of these routes might make sense.

Passive aggression

2010-08-25T14:24:00.000-07:00

<rant>

Time to take a bit of a break from transit issues, and engage in a bit of media criticism. Criticizing the mainstream media is a lot like fishing out of a stocked pond, or throwing paint on the wall--you're bound to hit something. And criticizing CNN is particularly easy--but here goes anyhoo.

On the frontpage of cnn.com, in the "politics" section, is generally found a pointer to CNN's political ticker,a blog covering US politics. An article posted today thereon is entitled TRENDING: Dems call Miller an 'extremist', referring to cricitism of Alaska GOP Senate candidate Joe Miller, who may (pending the tally of absentee voters) have upset incumbent Senator Lisa Murkowski. Miller has some pretty far-out positions (if he wins, he will likely displace Nevada's Sharron Angle as the looniest Senatorial candidate to win a primary this election cycle)--rest assured that I'm no supporter of Miller, and would tend to agree with his critics in the Democratic Party.

But on the headline page, pointing to the article, we find this: Ticker: GOPer called an 'extremist'.

Notice the difference?

In the teaser headline, CNN uses the passive voice to exclude a very important piece of information, which would take the entire space of one word to convey: just who made the accusation in question. Given that the accusation comes from the political opposition, it's not altogether remarkable--but the phrasing of the teaser makes it appear that some neutral, authoritative party has pronounced judgment.

CNN does this all the time. In this case, the victim is a conservative Republican, but Democrats (including President Obama) also receive this sort of passive aggression on a regular basis. Countless times I've seen headlines like "Obama said to be in over his head", only to find out it's Sarah Palin or some other GOP partisan doing the saying. Who cares?

But I guess--that's the point. If the teaser had the same headline as the actual blog article, many folks wouldn't bother to click through. OTOH, if and when they do click through--it's like the disappointment of Ralphie Parker when he finally got that Little Orphan Annie decoder ring, and discovered that the "secret message" from Annie was nothing more than an Ovaltine advertisement.

</rant>.

More on induced demand

2010-08-23T15:07:00.000-07:00

A quick hit... Yglesias his another out of the park. He write:

I feel certain that if Financial Times did an article about how some country’s determination to provide free bags of rice to all its citizens was leading people to spend a huge amount of time standing on line waiting for rice, that they would highlight the fact that this is what happens when you don’t price things correctly. There’s only so much rice. There are only so many hander-outers of rice. If you try to make the rice free to everyone, you’re going to get lines and shortages.

At any rate, as Clive Cookson points out in the FT a comparable problem exists on most countries’ roadways:

Read the full article, and this one in the Financial Times (registration required). As Matt points out, trying to eliminate congestion on roadways by adding capacity is like trying to give away free rice. (Or free beer, which doesn't sound like a bad idea). It's not exactly the same, of course, as people can hoard rice but it's not really possible to hoard space on the freeway--congestion relief is more akin to a service than a good--but making something really cheap (or nearly free) tends to encourage over-consumption.

Induced demand and transit

2010-08-20T12:54:00.000-07:00

Jarrett, as he usually does, has another interesting post up on Human Transit on the subject of whether or not rail attracts more riders than bus. He points to some research done by a Munich transit planner (who subsequently joins the conversation in the comments) suggesting that this is the case, comparing various mid-sized (under 500,000) European cities with trams and without, noting that the cities considered in the study who have trams generally have higher ridership than those without.

Jarrett asked the fundamental chicken-and-egg question: Was the construction of streetcars (in most cases, lines running in an exclusive right-of-way, functionally more similar to the MAX Yellow Line than Portland Streetcar) a driver of demand, or a response to it? In other words, "did the trams cause the ridership, or did the ridership cause the tram?"

The chicken...

This is a good question. A big technical advantage of rail over bus is vastly greater passenger capacity--and many successful rail lines have been built in bus corridors that got too crowded. A common argument against rail projects (or against capital-intensive busways) in corridors that aren't already crushloaded to the gills at three minute headways, is "the existing demand doesn't justify the investment". One commentor, "Danny", asserted that:

All successful high speed rail systems were capacity expansions for crowded low speed rail systems. All failing systems were constructed under the impression that speed causes ridership.

While I respectfully disagree with his use of the universal quantifier "all"; and I disagree with the first half of his statement completely (I can think of many counter-examples), the second half of the sentence has a lot of truth: Many "failing" systems (by which I assume he means systems with usage levels far less than predicted) were constructed based on ridership increases which didn't come too pass. If you build a rapid transit line in place of a local bus line and cancel (or reduce in frequency) the latter, you already have established a reasonable floor for the utilization of the rapid transit line--the bulk of the bus passengers will switch. OTOH, if you are anticipating additional ridership that isn't there... there's a far greater chance you will be wrong.

...or the egg?

But, there's also a good chance you'll be right. The Munich transit planner who produced the above-referenced paper surfaced in the comments, and had this to say.

When you have cities of a similar size and density usually you should expect a similar ridership of public transit. But obviously, in average, it is not like that. So I sent Jarrett the data as one indicator for this "tram bonus", as we call it, that is able to get people out of their cars, like a bus system would never be able to do it.

Even the successful BRT systems in different cities do usually just channel a demand that already exist, a high demand of captive riders. Who ever has a car in those cities still uses it.

We believe in the ability of a tram system to attract more people, people who would never set a foot into a bus, and we invest a lot of money in that. And: no matter if we are right or wrong with this "belief", it does work indeed. We see the numbers, we see the ticket sales and it makes sense, even from the economic perspective. It does not make sense for any bus line, but you can expect to increase ridership in a dimension of 50% to 100% on a line, compared to the bus service. If that makes sense for you, then do it.

Doug Allen, a local transit advocate (who was involved in the planning for the initial MAX line, and still works for TriMet--his words, obviously, aren't necessarily the opinions of his employer) added his two cents:

I would agree with "TransitPlannerMunich" that experience with the conversion of a bus route to tram, in a city with a mature system of bus and rail, can provide insight into whether passengers prefer rail over bus.

The implementation of the "Yellow" light rail line in Portland Oregon also showed that a rail line that is shorter and less frequent than the bus service that it replaced can attract higher ridership, no matter how irrational this may seem.

Doug refers to the now-gone 5/Interstate, which ran from Hayden Island along Interstate Avenue to downtown Portland. The Yellow Line doesn't presently serve the island, and runs at 15 minute headways, so in at least two respects, it's inferior to the bus service it replaced.

Neither Doug or "TransitPlannerMunich" offered any explanation why they observe a presence for rail; formal research on the "tram bonus" is inconclusive. And other commenters wondered whether or not reconfigurations of bus service (converting parallel downtown routes into feeder routes) might boost rail ridership without boosting overall commute share. Many properties which riders attribute to bus and rail, are often properties of the local implementation thereof--if, for example a transit agency operates 40' diesel busses through rough neighborhoods with no capital improvements on the bus routes, alongside modern light rail that sticks to the nicer parts of town--don't be surprised if local residents characterize the bus as dirty, noisy, slow, unreliable, and full of unsavory characters. Bus can be clean and fast, and rail can be slow and uncomfortable; there is much overlap in the service parameters for both. On the other hand, if there is a demonstrated community preference for one mode over the other--even if entirely irrational--that's something that ought to be factored into planning.

Induced demand

Which leads us to the subject of induced demand-- the "Field of Dreams" problem. ("If you build it, they will come"). If the supply of a given resource is increased, then more of it is often consumed. This is especially true when the existing supply is insufficient (or barely sufficient) to meet the existing demand; there's often lots of pent-up demand that is more than happy to consume the new supply. A related phenomenon is value-induced demand; if you increase the value (quality) of a resource, without increasing the cost, demand will also rise. Both phenomena are in the realm of Economics 101.

Induced demand is frequently invoked in arguments concerning construction or expansion of freeways, where congestion relief is cited as a justification for the bulldozer and the mixer. Highway opponents frequently point out that when freeway capacity is added, it frequently fills up with additional traffic, causing a failure to deliver on the expected congestion relief. (Freeways suffer from a fundamental scalibility problem as well--additional traffic, even if below capacity, increases the chance of a wreck, stall, or other incident which severely impacts service.)

But induced demand works for transit as well. Transit opponents frequently point out the same thing about transit projects sold on the basis of congestion relief--even if the transit service attracts motorists out of their cars, other motorists often take their place. But the principle applies: When transit service improves, either in capacity or in quality, more people will elect to use it. The improvement can be manifested in values which are easily measured--coverage, capacity, frequency, speed, reliability--or in those values which are less tangible and may reflect social facts or personal biases (comfort, prestige, sex appeal, environmental benefits, etc). Either way, if you make a service more attractive to the population, more people will use it. And the advantage that transit has over the automobile (considering only the geometric aspects of it, and ignoring the numerous negative externalities of cars which provide ample additional reasons for transit construction) is one of scalability at high density.

The reverse phenomenon is also readily observed: when you cut service, ridership levels go down--decreases in line frequency or other service parameters will often drive riders to other modes, or to not make trips at all.

How badly do you want it?

These phenomena can be explained by the property of elasticity--a concept which is the way economists answer the question, "how badly do you want it?". (Actually, it measures the inverse of that question--a lower elasticity means that the product or service is "wanted more badly"). Many transit advocates who know little about economics understand the fundamental concept of elasticity--the concepts of "choice riders" and "transit-dependent" refer to two different populations who express different elasticities with regard to their transit-using habits. Choice riders express a high elasticity--meaning that their consumption (use) of transit is likely to change as the value proposition changes; if the fares go up or the frequency goes down, they stop riding, and if service improves, they may switch back to transit. Transit-dependent riders express a low elasticity--they'll put up with a lot because they have no other choice, and conversely, improving service isn't likely to attract more transit-dependent riders, as those who need the service are already using it. A third community to consider is the transit-averse: those who won't use transit under any circumstances. They also express a low elasticity, as improvements to the system are unlikely to entice them to increase their consumption (usage), which will remain at zero.

One interesting phenomenon concerning elasticity is that it goes up in a recession. Even if the capacity remains adequate and the coverage remains the same, when a recession occurs, cuts to service are more likely to negatively affect ridership during hard times. When a recession occurs and people lose their jobs, two things happen: unemployed riders for whom transit demand was previously inelastic suddenly find it elastic, as they no longer need to be at work by a certain time. And congestion on roadways decreases, increasing the relative value of driving for those who can drive (which is the majority of the population in most parts of the US) . This is why "death spirals" are a pressing problem for transit agencies during a recession--loss of revenue leads to service cuts which leads to loss of riders which leads to loss of revenue which leads to... you get the picture. (When a transit agency finds itself in this situation, as TriMet appears to be, you had better hope that the pattern of panic/cut/cringe converges at a level well about zero).

Its all about the values

When publicly-operated rapid transit projects are proposed, there are often several reasons offered to justify the expenditure of public funds:

Increasing coverage
Increasing capacity
Increasing service quality
Decreasing operating costs
Environmental outcomes
Land-use outcomes
Economic development

The first three are important to transit users (and potential users). The others are important to other constituencies (the transit agency, the public at large, etc) and won't be considered further. Whether any of these are important to a given rider or group depends on what the rider or group's goals are. And if a person takes a more minimalist view of transit--s/he may not be interested in attracting riders to the system--and consider expenditures for that purpose a waste of money. While I can't point to research to back it up, it seems apparent that many of those who adapt the minimalist point of view are those for whom transit demand is most inelastic. the transit dependent, who have every reason to be skeptical of proposed new projects--many of which will benefit some other community and adversely affect the particular service they depend on; and the transit-averse, who won't ride the system at all, and may view the entire enterprise as a big waste of money.

This dichotomy may affect one's answer to the question posed by Jarrett at the top of this article. It's a common psychological phenomenon to project ones thoughts and beliefs onto others. Thus, if an individual's personal demand for transit is inelastic (or one's own personal value system WRT transit focuses on tangible service parameters such as coverage, capacity, and performance, and disregards things like amenities or social acceptance), s/he may assume that this is true for others--and question the claim that improving transit quality may increase ridership. Likewise, if a person's personal transit demand is highly elastic (or is motivated by factors specific to a particular mode choice), s/he may assume that increasing service levels (including by conversion to rail) will axiomatically drive up demand--and further assume that what is important to him/her, is important to everybody, thereby causing an overestimation of the induced demand.

The truth, of course, lies somewhere in between, and ought to be determined empirically rather than by ideological catfights between different communities and constituencies.

The problem of wide corridors

2010-08-19T00:27:00.000-07:00

One longstanding characteristic of public transit, is its linear nature. Transit systems are generally (and ideally) organized in lines, on which some vehicle travels progressively from point A to B, and then in the reverse direction. Not all such lines are geographically straight, of course, and many systems also feature loops with no discernible endpoints--but even in those cases, the vehicle makes progress towards some goal or direction, stopping along the way to let folks on or off. Vehicles cannot be in more than one place at a time, nor do they (Amtrak's Empire Builder notwithstanding), split into two to serve different sets of destinations simultaneously. Lines can branch, but you lose frequency on the branches--individual busses or trains running on the line can only serve one branch or the other, not both. (see Jarrett's excellent presentation for more on branching, and numerous other topics).

But what happens when you have a wide corridor--a geographic area which is linear in shape, but where the key destinations don't lie in a convenient linear arrangement?

Examples


67 Map, courtesy of TriMet

Consider TriMet's 67 Jenkins/158th route, driven by our good buddy Al (who wants it known that he doesn't speak for TriMet, or his union, or anyone else but himself). This route run between PCC Rock Creek and Beaverton Transit Center. The primary routing is kind of zig-zag (the as-the-crow-flies direction is diagonal, but the streets for the most part are not), but that's close enough to linear for our goals. However, the route contains two backtracking deviations, or as I prefer to call them, "cherries"--places where the bus leaves the main street, goes some distance to reach an important destination, turns around and backtracks, and then rejoins the primary service corridor. One of these cherries, serving the Cornell Oaks business park, will be eliminated in September (a move praised by Jarrett). The other, a shorter-stemmed cherry serving the Merlo/158th MAX station, remains in place.

Or consider the proposed Barbur Boulevard corridor for a new MAX or BRT line. Between downtown Portland and Tigard, there are several highly-important destinations (Tigard TC, Washington Square mall, PCC Sylvania, Barbur TC, Hillsdale, OHSU-Marquam Hill)--all of which, except for Barbur TC, aren't on Barbur. A simple line parallel to the existing boulevard misses most of the action in the corridor--which is why various proposals for tunnels get floated about. (I have no objection in principle to the proposal, but I seriously doubt that TriMet can afford it).

Or consider the Washington Square WES station. Of course--there is no such thing; the nearest station to the mall is the Hall/Nimbus station (which isn't even located on Nimbus Avenue). The mall is located about 2000' to the east, across a busy freeway and a major thoroughfare. Connecting bus service is actually pretty good (between the 76 and 78, and the occasional 43, up to six busses per hour connect the Nimbus Avenue stop with the mall--that's more frequent than WES itself), but the transfer to the bus lines plying Hall Boulevard is a bit inconvenient, especially in bad weather. WES was constrained to operate on the existing freight tracks, which lie on the opposite side of the freeway--but the mall is one of the most important destinations in the corridor.

Wide corridors--sets of destinations which are clustered around some linear corridor but not sufficiently close enough to it (or across some barrier)--cause lots of problems for transit. Serving them adequately requires diluting available service hours over greater numbers of route-miles--resulting in a net decrease in service quality. In some cases, rapid transit lines may not be practical due to dispersed demand--and in the worst cases, the only sorts of services which are practical are inefficient "social service" routes.

What to do, what to do

Some possible solutions to wide corridors are discussed below. These aren't solutions in the sense that they solve the fundamental problem; however they are different ways to provide service in a difficult situation.

Courtesy of thetransportpolitic.com

Longer routes. One way to serve the major destinations in a wide corridor is to lengthen the route. The "cherry" mentioned above is one case; serpentine routes such as a proposal for Maryland's "corridor cities" are another example. Either way, lengthening the route to cover the greater distances imposed by dispersed destinations effectively slows down the line, making it less attractive to riders.
Splitting and branching. If most of the trips are between destinations along the corridor and destinations elsewhere, branching may be an option. Branching reduces frequency in the branches, of course, so doing so may also make the service less attractive; it makes travel between branches more difficult. If the line requires fixed infrastructure, such infrastructure needs to be built on both branches. One useful option here, though, is "open BRT"--the trunk can often be built to high busway standards, with the branches running in mixed traffic--if the branches are short, this arrangement often results in service of reasonable quality.
Transferring. One reason "grid" or "fishbone" arrangements are useful is that intersecting lines can be used to provide service to destinations which are slightly off-track, while keeping the trunk line straight and fast. This depends a lot on the quality of the transfers, obviously--if getting the last mile requires a 20-minute wait on the side of a road in the rain, this is not an attractive option. If, on the other hand, transfers can be timed and waiting occurs in a protected space, this is an excellent option.


Mid-levels escalator (HK), image courtesy Wikipedia

Dedicated connecting service. This is a subset of transferring, but the previous paragraph assumes a generic line that happens to pass close to a point of interest, but serves much else beyond. A dedicated connecting service, on the other hand, provides point-to-point service between a station on the trunk line, and a given destination. Such services may take the form of shuttle busses (such as the shuttles running between PCC-Sylvania and Barbur TC), a dedicated people mover (the Portland Aerial Tram functions in this fashion; even though its primary purpose is not connecting the Marquam Hill campus to the Portland Streetcar), or even a special-purpose transit line (such as the "Disneyland Subway" in Hong Kong). With a dedicated service, there's ample room for creativity--the mode used might be outside the norm of services typically provided by the transit authority--and might not be funded by the transit authority anyways. The dedicated service might even be passive--a skybridge or tunnel where people walk, for instance, but one which lets users avoid weather, obstacles, traffic, or difficult terrain. Generally, a destination has to be fairly major to justify this sort of infrastructure, but things like gondolas, shuttles, elevated walkways, public elevators and escalators, moving sidewalks, and such are all pressed into service to connect a transit line to the places people ultimately want to go. (Many of these things additionally benefit pedestrians who aren't using the transit line as part of their trip).

Of course, as numerous writers cited above have pointed out, the best way to deal with this problem is to avoid it. Good land-use planning can avoid widely-dispersed destinations--and result in land-use outcomes which are easier to provide service to. The benefits accrue to well beyond transit--many other public goods, from police and fire protection to utilities, are cheaper and easier to provide if confined within a smaller space (It ought to be noted that automobiles, on the other hand, frequently benefit from dispersion--mainly due to their need for parking when not in use). But there are many existing wide corridors which need service; and many popular corridors can be victimized by their own success--attracting development which widens the corridor as the closest lots become scarce and/or expensive.

Transit minimalism, and why the left and the right frequently come together to oppose rail

2010-08-13T08:50:00.000-07:00

The Milwaukie MAX project, and its escalating costs and increasingly unstable funding, has become a prime target of criticism. While I'm critical of quite a few particulars of the project (its cost, for one; it's routing, for another)--most of my criticisms center around particulars of the project itself and the current economic climate. I think the corridor in question needs to have rapid transit of some form--by which I mean "real" rapid transit that runs mostly (if not completely) in an exclusive right-of-way. Rail or bus is a secondary concern.

However, much of the criticism of the project goes well-beyond the details of Milwaukie MAX, and instead takes the form of an outright anti-rail position. Several different identifiable factions have been advancing anti-rail positions, asserting that TriMet ought to cancel the project outright, and not advance any other rail projects for the foreseeable future. (Occasionally one even sees the suggestion that the existing MAX lines ought to be dismantled and replaced with something else; a position I won't consider further). Many of these factions have entirely different motivations and goals--in some cases, they even conflict--but their positions all lead them to the same conclusion.

The positions in question, and several others, were previously discussed in this post on transit agency missions; here we focus on only three. Some of the criticisms discussed herein extend to other forms of rapid transit as well, such as BRT; others are rail-specific.

Social justice

One common set of light-rail critics are to be found in the community of activists desiring social and economic justice. A prominent such organization in Portland is OPAL (Organizing People/Activating Leaders), which has, on numerous occasions, called for TriMet to halt future light rail constructions and instead provide more bus service. OPAL's John Ostar, speaking to TriMet on the proposed property tax levy now on the November ballot, had this to say:

What we're doing – what you're doing, essentially, is requiring voters to pass bonds for absolutely essentially service, essential infrastructure, basic infrastructure. Things that we have payroll tax revenue to pay for. But instead, we're now using that payroll tax revenue to pay for non-essential service – light rail - and requiring voters to pass bond measures to pay for essential service. I think that we have it backwards.

Emphasis added by me. Clearly, Ostar considers light rail to be a "non-essential" service--an interesting position to take given that 1/3 of unlinked trips are on MAX and not bus. But when you consider what OPAL considers important, and what they do not, it makes perfect sense:

OPAL, and similar advocates, think that a key part of TriMet's mission ought to be providing transit to the "transit-dependent"--people who cannot afford an automobile, or who otherwise cannot drive. Given that the transit-dependent (and their destinations) are often widely-dispersed in the region, that leads to service patterns which require coverage of a large area rather than focusing on a smaller corridor--a pattern of service that is easier to provide with busses (and in many cases, with paratransit).
Poverty advocates are generally less concerned with attracting "choice riders", providing extensive service to wealthier parts of town, increasing transit's mode share, or using transit as a land-use tool. Amenities beyond basic coverage and service frequency/speed/reliability are deemed unimportant. They are especially wary of anything that looks or smells like gentrification--almost always a bad thing if you're poor. (Your neighborhood might improve, but you won't be able to afford it anymore). Many of the stated goals of rapid transit--especially rail--are simply unimportant to advocates to the poor, and some are viewed with hostility.
Many poverty advocates are generally distrustful of government--which is often seen as in the hands of the wealthy and powerful, and inherently indifferent (or hostile) to the interests of the disadvantaged. Such advocates, when a large project is proposed by the government, frequently start to smell a rat.

In a world with unlimited funding (or at least in one in which comprehensive, quality bus service is provided), I suspect that capital-intensive projects would not raise much objections among the social justice community--especially if the projects were demonstrated to improve service in ways that were considered important--but in a limited funding environment, any concentration of resources on a particular corridor is problematic--especially if the result of such concentration is higher rents along the line.

Economic conservatives

A second group who can be counted on to oppose capital transit projects are what I'll call "economic conservatives"--a group which includes libertarians, many Republicans, and a broader spectrum of the population that objects to high(er) taxes for services they consider to be wasteful or non-essential. Motivations can range from ideological ("transit shouldn't be provided by the government"), to financial ("I don't want to pay for transit I don't intend to use"), to skepticism concerning particular agencies ("Sam Adams/TriMet/Metro are all crooks"), to hostility toward the community of transit users ("Those damn hippies ought to get a job and buy a car like the rest of us"). This community also includes a fair amount of lobbyists for industries (auto, petrochemical) which frequently regard transit as competition. With the financial crisis and economic downturn, calls for greater fiscal austerity ("light rail is a luxury we can't afford") get added to the mix.
The overriding concern for this group is that dedicated-ROW rapid transit, particularly rail, is too expensive. While some in this group would eliminate public transit altogether, there is a significant faction that supports what I call "subsistence transit"--transit that provides basic mobility to those who have no other choice, but of a quality which is so low that only the desperate (or dedicated) would use it. Almost invariably, this means POBS ("plain old bus service"), usually running at low frequencies--virtually any capital improvement to the system or attempt to provide frequent service (other than in places and times where the busses are crowded otherwise) is, by definition, superfluous. This may superficially appear to be similar to the social justice position--which also isn't interested in expansive service--but differs in several important ways. Where as the social justice advocate generally wants to provide decent transit to the communities s/he represents, those supporting subsistence transit generally care first and foremost about cost.
While some conservatives do generally care about (and will defend) basic levels of transit service; there are others who want to do away with it altogether--and frequently use the characteristics of "social service" transit to attack transit. Social service transit is inefficient by its nature (the busses are often empty); and that is used to advance arguments that the transit agency is incompetent (otherwise the busses would be full!), or that transit is not environmentally friendly (an empty bus is less fuel-efficient than a single-occupant automobile, after all), or that it's wasteful because hardly anyone uses it (which is, after all, the point).
Conservatives are also frequently skeptical about politics and government in general--especially in large cities, where the political scene is often dominated by liberals. Charges that rapid transit projects are exercises in "social engineering", or represent forthcoming Soviet-style totalitarianism, or are intended to enrich labor unions, are common.

Speaking of unions...

A third constituency which is often hostile to rapid transit, especially rail, is transit unions--and the reason is obvious: Jobs. The biggest operating cost for transit agencies is labor; and one of the selling points of rapid transit--especially rail--is that you can provide the same capacity and service levels with fewer payroll hours. While this can mean increases in service without corresponding increases in labor cost, in practice it often means reductions in hours, or layoffs. And while some transit agencies (such as Muni in San Francisco) are notoriously labor-friendly, in most cases, the agency and its workforce have a relationship that is at least somewhat antagonistic.

What do these all have in common?

What do these positions have in common? Several things:

A belief that the specific benefits provided by rapid transit are unimportant, and thus not worth spending money on.
A desire for transit minimalism--lack of interest in increasing ridership or service beyond some baseline level which is held to be "good enough"; in particular, a lack of interest in attracting "choice riders" to the system.
A lack of confidence in transit management/governance, often causing disbelief in the stated goals of the project(s) in question, and/or the projections concerning population growth, future ridership demands, and future revenue used to justify such projects. In many cases, this is expressed as a public officials are acting in bad faith.

Of course, the different groups have lots of things which are not in common--fundamentally, social justice advocates are interested in service quality; conservatives in minimizing public costs; and labor advocates in maintaining payrolls and jobs. These things are all somewhat in conflict--if you reduce the budget, you either have to slash service (and hours) or wages. Increase wages, and either revenue must increase or service must be cut. And increasing service requires either new revenue, or wage concessions. But in all cases, there is a fear that if money is diverted from the taxpayers, or existing uses, to fund new capital construction--that there won't be any return on that investment or expenditure. And driving that fear, in many cases, is a lack of trust in the transit agency.

When someone makes a statement that light rail is not an "essential service", or that it is "anti-transit"--it is good to ask of them what their vision for the transit system is. Chances are, their vision is one of minimalism--they believe that transit has a limited (and specific) role to play in the overall economy and infrastructure of a place, and that attempts at expansion are out of line.

A few final thoughts

Many transit activists, including yours truly, don't subscribe to the minimalist philosophy. After all, we (as a society) haven't practiced minimalism when it comes to road-building over the past century--there's scarcely a capacity problem on the roads that doesn't provoke calls to build more of them. And the result is a mess--and will become a larger mess the next time gas heads north of $4 a gallon. I'm not a maximalist, either--I'm fully cognizant of the political and financial constraints which are in place, and believe that projects need to undergo public scrutiny.

However, the absolutist positions expressed by some, are extensively troubling. They're political arguments couched as technical arguments. (This is true for light-rail supporters as well). It's far more open and honest to say things such as "I think TriMet should focus on social service to the poor, and not on trying to attract motorists from their cars", rather than attacking a particular mode choice as unsound. It's better to have an open debate about values--what sort of service should be provided, then cloud that debate in pissing matches about bus vs rail. Because that's what the debate is really about. Arguments about mode choice are really arguments about values, and the vast majority of participants in transit blogs (including myself) have only a superficial understanding about the limitations of various technologies--often colored by what TriMet (or whoever the local transit agency is) does in practice.

Transit and safety

2010-08-05T23:44:00.000-07:00

Over at portlandtransport.com, a frequent poster who is a harsh TriMet critic posted a news item concerning a recent act of violence involving the MAX system. Apparently, a pair of hoodlums were having a smoke at Gateway TC, when a TriMet employee and an off-duty deputy (who flashed a badge at 'em) told them to put it out. They did, but got on the same southbound Green Line train as the deputy, and after the cop got off the train at Clackamas Town Center, the two men jumped him. The attackers were quickly subdued and arrested, but the deputy suffered a few minor injuries.

The thread quickly turned into a heated debate about transit safety, or Why (Everyone Thinks) Transit Is Dangerous. The incident is an isolated one, no civilians were injured, and the security personnel involved did their jobs. Yet the attack was featured on no less than three different evening news programs, and prompted a few of the local anti-transit advocates to fan the "TriMet is unsafe" flames. (Disclaimer: Some of the content here was taken from my comments on that thread...I'm a sucker for a good heated debate).

Is TriMet dangerous?

The safety of TriMet has been in the news quite a bit. There are two essential components of safety--risk of accidents, and risk of crime--and TriMet has attracted much bad press (some of it deserved) on both counts. A series of high-profile attacks on the Eastside Blue Line a few years back prompted TriMet to install fare gates at some platforms (the system mainly runs on the proof-of-payment system; the fare gates are intended to keep thugs off the line under the theory that potential violent offenders are also likely fare-jumpers). Recently, the Clackamas County Sheriff complained that crime had risen in the vicinity of Clackamas Town Center since the Green Line opened. TriMet disputes these claims, and portlandtransport.com has been trying to get clarification on these claims--including information as to whether apprehended miscreants were (ab)using MAX, or whether the new park-and-ride is an attractive target for thieves, or whether this is just a result of increased traffic, increased law enforcement presence, or coincidence. It's worth noting that the sheriff has publicly complained about tax-increment financing for the Milwaukie Line, so there's some evidence of a strained relationship between his department and TriMet.

TriMet has been fortunate in that it has not experienced any accidents resulting in serious injury to passengers in quite a while. However, pedestrians and cyclists have not been as fortunate, and there have been several incidents in recent years of walkers and bikers being struck by busses and trains--in some cases, the fault of the operator, in others, the fault of the person struck. After the April 2010 accident where a bus ran down five pedestrians in a crosswalk, killing two, the agency engaged in much navel-gazing, culminating with the appointment of a director of safety; who reports directly to the general manager.

Or are standards too high?

Certainly, TriMet has had problems. But are expectations too high for the agency (or conversely, too low for other forms of transport?

One common area of criticism from many critics is that the agency doesn't "do enough" to promote safety. There are often calls for the agency to hire more security and more fare inspectors, to install fare gates on more of the system, or to even close stations in blighted areas. Often, such calls come with the expectation that the cost of this will be borne by the agency and its passengers--not by additional tax increases beyond what the agency already receives--implying that the difference will need to be made up by lesser service, higher fares, or both.

But is this fair? States, counties, and local governments in Oregon spend hundreds of millions, if not billions, on police officers (and other emergency responders) designated to traffic patrol--essentially, security services for roads and highways. The Oregon State Police patrol division--which doesn't do anything but patrol the state highways of Oregon--has a budget of over $100 million. The thirty-six county sheriffs and numerous municipal police departments in the state likewise devote considerable resources not to crime prevention or investigation, but to nabbing speeders and drunks and cleaning up accidents. And virtually all of this police work is paid for out of the general fund. There aren't suggestions that ODOT ought to pay for the OSP Patrol Division out of gas tax proceeds (in fact, OSP was funded by gas taxes in the past, but the law was changed twenty years ago). Patrolling the highways and byways (and many other public speces) is generally assumed to be part of the job description of police--they just do it. However, patrolling transit is treated by many law enforcement agencies like a budget-busting headache.

Of course, the "transit is dangerous" meme is an old one. There are some places where public transit is (or was at one point) the exclusive province of the poor, and violent incidents on bus lines or subways are not uncommon. Many people are uncomfortable travelling with other demographic groups, and this discomfort is often perceived as a safety issue. Even in New York City, where busses and trains run every few minutes, you can get anywhere on transit, and driving is miserable--there are lots of residents who use taxis to get around.

A question of structure

But this debate poses an interesting question: Why has there been complaints from law enforcement about servicing transit, when you don't hear the same complaints uttered about patrolling parks, highways, local streets and sidewalks, shopping malls, and other public (and quasi-public) places?

Part of the issue might be one of structure. There are several different arrangements by which public services (public works, police, fire, transit, schools, ports, utilities, etc.) can be provided by the government:

As a department within "general" government (a city, state, county, or national government agency)--where the head of the department in question reports to, and serves at the pleasure of, elected officials.
As a department within a larger general government, where the department head is him/herself an elected official; a common example in Oregon are county sheriffs.
As a "special district", separate from any mainline government agency, where a board of directors is elected by the voters, and in turn hires a manager, approves budgets, etc.
As a commission, or similar arrangement, where an independent agency has directors which are appointed by an elected official. Unlike department heads, who serve at the pleasure of their superiors in mainline government, the commissioners in such an arrangement are often appointed for fixed terms, and in many cases cannot be removed without due process (and generally not without cause).

Many public services can also be provided by the private sector; those arrangements aren't relevant to this post.

In a post at The Urbanophile, Aaron Renn mentioned an article concerning mergers among fire departments in the Midwest, and whether that would produce cost savings or not. He concluded his remarks with this:

I’m generally all in favor of eliminating non-general purpose units of governments that aren’t controlled by elected officials of a real government that people actually care about (e.g., a city or county). But not for merger related savings, which don’t seem to exist.

In a comment, he added the following:

I do dislike special districts that aren’t accountable. Indiana township government is a perfect example. Indiana townships are not general purpose governments. They provide only certain functions like poor relief and fire departments (mostly in rural areas). They are controlled by their own elected officials, who operate largely out of sight, out of mind with the public. Unsurprisingly, the trustees and boards who run them do so as if they were personal fiefs, often employing relatives, and giving themselves generous pay and benefits for almost no work. Center Township in Indianapolis, for example, which is entirely inside the city limits, has amassed a huge property portfolio and over $10 million in cash for no apparent purpose.

Schools are another interesting one. They are often a similar case. I support mayoral control of schools, generally.

This old school notion of Tocquevillian style government with a plethora of elected officials and a patchwork of jurisdictions is simply not relevant in the current era. For sure it doesn’t work, or get the benefits that Tocqueville saw from it today. I do happen to think there’s a loss there. For example, we’ve seen the rise of the political class versus the citizen government ideal of old. But we can’t roll back the clock, and today’s urban scale is very different from the past.

In general, my preference is for competent governance. Muni is subordinate to the city of San Francisco, and the service their stinks in large part because city government is famously dysfunctional. However, Renn has a point. Many special districts are run by officials who are elected in noncompetitive elections that nobody cares about.

But another issue, that is relevant to this post--is that in Oregon, transit authorities are generally special districts (TriMet is run by a governor-appointed commission); whereas the police and public works are generally part of mainline government. While Metro and other MPOs can help bridge differences; it often remains the case that public agencies which are not part of a common reporting structure will have different organizational missions and goals. Communication may be deficient--as nobody is responsible for the intersection of the services provided. They may compete with each for public resources, and in some cases, may actively try to undermine each other. Such arguments may occur within mainline government of course, but when two departments are part of the same larger organization; there is a built-in means for resolving such disputes.

This arrangement can have consequences beyond law enforcement complaining about the cost of patrolling transit. Jarrett blogs about a recent event in Ottawa, wherein construction crews tore up a downtown stretch of the Ottawa Transitway, without informing the transit agency--resulting in a major disruption of bus service. And many efforts to install BRT are routinely stymied by public works departments, who view signal priority for busses with hostility--understandable, as their organizational mission is often centered on efficiently moving cars.

Quick hits

2010-08-05T19:22:00.000-07:00

Next Monday, leaders from various local, regional, and state governments will get together to vote on what design for the Columbia River Crossing to proceed with. Metro and the City of Portland have jointly announced that they will vote for the 10-lane solution, initially striped for 8 lines if possible, with a separate connection to Hayden Island from Marine Drive (across the south channel), instead of an interchange on I-5.
TriMet bus driver Al Margulies, whose blogging activities prompted a rule change at the agency concerning what drivers can do while operating a bus, is shutting down his blog, apparently at the behest of TriMet management. Al has long been a great source and great friend for the Dead Horse Times, I'll miss his online presence. (And hope he keeps commenting here, at portlandtransport.com, and elsewhere...)

Tax increment financning and transit

2010-08-01T17:52:00.000-07:00

Last week, the web site portlandtransport.com posted a five-part series of an interview with new TriMet director Neal McFarlane. The interview touched on numerous topics, but a significant portion of the video dealt with the current financing crisis at the agency (and at many other transit agencies, and state and local governments in general). One of the more contentious topics was the use of tax increment financing to pay for improvements to transit infrastructure and service.

The video included several people giving testimony at a TriMet board meeting, in opposition to the practice--including the sheriff of Clackamas County and the chief of Clackamas Fire District, whose territories are served by the MAX Green Line, and the planned Milwaukie extension. Both of them complained that TIF, which has been used in the past to finance improvements to the transit system, was hampering the finances of their respective departments, by simultaneously creating new demands for service and depriving them of revenue with which to provide that service. Also appearing in the video was conservative political activist Steve Schopp, who has engaged the producers of the video (and yours truly) in the comment threads at portlandtransport.

And while I disagree with much of what Steve has to say, on this issue he's got a valid point.

What is TIF?

Tax-increment financing (TIF) refers to a means of public financing whereby the portion of property taxes (or other taxes) collected on certain parcels of land, which goes to the general fund, is frozen--with the difference being used to finance capital projects designed to improve the value of said parcels (and bring about some public benefit as well). Generally bonds are issued to finance the actual project, and the tax-increment is used to pay back the bonds until they are retired. This is especially important for Oregon, where Ballot Measures 47/50 limit property tax increases to 3% per year; unless the property in question is , or the taxes are to service bonded indebtedness. TIF seems simple enough, but it has a few issues, even when used "properly":

Inflation may not be accounted for--if baseline costs to provide government services are rising due to inflation, but the revenue provided is frozen, cuts to service may result.

Sometimes the new development may increase the need for government services, such as turning a brownfield into a dense mixed-use residential zone. Brownfields seldom need service from the police or paramedics, whereas places where people live often do.

The graph to the side, apparently designed by local TriMet critic (and frequent portlandtransport.com commenter) Jim Karlock for an anti-urban-renewal article at bojack.org, demonstrates how it works. Whether or not the section labelled "red ink" is truly red depends on how expenses grow or shrink; in a well-designed TIF the red ink is minimal or nonexistent.

When does TIF work?

TIF works best when the following conditions are met:

The improvements are largely specific to those parcels being tabbed for tax-increment financing.
The improvements may decrease, or at least minimize the increase, the need for public expenditures
The resulting property value increases are of sufficient magnitude that the bonds can be paid of quickly, returning the full value of the tax base to the general fund.

A common use of TIF that meets these requirements is certain types of urban renewal; where blighted neighborhoods are rebuilt. Urban renewal of this sort satisfies the conditions--specific lots are affected, the improvements are frequently substantial, and the elimination of blight and the related social pathologies may well reduce public expenses. (This analysis ignores the effects of gentrification--in particular, the beneficiaries of such projects are often landlords and developers, not people who live there who may be forced out due to higher rents or taxes. But that's another subject).

What about infrastructure?

What about public infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, or transit lines? At a neighborhood level, TIF (or better yet, Local Improvement Districts, where specific local taxes are levied against a neighborhood to pay for improvements), it can work. But for major regional infrastructure projects, such as freeways or MAX lines, not so much:

Many demands for service are not reduced, and may increase, if the improvements result in more people living in the area (or travelling through).
Such things are built on public rights-of-way (whether on easements or owned by the public outright), not on private lots subject to taxation--in other words, the directly affected land is off the tax rolls. Instead, TIF depends on general increases in the value of nearby properties to work.
For large-ticket projects, the size of the TIF district needs to be also large; magnifying the risk to other government functions should the projected increases in value not materialize, or should inflation or other causes increase government expenses unrelated to the project, which must be met with a frozen tax base.

What's the best way to finance major infrastructure projects? For large capital projects which are regional in scope--the traditional way (an explicit bond measure backed by a specific tax levy) is probably the cleanest way to do it--it doesn't affect existing services, it demonstrates political will to do the project, and it represents a stable source of revenue which makes lenders happy, lowering the cost of financing.

Voterphobia

Unfortunately, TriMet lost a measure in 1996. Actually it was a statewide measure, Measure 32, that authorized using lottery funds to fund the N/S MAX project and numerous road projects elsewhere--one that was put before voters during the height of the Oregon tax revolt. But it failed--and since then, TriMet seems terrified to go before the voters to raise money for capital projects (or to use existing bonding authority that it has used but has not exercised). Instead, we get things like TIFs, bonding payroll tax revenues (the source of much of TriMet's operating budget), and the like to fund capital projects.

Some parting advice

A bit of advice to TriMet. Your service area includes Portland. A place which is highly transit-friendly. The greater Portland metro area, excluding Vancouver, presently sends THREE Democrats to Congress. I don't expect either Wu or Blumenauer to lose this November; Kurt Schrader is a bit more vulnerable, but the GOP has nominated yet another nutcase. While the following advice might not fly during the current recession, what with everyone grabbing their wallets, I will nonetheless offer it:

Trust the voters. The bulk of the populace supports transit, especially if you can convince them that you know what you are doing, and aren't just wasting taxpayer money on patronage projects. Demonstrate some fiscal soundness, quit f---ing around with crazy financing schemes, grow a pair, and put a bond levy for Milwaukie MAX on the ballot. Or better yet, put a levy for MLR, Barbur, and improvements for the WES corridor on the ballot, so all three counties get some cake. Even better than that, put different proposals on the ballot (light rail, BRT) and let the people decide what quality of transit they are willing to pay for. Or not.

But enough with the current "system" of scraping together funds from a zillion different sources to pay for major infrastructure projects. It makes it look like TriMet and Metro are trying to hide something; it puts you in hock to a whole lot of folks who don't give a damn about quality transit, and when it results in service cuts, it alienates the demographic you can least afford to alienate--your current supporters.

As stated previously, the appointment of a new GM is an opportunity, a chance to wipe the slate clean, and break from the past policies of the agency which have been met with much scorn.

And after all--if you don't trust the voters, why the hell should they--should we-- trust you?

Federal funding fun and games

2010-07-27T19:53:00.000-07:00

In a comment on the prior post about Milwaukie BRT, RA Fontes noted in the comments that...

Don't know if things will change, but Mr. McFarlane has so far been awfully positive in his comments about Milwaukie LRT---all the jobs and economic development, etc.

An open BRT seems to be a no-brainer for this corridor. Single-seat service from OC and all over Clackamas County with door-to-door trip times that LRT can't hope to match except in a very few showcase examples.

But who cares?

My response was this:

If I were cynical, I might suspect that getting $750 million of Federal money into the local economy is actually part of the goal. :)

Actually, I am a bit cynical. I'm not suggesting that TriMet (or any other particular agency) is engaging in any unique skullduggery... but I'm becoming more and more convinced that the current funding system in the US--where the bulk of tax dollars go to the Great Sausage Factory in the Sky, only to be doled back to the states and local governments by a bureaucracy with more layers than a bushel of onions--is broken.

Other bloggers I know disagree with me on this point, for various reasons. Uniform standards are a good thing, and on many issues the US Government is more enlightened than quite a few states. (Even the Bush Administration was more enlightened on transit issues than a few states I can think of...).

But the current method of funding disconnects the source of the funding from the target--encouraging waste and games. Local governments generally view Federal grants as "free" money--even though it is funded by taxes, receipt of such funds has nothing to do with an area's federal tax liability. Projects aren't always funded based on technical merit--much ink has been spilled about Peter DeFazio's ability to send transportation earmarks are way. And yes--it is possible that in extreme cases, projects are pursued not because of the value of the system that gets built, but because of the opportunity to pump outside dollars into the local economy. While the stimulus affect of locally-funded projects is overrated (such things merely move money around, not add to the wealth of a region); the stimulus affect of $750 million being sent into town courtesy of Uncle Sam is definite and real. And if the money doesn't come to Portland, it will go to some other region.

Were I really cynical (I know, it's a cheap rhetorical device), I might even expect that project costs were frequently being inflated to boost the tab, and the overall Federal match. If most of the expenditures are local (local contractors, design firms, property owners), much of the cost may be recovered as additional taxes--and the additional contributions to the overall economy might cancel out the additional cost to public coffers. As noted previously, the costs for rail construction in the US have risen dramatically in the past decade--far outpacing inflation, wages, or other quantifiable cost factors.

What would I prefer? Lower federal taxes for this sort of thing, with local revenues raised to offset the Federal tax break; and local money used primarily to fund local projects. The Feds could still get involved for projects of national significance (say, the CRC); when recession or other financial crises require use of US government credit, or in other unusual circumstances such as natural disasters--but as a general principle, regions would be expected to self-fund. Likewise, state and local involvement ought to be segregated somewhat. Of course, that might result in a few idiocratic states deciding to strike a blow for freedom by paving everywhere--but when gas costs $10, they'll have to live with that decision.

Of course, I don't expect this sort of fundamental restructuring of US governance to happen anytime soon. Many on all sides of the political spectrum prefer a strong federal government with lots of cash, for numerous reasons. A massive culture in DC has grown up around a large federal government, a culture that is neither liberal or conservative--and this sort of structural change would be resisted strenuously. But that doesn't stop me from griping...

In the meantime, I should just remind myself: When the folks in DC are picking up the tab, I shouldn't complain too much when surface rail projects cost $200 million a mile.

But I'm not that cynical.

Milwaukie BRT?

2010-07-27T00:38:00.000-07:00

Today, it goes without saying, was not a good day for the Milwaukie MAX project. Only a few days after the projected budget for the project went up by $100 million, the FTA made official what may have been unofficially known to TriMet for about a year; they are only planning to match local funds evenly ("50% match"), rather than contributing $1.50 for every local dollar ("60% match"). The stated reason? The FTA doesn't want to "set a precedent" for matching big-ticket projects at such high levels. There's probably lots of other politicking going on in DC, as the transportation bill is stalled in the Senate (like everything!), but given FTA chairman Peter Rogoff's recent remarks about allegedly-overpriced rail projects, I'm not surprised.

$300 million hole

This decision leaves TriMet about $300 million in the hole--around $470 million of local funding has been located, and 50% of $1.5 billion is $750 million. According to GM Neil McFarlane, TriMet plans to tighten belts accordingly. "Over the next few weeks, we'll be working with our project partners to recalibrate the project to fit within these new funding parameters" said McFarlane. What "recalibate" means exactly is unclear, but according to spokesperson Mary Fetsch, who was interviewed by portlandafoot.com, part of the strategies being considered include eliminating parking garages, shrinking the maintenance facility and not ordering spare cars for trains on the line.

[Graphic courtesy of portlandafoot.com]

While those steps would save some money, it's hard to see the savings from those moves amounting to anywhere near $300 million. And its hard to see where additional local funding might come from, given that government agencies of all sorts are dealing with budget problems--and if push comes to shove, MAX is not likely to be the highest funding priority. If a funding package is not completed by the fall, the project may need postponement--which would put current funding in jeopardy. Many other projects and constituencies in Oregon have uses lined up for $250 million in lottery dollars--and there's not guarantee that the figure would be made up in a future funding cycle. (Especially if the GOP manages to retake control in Salem). TriMet has discussed borrowing more itself--likely bonding more payroll tax revenue, in addition to the $39 million it already plans to contribute via this controversial form of financing--a maneuver which would no doubt make many of its rider base scream.

Not all of this mess is the agency's fault, of course--rail costs have gone through the roof in the past decade; and the current recession seems to have governments all around the country scrambling. However, the agency has committed a few unforced errors of its own--and has opened itself to criticism that it is over-extending itself.

Unlike a few other projects on the drawing board, rapid transit in the Portland-OC corridor is important for the region's future. My concerns about Milwaukie MAX chiefly lie around cost, not about the usefulness of the project. But if the money isn't there, the money isn't there.

Depending on what happens...maybe it's time to revisit BRT.

Milwaukie BRT

Consideration of BRT in the corridor is nothing new. After the Milwaukie/Vancouver MAX funding initiative failed back in the 1990s, Metro gave serious consideration to various flavors of BRT in the early phases of the South Corridor study--a study which initially excluded light rail. At the request of leaders in Clackamas County, LRT was added to the study, and eventually became the locally preferred alternative for both Phase I and Phase II of the project. Phase I is now the MAX Green Line; Phase II is Milwaukie MAX. The South Corridor Supplemental DEIS considered several options for the Portland/Milwaukie/Oregon City corridor, at the following price tags:

BRT from Portland to Oregon City (here, "BRT" means bus service enhanced with low-cost capital improvements such as signal priority, but not a full busway): $119-$131 million.
Busway from Portland to Milwaukie, BRT from Milwaukie to Oregon City: $267 million - $299 million. ("Busway" means a fully dedicated ROW for the exclusive use of transit vehicles).
LRT from Portland to Milwaukie, BRT from Milwaukie to Oregon City: $467-$518 million.

Careful readers will note that the current LRT price tag is 3 times the SDEIS estimate, and that doesn't include any bus enhancements south of Milwaukie. Pretending the BRT part doesn't exist, that would be about $70 million per mile, about the same cost as the Yellow Line, which was under construction at the time. The SDEIS glossed over the question of how MAX would cross the river (the maps included had trains going across the Hawthorne Bridge--a dubious notion), but the fact that the project has tripled in price since early planning illustrates the problem.

A few other proposals for a Portland-Milwaukie BRT have been floated, such as this one by John Charles of the Cascade Policy Institute (a libertarian think tank that has a reputation for not being terribly fond of public transit). BRT was also discussed at portlandtransport.com when the decision to go with light rail was made. Critics of BRT have noted that light rail "won" the technical analysis to become the LPA--the SDEIS predicted 33% more trips with the LRT solution than the busway, and 60% more than with BRT. However, given the new project constraints, the prior analysis may no longer be sound.

[Image courtesy of South Corridor SDEIS]

A good potential BRT corridor

The Portland/Milwuakie corridor has good BRT potential for numerous reasons:

The Willamette River acts as a "funnel" for commuters; other than the Sellwood Bridge (presently closed to busses due to weight limits), there is no public crossing of the river between the Ross Island Bridge and Oregon City. Numerous busses converge on the corridor from points east and turn north into the city.
With the existing bus services along 99E, there is already frequent service along the corridor for the entire length (the #33), along with numerous other routes which provide augmented service during peak hours. Even without introducing any additional routes, an "open busway" between Portland and Milwaukie would be an attractive transit corridor.
The SDEIS predicted 30,000 rides/day with the "busway" alternative, vs 40,000 for light rail (a figure which has been slashed as the issue has been studied further; a common phenomenon in planning). Not bad for a second option.

The support of BRT I envision would be the "busway" alternative, with a fully dedicated bus lane. In addition, even though it is one of the most expensive components of the Milwaukie MAX project as currently constituted, I would look to keep the Caruthers bridge, as the busway would have the greatest impact if there were a continuous exclusive-transit route between Milwaukie and the mall. (I would also love to see the Milwaukie-OC section added back into the project, even if only consisting of signal priority and queue jump lanes on McLoughlin).

Switching to BRT, or at least publicly considering it, could have significant political impacts as well. It would demonstrate to TriMet's critics a greater regard for financial responsibility, and help to demolish the meme that "TriMet no longer cares about the bus system"--especially given Neil McFarlane's prior role with the agency. Such political calculations ought not drive the decision, but it would be ignorant to ignore their potential impact. And even if TriMet were to go ahead with light rail, it would improve the optics of the situation tremendously.

Opportunity

David Axelrod, President Obama's chief campaign strategist, is famous for saying "never let a good crisis go to waste". With the financial straits facing the organization, and the greater ability to change direction afforded by a new general manager, TriMet has an opportunity here to greatly change the nature of transit politics in town. It may be that reconsidering BRT remains a bad idea; and that the correct decision may be to proceed as planned, delay the project until costs come down or money becomes available, or no-build. But one paradox of management is that constraints can be liberating, as they allow consideration of alternatives that were previously unthinkable.

A few quick links

2010-07-18T19:57:00.000-07:00

to two articles at The Urbanophile:

One, published this weekend, in support of busses--in part because rail costs have been skyrocketing (a phenomenon which is not unique to Portland or Oregon, but does appear unique to the United States).
Another, from a year ago, discussing what is causing the skyrocketing rail costs, and what might be done them.

More grist for the mill.

Time for Plan C?

2010-07-18T17:46:00.000-07:00

The Lake Oswego transit project has been a hot topic there this weekend. The latest cost estimate for the project is nearly double previous estimates. Some of that cost is the result of changing estimates for the value of the Jefferson Branch real estate, a cost which is already paid for (it's both a debit and a credit on the books), and will be matched at 1.5x--the "out of pocket" costs for the region are more in the range of $50-$75 million. However, the size and scope of the cost increase is a bit disturbing, and isn't entirely accounted for by the ROW value. (Not even close). The politics are lousy, to be frank.

The problems

There are two bigger problems, however. The projected "out-of-pocket" costs (excluding the ROW) to the region are expected to be a small fraction of the overall cost of the thing--$50-$75 million or so. That actually looks good--if the region can get a 6x-9x multiplier on its cash investment, it might be a good deal. The flies in the ointment are these:

Until an appraisal is done, the actual value of the ROW will not be known. Appraisal probably won't be done for a while; and may be an avenue for opponents of the project to tie it up in court. (Those trying to sabotage the project may argue for a lesser value; those trying to cash in if their adjacent property is condemned may try to escalate the value). A proper project budget depends on this, obviously.
The technical parameters of the project are... underwhelming. The proposed route is no faster than the existing parallel bus line (it is expected to offer improvement when projected traffic increases tie the bus up in traffic); the capacity of the project is very low by mass transit standards (less than 1000 pphpd, assuming single-car Streetcars at no better than 10 minute headways); and the land-use potential seems limited. Other than the SOWA area, and perhaps the Foothills area in Lake Oswego; most of the land along the line is either already developed, or geographically unsuitable for development. (And those portions outside the Portland city limits are outside the scope of Portland Streetcar's organizational mission). Given that--why would the FTA consider spending $240 million on this project, over other worthwhile projects in the country (and even possibly in the Portland area)? Peter DeFazio might be in a position to steer an earmark Portland's way if the Democrats retain control of the House; beyond that, prospects strike me as dubious. Given that the region will need to spend another $25 million or so to get to the point of submitting an application for the funds--money that will NOT be matched or reimbursed should the feds say no--is there a better way?

Plan B

The Streetcar alignment (including the trail option) is Plan A, of course. There is a Plan B--the "enhanced bus" option. In this option, no Streetcar is built; the ROW is used for a trail, and limited-stop bus service, augmenting or replacing the 35, runs along the OR43 corridor, with limited stops north of Lake Oswego. Unfortunately, the "enhanced bus" option runs along 10th/11th through downtown, rather than the transit mall, a flaw which the proposed Streetcar alignment shares. I suspect this routing was done to make the "enhanced bus" option a substitute for the Streetcar option--but if you're a cynic who thinks the bus option is only there because the law says it has to be, and isn't being seriously considered--this routing sure looks like a poison pill.

There is also "Plan Zero"--no-build. Here, no capital improvements are made to either rails, trail, or bus infrastructure, and the 35 runs as before. It is on TriMet's list of Lines To Promote To Frequent Service, but the agency is having trouble maintaining current levels of service.

Plan C?

Let's assume, for a moment, that we decide Lake Oswego Streetcar isn't a great idea--but that transit in the OR43 corridor is going to be a pressing concern in the next few decades. Assume that population and traffic projections a few years hence are accurate, and OR43 will no longer be a convenient route for busses to use, due to congestion. For riders from Oregon City, switching to the 33/MAX will be an option, but for riders from West Linn, that won't be.

Ignore the trail, for a bit.

And assume that the funds that the region were planning to use on the Streetcar could be invested on some other piece of infrastructure in the region. What would be a good option?

Transit bridge across the Willamette, perhaps?

In Metro's high capacity transit plan, one of the longer-range transit corridors connects Clackamas Town Center with Washington Square. While the endpoints are strange--there is a substantial amount of workers living in places like Happy Valley, and working in Washington County. Right now, commuters south of town who need to cross the Willamette must either head south to Oregon City, or north to downtown. Imagine the potential of a transit bridge between Lake Oswego and Oak Grove.

Should either traffic congestion or operational efficiencies require it, the 35, 36, and 37 could use the New Bridge and connect with Milwaukie MAX at Park Ave. or Milwaukie TC. (Some service should probably continue along OR43; but MAX could become the primary conduit). A MAX line should be able to whisk commuters downtown faster than the proposed Streetcar line would.
Many of the east/west lines terminating or passing through either the LO and Milwaukie TCs (such as the 36, 78, 29, and 31) could be "linked up" as through east/west lines.
While this proposal doesn't assume that rail goes across the bridge at its opening, it does assume that this is an eventual possibility. One possibility would be to build the bridge as an extension or branch of Milwaukie MAX, and put rails and catenary on the bridge at the beginning. But it isn't necessary for the purposes discussed here.
The bridge would naturally include facilities for pedestrians and bicycles. Not for automobiles, however.

There are several potential locations for such a bridge. The most likely option would probably be adjacent to the existing railroad bridge, or possibly even replacing it. (One evil thought: build a new rail bridge upstream connecting the Willamette Shoreline tracks with the Samtrack rails; run P&W freights on THAT, and convert the existing line between Lake Oswego and Milwaukie to exclusive transit use. I'm sure folks in Riverdale would love that...)   Another option would be somewhere in the Courtney/Terwilliger corridor; or possibly the Oak Grove corridor. (Both of these latter crossings would be south of the planned terminus of Milwaukie MAX; though both are likely to attract more NIMBY opposition).

A recent estimate of how much such a bridge would cost was in the order of $200 million (courtesy of frequent commenter RA Fontes, who has been advocating such a bridge for a while now).   Given a 1.5x match, that would mean $80 million out of local coffers to build it.   But given the escalating pricetag of the Lake Oswego streetcar, this seems like a much better deal for taxpayers, who would be getting a more regionally-important facility than the proposed Lake Oswego streetcar line.

What about the trail?

So far, I haven't discussed the trail portion of the project. If either no-build is done, or the "enhanced bus" option is selected, it is generally assumed that the Jefferson Branch ROW will be used for a trail instead. For portions of the line, there are issues with the existing easement, which might require use of eminent domain to fashion a new easement. On the other hand, a new bridge across the Willamette would provide trail users a new option: connecting to the Trolley Trail and the Springwater trails on the east side of the river.
What about Johns Landing?

One remaining question: What about Johns Landing and the rest of the Macadam area? The current Streetcar planning has identified a minimum operationally-usable segment (MOUS) from SoWA down to Nevada Street; with the possibility of extension to and across the replacement Sellwood Bridge when built.   I'm in agreement with blogger Erik Halstead--a frequent TriMet critic--who opines that building the MOUS makes sense. Having Streetcar run extended down towards Johns Landing would provide opportunities to speed up the 35, 36, and 43 through the area. However, were this to be done, I expect that this would be a typical Streetcar project, not a rapid transit project, and should be designed and funded as such. Things like more frequent stop spacing would be appropriate, as the line would no longer be charged with getting Clackamas County commuters to the office.

Impedance matching and transit

2010-07-18T01:08:00.000-07:00

This morning, the DHT takes a minor break from discussion of the Lake Oswego transit project, to emphasize a fundamental principle of transit design (one that certainly has relevance to Lake Oswego, and beyond). Yours truly hold an MS in Electrical and Computer Engineering from Oregon State University, which implies that I know something about electricity and electronics. (That said, I've spent the past fifteen since graduation doing software, which implies that I've probably forgotten most of it). However, one important principle of electrical engineering, that of impedance matching, has significant relevance by analogy to transit.

Impedance is defined by Wikipedia as a quantity which "describes a measure of opposition to alternating current (AC)." While I have some quibbles with that particular phrasing, they're off topic here on the DHT--the definition given is good enough for the purposes of this post. Impedance can be broken down into two fundamental components: resistance (opposition to non-changing, or direct, current--always a positive number), and reactance (opposition to changes in current, which can be positive, negative, or zero). Electrical circuits can be modified by a source (typically a voltage source, such as a battery or power supply), and a load (the device that does whatever work or performs whatever function is desired). Both the source and the load have an impedance associated with them, and the behavior of the circuit depends on the impedance of both components.

Why impedance matters

In many applications, it is important that the impedance of the source and load be matched--a condition which occurs when the resistance of source and load are the same, and the reactance of source and load sums to zero. Impedance matching is required for maximum transfer of power from source to load, and for minimizing "reflections" of the signal (which can disrupt communications). The latter phenomenon is too complicated to do justice to in a post for laypersons; but the former can be be explained easily enough: The power consumed in a circuit element is the product of the voltage drop across it, and the current which flows through it: P = VI (I is used for current in the field of electronics--C is used for capacitance). The current through a circuit element can be computed by dividing voltage over impedance: I = V/Z (Z = impedance; don't ask me why). The total voltage of the source is distributed across the source and load impedances, V = VS + VL; where VS = VZS/(ZS + ZL) and VL = VZL/(ZS + ZL). Thus, doing a bit of math produces the result that the power dissipated by the load is ZL (V/(ZS+ZL))² Given that the source impedance ZS is often fixed, a bit of calculus shows that the load power is maximized when the load impedance ZL is set to match it.

One problem with impedance matching is that while load power is maximized; so is source power, such circuits are only 50% efficient. Efficiency can be computed by dividing load power over total power, under the assumption that only load power is used for doing useful work. To maximize efficiency, one deigns so that the load impedance as high as possible. This limits the amount of power which can be delivered to the load, but in many cases that doesn't matter--if you have a 60W light bulb, it doesn't matter that the household circuit may be capable of delivering 2kW--you only need 60W to make the thing work. Maximum efficiency is achieved by making the load impedance as high as possible relative to the source impedance. This technique, impedance bridging, is generally only used in situations where reflections aren't an issue.

On the other hand, if the load impedance is lower than the source impedance, to much power is wasted in the source or the interconnecting wires. This is generally not a useful case, and in extreme cases is known as a "short circuit".

What of the source impedance itself? The source impedance of a power supply is in many ways, a figure of merit--lower is better. A power supply with a lower source impedance will be able to deliver a higher maximum power for a given voltage level than a supply with a higher impedance; and will waste less power no matter what the load. Unsurprisingly, designing power supplies with very low impedances is difficult and expensive.

(EEs may note that I'm glossing over power supplies modeled as current sources--and they would be correct. I'm glossing over lots of things...)

What does all of this have to do with transit?

Good question.

When designing a transit line, there are several important factors to consider:

The nature of the route (including the vehicles):
The nature of the stops (distance between, amenities, platform height, etc)

A transit vehicle or system does two important things: It stops to pick up or drop off passengers, and it moves to the next stop. For both functions, minimization of time is required. It's relative easy to come up with first-order figures of merit for both operations:

First, consider a transit vehicle which is deadheading on its route. Here, the vehicle traverses the route, running under normal conditions and at normal speed--stopping at traffic lights, stop signs, and for obstacles in the road (other traffic, pedestrians, debris) as necessary--but does not stop to pick up passengers. We could measure its velocity over the route, under various conditions, to come up with a number we'll call the deadheading velocity, VD. Higher is better, obviously--and various things can contribute to a higher deadheading velocity: higher-performance vehicles, a dedicated guideway (no interacting with other traffic), priority at intersections, etc.

Now consider the hypothetical case of a vehicle which traverses its route, stopping at stations and stops in the ordinary manner--but travelling instantaneously from one stop to the next: when the doors close at one stop, the vehicle and its passengers are teleported instantly to the next needed stop. We add in a per-stop penalty for to account for acceleration and decelation as well. Assume that each stop is serviced normally--if little old ladies need to fumble through their purse to find exact change, that time is counted. Were we to sum up all the stop times (averaged over numerous runs), and divide them into the length of the route, we would come up with a number I'll call the service velocity, VS.

Now, let's invert the two parameters, VD and VS. Science doesn't presently have a good term for the inverse of velocity, so I'll coin one: lethargy, or L (LS, LD). The lethargy of something is the amount of time it takes to cover a distance, divided by the distance. Why do we use lethargy? Because, lethargy is additive. The total lethargy is simply the service lethargy plus the deadheading lethargy. (One can invert the total lethargy to get the total velocity, or an approximation thereof--keep in mind, this is a crude model). If it isn't obvious already; lower is better.

How lethargic is good?

What values of lethargy are good? Bad? Typical? First, lets consider some typical LD values for various modes of transportation:

Jet air travel: < 0.12 (>500MPH)
Turbofan air travel, true high speed rail: 0.2 - 0.3 (200-300 MPH)
Second-tier high-speed rail : 0.3 - 0.5 (120-200 MPH)
Amtrak, rural freeway: 0.7 - 0.9 (65-85 MPH)
Urban freeway (no congestion), grade-separated metro: 0.8 - 1.2 (50-75 MPH)
Rural highway: 1.1 - 1.3 (45 - 55 MPH)
Urban expressway with stoplights, i.e OR224: 1.5-1.7 (35-40 MPH)
Median-running light rail: 1.7 - 2.1 (28-33 MPH)
Urban boulevard: 1.8 - 2.2 (27-32 MPH)
Urban arterial: 2.4 - 3.0 (20-25 MPH)
Light rail, traffic in downtown grid: 2.4 - 3.0 (20-25MPH)
Residential streets: >3.0 (<20MPH)

Now, LS.

Point-to-point auto travel: < 0.1
Point-to-point commuter bus/rail, >10 mile trip: < 0.5 (assuming 2.5 mins for loading and unloading)
Point-to-point air travel: <300 mile trip (40 mins to load, 20 mins to unload plane): >0.2
Point-to-point air travel: <300-600 mile trip: 0.1 - 0.2
Point-to-point air travel, >600 miles: < 0.1
Corridor commuter rail/express bus (such as WES): 0.1 - 0.3
True-metro rapid transit, 1-2 mile stop spacing, 30-40 second dwell: 0.33 - 0.5
Transit, 0.6-1 mile spacing, 30 second dwell: 0.5 - 0.8
Transit, 0.4 - 0.6 mile spacing, 20 second dwell: 0.8 - 1.3
Transit, 0.2 - 0.4 mile spacing (1000-2000 feet), 15 second dwell: 0.6 - 1.2
Transit, 750 - 1000 feet, 15 second dwell (i.e. Streetcar): 1.2 - 1.6
Transit: 500-750 feet, 10 second dwell: 1.1 - 1.5

For a given service type, by adding the corresponding lethargies for the route type and the stop spacing, you get a good estimate of the overall lethargy--and the overall speed.

What lethargies do riders generally expect or encounter? Values less than 1.5 are generally rare, but here are some "typical" values:

Point-to-point commuter rail: 1.5
Corridor commuter rail, i.e. Sounder or WES: 1.8-2.2 (WES is 2.4; due to shorter-than-typical stop spacing and tracks not rated for higher-speed operation).
Point-to-point highway-running express bus: 1.8-2.0 (i.e. C-Tran 199)
Corridor express bus: 2.2 - 2.6 (C-Tran 105)
"True" metro: 1.7 - 2.2
Dedicated-guideway light rail: 2.0 - 2.8:
Dedicated guideway BRT, limited stop, no signal priority: 2.5 - 3.0 (LA Orange Line)
Median-running light rail (i.e. yellow line): 2.8 - 3.2
Suburban highway bus: 3.0 - 3.5 (the 33 and 35 are both in this range)
Rapid streetcar: 2.8 - 3.5

Proposed Lake Oswego streetcar, LO-PSU: ~3.5

Downtown light rail: 3.5 - 4.0
Urban boulevard local bus (ie TriMet 9): 3.5-4.0
Local bus: 5.0 - 10.0
Portland Streetcar downtown: ~8.0

Excluding express and commuter services, a common cutoff for rapid transit is a lethargy of about 3.0 (an average speed of 20MPH). High-quality rapid transit can do 2.0 or better; medium-quality, about 2.5. Frequent stop (non-express) bus service running in mixed traffic on ordinary streets has a hard-time doing better than 3.0, and mixed-traffic streetcar is unsurprisingly, very slow.

What does this all mean?

The reason I use lethargy, in addition to the fact that it's easy to compute with--is that it's analogous to the electrical property of impedance discussed in the first section. Furthermore, deadheading lethargy is analogous to source impedance, and service lethargy is analogous to load impedance, in the following ways:

Power consumed in the load, and time spent picking up and dropping off passengers, is useful. Whether a high or a low value is good or bad depends on the application--commuter rail (and point-to-point transport) have very low service lethargies, as the bulk of the time is spent in transit--but don't serve very many people. Local bus service, on the other hand, has a very high service lethargy--it stops in lots of places--but this limits its effective speed.
Deadheading lethargy, like source impedance, is a figure of merit--the lower, the better. And like source impedance, making it lower costs money. Time spent in transit is generally time wasted, just as power consumed in the source is wasted energy.
Most importantly, it is useful to match lethargies, just as it is useful in electonics to match impedance. Building expensive transit infrastructure, but running services with frequent stop spacing on top of it, does not lead to better service, at least as far as this analysis is concerned. (There may be other reasons--reliability, capacity, sex appeal, whatever, to do so; all of these things are outside the scope of this post).
On the other side of the coin, running limited stop service in mixed traffic is useful--express bus and commuter rail being two examples--but these services generally have low impact.
Finally, like impedance, lethargy is logarithmic in its impact. There's a bigger difference between lethargies of 2 and 3, then between lethargies of 5 and 7, for instance. This logarithmic nature makes higher-performance lines difficult and expensive to build; it's far too easy to build too many stops on a line to garner greater political support, sabotaging its technical merit in the process. (MAX downtown suffers from this problem to some extent--that said, MAX was designed to provide local service through downtown; not to be an efficient means for crosstown trips).

Sticker shock

2010-07-15T20:25:00.000-07:00

In the past weeks, I've a handful of posts about the Lake Oswego Streetcar project, either directly or indirectly. The tone of the articles has been less than enthusiastic, generally--as I've been searching for the right balance between expanding high(er) capacity transit and serving existing needs. One thing in favor of the LO project, though, has always been its relatively low cost, particularly including sunk costs. Back in the 80s, the Jefferson Street Branch line was purchased from Southern Pacific for $2 million, and is now apparently worth around $80 million (though the recent downturn in the real estate market may lower that figure; an earlier article here quoted a figure of $50 million). Given that the value of the right-of-way could be used for Federal matching purposes (up to a 1.5x match), the project seemed to be a good way to get a decent rapid transit line on the cheap.

However, word now comes today from the Portland Tribune (hat tip to bojack via Al) that the price tag for the project is now in the range of $380 million to $458 million.

Ouch.

Time to break out the Dr Evil photo.

"Four... Hundred... and Fifty.... MEEELYUN dollars!"

Only I don't hear the delegates to the United Nations--or anyone else for that matter--laughing.

The good news, I guess, is that the "local match" is only $47-55 million, excluding the value of the Willamette Shoreline ROW.

The bad news is that if the estimated value of the ROW goes down, potentially 1.5x that shortfall must be made up elsewhere. Also, the match depends on re-authorization of a federal transit funding bill that expired last year; and while Congressman DeFazio has lots of clout in the House; this is the sort of thing that might find a hostile reception in the Senate, where one party seems determined not to spend any money on anything that might stimulate the economy.

Of the $50 million or so in cash that local governments must find under the cushions, half of it needs to be spent up-front and would be lost were the project to get canceled (or not approved). And only if the project is built do any Federal matching funds get provided.

Of bigger concern seems to be the ever-increasing budget for the thing. In 2007, according to the Daily Journal of Commerce, the projected cost of the line was $149 million for the transit portion (and another $83 million for the trail portion). Now the cost is almost double.

To quote Lando: "This deal keeps getting worse all the time!"

The good news

The good news, of course, is that the increasing costs are being made public before construction begins. This is a sign that the project is at least being run in good faith. (Compare that to the Portland Aerial Tram, which didn't see its budget triple until construction had already begun; an audit revealed that OHSU managers had kept overruns to themselves until sufficient costs had been sunk, and canceling the project was no longer an option). Some dollars have been spent on early planning; and more money is to be spent to complete the DEIS; but this is a small fraction of the total cost. Sometimes, spending money to discover that something is a Bad Idea is necessary. That said, even with the steadily increasing budget, the out-of-pocket price for a seven mile rail line still is not bad. Were the existing ROW not available (or not available for a federal match), this project would probably be DOA; but at this point, it's still got legs.

Why?

An important question to ask is "why". Not just why this project has seen its budget grow faster than dandelions, but transit projects in general. The US economy, after all, is in a recession. Lots of people are looking for work. The spectre of deflation (an outcome which would make rich people very happy, and most of the rest of us suffer) is rearing its ugly head--and as noted above, the Senate (or a particular faction therein) seems to desire this outcome. Yet the costs to build public works projects seem to be skyrocketing. It's interesting to compare recent transit rail transit projects in the area:

Original MAX (1982-1986): $214 million, 15 miles (approx $400 million in 2010 dollars, $27 million/mile)
Westside MAX (1993-1998): $963 million, 18 miles (approx $1.4 billion in 2010 dollars, $78 million/mile, including a tunnel)
Airport MAX (2001): $125 million, 5.5 miles (approx $155 million today, $28 million/mile)
Interstate MAX (2000-2004): $350 million, 5.8 miles (approx $400 million in 2010 dollars, $69 million/mile)
Green Line/Transit Mall (2007-2009): $575 million, 8.3 miles ($590 million today, $71 million/mile).
Milwaukie MAX (estimated): $1.4 billion, ~7 miles ($200 million/mile, including a bridge)

A definite trend can be observed... but again, the important question is "why"? Heck if I know. I can think of numerous possibilities (most of them no good), but as I have no particular evidence at hand to suggest what may in fact be the cause of the rapid cost escalation experienced in the past decade, I'll just leave it there.

Why?

The express vs rapid transit paradox

2010-07-15T00:48:00.000-07:00

Whenever it seems that a new rapid transit line opens, especially on which runs on rails; there's a bit of a backlash (and sometimes a big one) from riders whose prior service was curtailed as a result of the new transit line, and who view the new line as inferior in some respect. A particularly common case of this occurs when an express bus (whether a service explicitly signed as express, or one which acts substantially like one) gets replaced with rapid transit--in many cases, the rapid transit line is less "rapid" end-to-end than the express bus it replaced. While rapid transit service is generally considered more desirable--for those who utilized the express, having it replaced with rapid transit can be a cheese-moving experience. Thus, there is often much public agitation to not upgrade--hence the paradox.

In Portland, we saw it when the original MAX line opened in 1986, and numerous Banfield express routes were discontinued (legend has it that one well-known TriMet critic got his start due to this reason). We saw it again in 1998 when Westside MAX opened--no less august a personality than Tom Hughes, the former mayor of Hillsboro and current candidate for Metro president, has complained that his wife was forced to switch from transit to driving when the MAX line opened and the former Washington County express bus service was canceled. We didn't see it as much with the Yellow Line (the bus that replaced, the 5/Interstate, isn't an express bus; though Hayden Island commuters were inconvenienced); but we'll be sure to see it if and when the CRC gets built (in whatever form) and MAX gets extended into the Couv. We didn't see it much with the Green Line; but we're hearing it already with the LO Streetcar and riders of the 35, and I'm sure we'll hear it lots with Milwaukie MAX and riders of the 32 and 33.

Conflict of interests

As mentioned in the lead, most transit planners consider a rapid transit line in a given corridor more valuable than an express service. (Assuming, of course, that demand is there--white elephant projects that don't attract riders are an exception to this principle). Rapid transit can potentially serve more people, as it has stops all along the line. (And given the the service is faster than local, the stops are more valuable and attract more riders than a signpost on the corner). True rapid transit (running predominantly or completely in its own right of way) is generally more reliable than mixed traffic busses or streetcars. (Of course, when service on a rapid transit line is disrupted, often the disruption is more severe than what happens to busses caught in traffic; busses can often route around problem). However, none of this stops express bus riders from voicing discontent--for many riders, the only stops which matter are where they get on and where they get off.

The paradox is a common phenomenon. As transit needs of a community grow, adding express services to complement local service is a common first step. Express services serve a specific need well--quickly connecting suburban commuters to job centers during peak hours over distances where local service would take too long. They generally are found in important transit corridors--the sort of corridors which eventually get converted to rapid transit. And while a limited-stop rapid transit line provides overall superior service to the community--making transit a more viable choice for many along the corridor in question--for end-to-end commuters it often results in a longer trip.

Rapid transit has other disadvantages over express service for these customers, as well. True express lines, such as C-Tran's express busses to Portland, often use vehicles in coach configurations, where seats are maximized and standing room minimized or eliminated. Express services often have a demographic mix that suburban commuters find preferable (i.e., other suburban commuters); many users of express lines find the wider demographic mix present on more comprehensive services to be disconcerting. (Whether for good reason or for bad). The lack of stopping and starting and opening and closing of doors can make for a more comfortable ride.

Two halves don't always make a whole

Even replacing a local line with a rapid transit line can raise hackles; particular if the rapid line is shorter than the local it replaces. Such is the case for the two primary bus routes connecting Portland with Oregon City, a third-ring Portland suburb located 13 miles (22km) south, upstream on the Willamette River. The 33/McLoughlin plies the eastern shore of the river mostly along OR99E, serving the communities of Milwaukie, Oak Grove, and Gladstone before reaching Oregon City. The 35/Macadam travles on the opposite shore along OR43, through Lake Oswego, Marylhurst. (Two other bus routes, the 32/Oatfield and the 34/River Road, also serve the area; neither does the volume of the 33 and 35). The 35 continues past downtown Portland into North Portland; that segment of the route is not considered in this article.

Of course, none of these Oregon City-bound busses is an express bus.   Both have local service stop patterns, but move quickly, and are able to cover the 13 mile distance in 45-50 minutes, depending on traffic. And as indicated above, both have rail lines planned for the corridors they serve--but only halfway. Milwaukie MAX will open in 2015, connecting Portland with Milwaukie; and the LO Transit project is investigating opening a rapid streetcar line between Portland and Milwaukie, possibly opening as early as 2017. When these lines are opened, the 33 and 35 will be converted to feeders terminating at the Milwaukie and Lake Oswego transit centers, requiring Portland-bound passengers to transfer. (A few other weekday bus lines, such as the 34 and the 36/South Shore, presently end at the transit centers and require transfers to the 33 and 35 respectively).

In the case of Milwaukie MAX, the new transit service will undoubtedly be faster than the bus. The planned line has wide stop spacing (.7 miles, or 1.1km between stops on average). On the LO side of the river, the Streetcar actually will be slower than the bus presently is, although by not much (Metro estimates that increased traffic on OR43 will vastly slow down any bus service on the highway). Planners are predicting significant increases in usage on both sides of the river, due to the new lines better attracting riders from neighborhoods along the way--predicting up to 6000 riders/day on the Streetcar, and up to 27,000 riders per day on Milwaukie MAX. Some of those will be users of existing bus services, but the existing busses do not account for those estimates; they include significant numbers of new riders as well.

So is it worth it?

So is this a good idea? Experience has shown, over and over, that replacing express service with well-designed rapid transit does produce overall increases in ridership. Some of this is simply the value of rapid transit; some of this may be due to conversion to rail, especially for communities where it is viewed as a more prestigious service. (I don't care much about the bus/rail debate, but there is evidence, albeit disputed, that a rail preference exists--I will not attempt to justify it). Of course, a key word is well-designed; replacing local bus service with poorly designed rapid transit is not likely to have the same benefit.

Turning again to the #33 and #35, a stronger case can be made IMHO for the Milwaukie MAX project. Cost is a major issue, but the line appears to be designed to supply a high quality of service--and many of the infrastructure enhancements (particularly the Caruthers bridge downtown) are valuable for many other reasons.   In addition, prospects for extending the line to Oregon City are good. The Lake Oswego line is harder to defend for several reasons--it essentially turns into local-stop service closer to downtown, and the predicted number of additional ridership is fairly low; and the geography on the west side of the river makes further extension of the line south very unlikely. OTOH, the cost for this project is far lower, given that the right-of-way is already owned by the government, and the design standards of the project are far lower. Some things could be done to mitigate this, but would require significant operational and possibly cultural changes within TriMet.

What about bus rapid transit?

One proposal which is often made, when rail-based rapid transit projects are considered: What about building bus rapid transit instead?   The term "BRT" is often a weasel-word, and can refer to anything from minor infrastructure improvements and a new coat of paint, to fully-segregated busways with special-purpose rolling stock with performance that rivals (and in some ways, exceeds) rail. Assume for the purposes of this discussion that similar amounts of money are available for BRT as for rail.

In many cases, BRT may be an excellent alternative. If existing routes simply shift to a busway rather than terminating at a transit center, the need to transfer can be eliminated; and the cumulative effect of numerous bus lines converging on a busway trunk can lead to excellent levels of service on the trunk line. Busways also have the advantage that it's far easier to implement express service than it is on rail; busways simply need pullouts at stops whereas combined express/local service on a rail line often requires additional tracks. On the other hand, "open" busway systems, where local busses use the busway for part of their route, may not be as efficient as dedicated (closed) systems with special equipment optimized for rapid transit. (Hybrid systems are of course possible.) And if environmental issues are a concern, electric-powered rail is "cleaner" than combustion-powered busses. (Trolleybusses and other electric busses are an option, but these often require their own infrastructure--infrastructure which Portland lacks. Power systems used to drive rail are not compatible with trolleybusses, which need more complicated and less-reliable dual-wire catenary systems).

BRT would have been an excellent choice for the Milwaukie MAX line, as the Willamette River "funnels" many bus lines into the McLoughlin corridor. It also would probably be an excellent choice for Barbur Boulevard, for similar reasons (geography funnels numerous lines into the Barbur corridor from Burlingame to downtown). On the other hand, BRT was probably not a viable option for Lake Oswego, given the existence of an available rail right-of-way, and limitations on the ability to widen OR43 to accomodate dedicated bus infrastructure.

Rapid streetcar, Portland, and the rail divide

2010-07-10T17:37:00.000-07:00

There's an article on the light-rail advocacy site lightrailnow.org, which introduces a concept known as Rapid Streetcar. Rapid Streetcar, as they define it, is a rail transit system which is a hybrid between "traditional" mixed traffic streetcars, and light rail systems. With a rapid streetcar design, streetcar-class rail vehicles (which weigh considerably less than light rail vehicles) are operated in exclusive rights-of-way in urban areas, often in lanes which were previously dedicated to automobile service, and often in multi-car trains. The page goes into detail on the advantages (lower construction cost, ability to run in mixed traffic if necessary, the possibility of tram-train like operation) and limitations (speed and capacity) of such systems, and discusses Portland's rail systems in great detail.

Of course, there's one catch: Portland doesn't HAVE any Rapid Streetcar. The article primarily uses Portland's streetcar system as an example of how such a system might be designed (focusing on details such as construction costs and techniques, station design, etc), while glossing over the fact that Portland Streetcar is, at present, a mainly mixed-traffic circulator system, not something marketed as rapid transit (or rapid anything). Portland does have rail lines with service parameters that satisfy the conditions for Rapid Streetcar--but those lines (such as the Yellow Line) are running light-rail rolling stock, not streetcars. There has been some discussion of Rapid Streetcar in Portland, but currently none exists.

As the article notes, "Rapid Streetcar" is not really a novel idea; many European tram systems have been operating in this fashion for decades. It is more novel in the American context--the legacy streetcar systems which operated in the early 20th century before being replaced with busses and the automobile, were almost always mixed-traffic types; and many of the "revival" streetcars, such as the Portland Streetcar, are this way as well.

The Portland rail divide

The Portland metropolitan area has three transit rail systems in operation; this post compares the three systems (along with two "full metro" systems in other West Coast cities). The remainder of the present article will ignore everything but MAX and Portland Streetcar.

In many ways, the two systems are dramatically different. MAX is a traditional light-rail system, operated by TriMet--a mobility-focused transit agency which also provides bus service to the bulk of the metro area. MAX uses light-rail class vehicles (such as the Siemens S70), usually running in two-car trains. It runs almost exclusively in its own right-of-way, and in many places it is built to "light metro" standards, with grade separation or guarded crossings. Other than the downtown area, average stop spacing on MAX is generally 3000-3500 feet (1km); and average speed on the system is about 20MPH (32km/h). MAX operates on the proof-of-payment system, with tickets vended at platforms. The fare structure for MAX is the same as for TriMet's bus system (with the added benefit of the Free Rail Zone downtown); service is branded similarly to the busses (both use the same colorschemes); and MAX is not marketed in any way as a premium or upscale service. (Many of the MAX lines pass through parts of town regarded as blighted, and the "MAX causes crime" meme is unfortunately popular ).

Portland Streetcar, on the other hand, is a different beast. While TriMet drivers drive the trains around, the Streetcar is owned and operated by Portland Streetcar Inc (PSI), a subsidiary of the City of Portland. Unlike TriMet, PSI is focused on urbanist and community-development outcomes; on "placemaking". The Streetcar uses streetcar-class vehicles (the Skoda 10T) operating in single-car units, and provides local circulator service through downtown Portland. It operates in mixed traffic, mostly on streets of secondary importance. Average stop spacing is about 750' (230m), or about once every three blocks. Average speed is less than 7MPH (11.1 km/h); slower than many busses. The Streetcar also uses the same fare system as MAX and the busses (and passes and transfers are interchangeable between the systems)--however, the Streetcar is marketed differently, with a brightly-colored colorscheme and styling aimed at more upscale riders. Onboard amenities are similar. The Streetcar also operates on a proof-of-payment basis, albeit with ticket machines onboard rather than at platforms.

Divide is perhaps too strong a word--as the two systems coexist fairly well. The two agencies are on friendly terms, despite differing missions, and the systems are presented to the public as parts of a unified transit system. Presently, they cross each other in two places (at Portland State University, and where the Yamhill/Morrison and 10th/11th couplets intersect), with a third crossing near the Portland Convention Center coming in 2011 when the Streetcar Loop project opens. However, at the present time, the two systems are completely separate--separate routes, seperate rolling stock, separate yards and maintenance facilities, separate organizations, and separate missions.

Change coming

The opening of the Streetcar Loop project in 2011 won't change any of this. However, when the Milwaukie MAX line opens in 2015, a shock to the system will come. The new Caruthers bridge, which will ferry MAX across the river south of downtown, will also carry Streetcars as the Streetcar Loop project is completed to become a real (bidirectional) loop winding through both sides of the Willamette River. For the first time, MAX trains and Streetcars will share the same tracks while in revenue service. They won't share any stops--Streetcars will pass through the MAX stop on the west side of the bridge without stopping (and the lines diverge immediately after that), but they will share rails and catenary.

The next planned Streetcar project after the Loop is the Lake Oswego transit project, which everyone expects will select Streetcar as the LPA (locally preferred alternative). This project, planned as a southward extension of the current Streetcar service down the Jefferson Branch line, is being billed by some (including local planners) as Rapid Streetcar. However, the predicted speed of the line--approximately 19MPH (30km/h), is on the low edge for a rapid transit line. South of South Waterfront, the line is projected to be fairly fast; however the present Streetcar route takes ten minutes between OHSU and PSU. (Planned enhancements to the line should shave a few minutes off that; however the numerous stops along this stretch of the route limit the impact of track improvements). Further, the proposed project may suffer from capacity issues--as much of the route is single-tracked, effective headways are limited to 12 minute (5 trains per hour), or 700 pphpd. Finally, one other significant issue is that whereas the #35 bus (which the line intends to replace) travels the transit mall, the Streetcar extension would instead stay on the existing alignment along the 10th/11th couplet--a five block difference. Many of the commuters from West Linn who use the #35 either work downtown or plan to transfer to another line on the Mall; and are not well-served by a line which instead takes them to the Pearl District).

Streetcars on the Mall?

Given all that--what if the Lake Oswego Streetcar, instead of being an extension to the existing line, were instead routed on the Transit Mall? Doing so would provide the following advantages (albeit with the indicated conditions).

Better replace the #35 service than a 10th/11th alignment. Operation on the Mall would deliver riders to the core of downtown Portland's commercial district, and to all the transfer opportunities found there.
Would make running trains--i.e. more than one car--a possibility. As the current Streetcar alignment north of PSU runs through existing, mature urban fabric, and in mixed traffic, the service is limited to single-car "trains" in order to minimize impacts. The transit mall, OTOH, already serves 2-car MAX trains (equivalent in length to three Streetcars) with no difficulty. Much of the line south of PSU could more easily be expanded to accommodate larger vehicles; permitting the LO line to have capacities closer to what MAX can deliver.
To further improve performance, the proposed Harbor Drive transitway (connecting the new Caruthers bridge to Lincoln Street) could be modified to accomodate Lake Oswego bound streetcars, thereby skipping many of the intermediate stops

In short, running the LO Streetcar on the Transit Mall would separate the local service (the existing Streetcar line and the loop) from the rapid transit service (the Lake Oswego line).

Now how much would you pay?

[Map courtesy of City of Portland/thetransportpolitic.com ]

But wait...there's more!

Last year, the City of Portland and Portland Streetcar published a draft Streetcar System Plan, which was passed by the city council last September. The plan is a document outlining where Streetcar service might go in the city of Portland in the future. The document isn't intended to articulate future corridors for high capacity transit (see here for that); and limits its coverage to the city of Portland, not to the suburbs. Most of the routes proposed are local circulators such as the current Streetcar; however the document does address Rapid Streetcar, further dividing it up into "enhanced local service" and "priority service", proclaiming the LO Streetcar extension to be the latter. The Plan has this to say on the subject:

The rapid streetcar concept aims to combine the best features of streetcars and light rail transit (LRT) to achieve faster commute/travel times than streetcars and lower system costs than light rail. Streetcars are typically designed to go shorter distances in central cities, densely populated mixed-use centers and neighborhoods. Streetcars are also typically designed to operate in mixed traffic, preserving street traffic patterns.

LRT typically functions as regional high-capacity transit (HCT), generally traveling in a separated right-of-way with relatively fast-moving, larger-capacity vehicles designed to rapidly transport large numbers of people between suburban and urban centers.

The rapid streetcar concept would apply some of the LRT features to streetcars to improve travel times while keeping capital costs lower. It would combine features of a semi-exclusive transitway and transit priority features within the street right-of-way to achieve faster travel times and maintain lower system
capital costs. This could introduce two new levels of service to Portland’s system.

Several corridors under consideration for the Streetcar System Concept Plan are prime candidates to introduce Enhanced Local Service. These corridors are major arterials with 4 to 5 lanes and on-street parking such as NE Sandy Boulevard and SE Foster Road. In Portland there are potential corridors for introducing priority service. Currently, the region is undertaking a study to extend the existing streetcar system along a former railroad right-of-way from the South Waterfront District, through Johns Landing and south to Lake Oswego. SE Foster Road and 122nd Avenue are also candidates where there may be sufficient right-of-way width to introduce streetcar priority lanes.

I encourage all readers to download and read the draft plan--even if (or especially if) you think local service streetcars are a boondoggle or a weapon of gentrification. (The document probably won't change your mind, but it may make you angry).

In the plan, numerous potential Streetcar corridors are considered. Several screening functions are applied to exclude those which are technically unfeasible, unlikely to draw sufficient ridership, or unlikely to promote transformative land use outcomes; with the remaining corridors grouped into tiers. More filtering was performed, with the following routes surviving all the cuts:

MLK from Alberta to the Loop.
Thurman/18th/Burnside/Sandy. NW 18th/19th couplet, south to Burnside, east to Sandy to the Hollywood District.
The loop
The current route, with extension to Lake Oswego.
Sellwood Bridge, between LO route and Tacoma Street MAX.
Gateway Loop
Goose Hollow to 3rd/4th to Morrison Bridge to Belmont to 39th to Hawthorne to 50th.
Broadway/Weidler from loop to Hollywood.

The plan assumes that the Powell Boulevard and Barbur Boulevard corridors will be constructed as light rail, and assumes that no sharing of track between MAX and Streetcars will occur, other than on the Caruthers Bridge. If, however, Streetcars could use lower-speed MAX routes to get around, it may be possible to eliminate some redundant routes downtown, or use the existing Ruby Junction yards to service the Gateway Loop. For example, if connectivity to St. Johns were desired, but extending the MLK line were thought to be difficult, it might be possible to lay tracks from Interstate only, and then have trains run down the Yellow Line--or even augment (or replace!) the Yellow Line itself with streetcar service, as a way of dealing with the Steel Bridge bottleneck.

Technical difficulties

How technically (and politically) feasible is any of this? Both systems use the same rail gauge (standard) and power system (overhead catenary supplying 750VDC), so two key requirements for mixing the systems are satisfied. The following technical issues and restrictions do exist:

The signalling systems are presently different; unfortunately, I'm not aware of the technical details, or how much it would cost to retrofit them to be the same (I imagine the Streetcar, with far fewer miles of track than MAX, would be converted).
The Skoda streetcars are about 8" narrower than MAX trains--introducing a 4" or so platform gap were a Streetcar to use a platform designed for MAX. That gap, too wide to simply instruct users to mind, could be bridged with platform extenders. (For obvious reasons, MAX trains cannot use Streetcar platforms--but there are many other reasons MAX can't run on streetcar routes).
MAX trains are too heavy to run on the current Streetcar route, which has a smaller railbed. (The use of the lighter-grade construction is one thing that produces the cost savings attributed to Rapid Streetcar). Nor could MAX take many of the corners successfully.
The Skoda 10T streetcars have a top speed of 40-45MPH (64-70km/h); making their use on the high-speed parts of the MAX network (anything west of Goose Hollow, the I-84, I-205, and Airport segments, and the Milwaukie Line south of Holgate) inappropriate. Were a faster vehicle available, this would not be an issue.
According to Curt Ailes at Huston Street Racing, who interviewed Oregon Iron Works president Chandra Brown on the subject, the 10T streetcars cannot be coupled for in-service operation. They have couplers, but Ms. Brown suggested that they aren't suitable for operational use. (Perhaps they are only for towing the streetcars; but the model in question lacks the electronics for tandem operation of multiple units, and/or the horsepower for one to pull another). Skoda makes other streetcars (such as the 14T and its successors) which can be formed in trains; but current practice in the North American streetcar market seems to be to use streetcars are larger busses, and to stick with light rail or metro for high-volume applications.

In addition, there may be political objections as well. As noted above, the two agencies have different missions: TriMet has an operations focus (claims by its critics to the contrary nonwithstanding), and PSI is focused more on land use. PSI board member (and Portland planning commissioner) Chris Smith indicated, in a conversation on portlandtransport.com, that the former agency isn't interested in the land use goals of the latter, noting that:

I think it would be fair to characterize streetcar supporters (including the City of Portland) as believing that as soon as the streetcar system is handed over to TriMet it will stop expanding. So unless TriMet changes its culture and mission I don't see the organizations being merged for a long time.

While increased joint operation of the Streetcar and MAX certainly doesn't require a merger between the two organizations, Smith has a valid point: Many in Portland's transit community take a dim view of Portland Streetcar, in particular it's land-use focus--and may extrapolate negative views towards mixed-traffic rail and transit-oriented development into opposition to streetcars (the technology), even in applications where they make sense from a transit-focused perspective. And, there are probably many on the TriMet operations side who would look unfavorably to an additional vehicle type to deal with.

Final thoughts

Does running Streetcar technology and light-rail technology on the same tracks, beyond the planned Caruthers bridge concurrence, ultimately make sense? It's hard to say--for specific lines, such as Lake Oswego, a good argument can be made. Elsewhere in the system, arguments get sketchier. Long range, it may be the case that a downtown subway is built to handle light rail, and that the surface routes become exclusively served by streetcar. It may be the case that rapid streetcar is selected for future transit corridors such as Powell, which already runs parallel to light rail.

It's also possible that the Lake Oswego project won't survive the DEIS process in its current form; and Streetcar technology is for the foreseeable future only used for local circulators--making the whole subject moot.

But in planning for the future, it's good to keep an open mind, especially in an era where budgets are tight. And just because a vehicle looks like a streetcar, doesn't mean it has to act like one.

A closer look at southern downtown Portland

2010-07-08T23:07:00.000-07:00

Today, the DHT takes a closer look at the southern region of downtown Portland, and surrounding neighborhoods. It's an area which is being branded the "Innovation Quadrant" by city officials, and which is key to the region's mobility. Roughly, the area is bounded by the Hawthorne/Madison couplet to the north; by I-450 and the West Hills to the West, by Holgate (and its westward extension) on the south, and by the UPRR tracks and SE 20th or so on the east.

The Innovation Quadrant (a name I dislike, but we'll go with it) is presently well-served with transport infrastructure. Highways in the area include I-5 and I-405, US26, and state routes 99W/10, 99E, and 43. Three bridges presently cross the Willamette in the region--the Ross Island, Marquam, and Hawthorne. The MAX Yellow and Green Lines terminate at PSU, and the Portland Sreetcar runs through the region. Numerous frequent bus lines (4, 6, 8, 9, 12, 14, 33, and 54/56) serve the area. The Center Street bus depot is in the southeast corner. The UPRR mainline, the Oregon Pacific ("Samtrak") branchline, and the Jefferson Branch line all pass through the area, as do numerous trails (the Vera Katz Esplanade, the Springwater Corridor). Oh, and the Willamette River itself.

Major destinations in the area include OHSU (both the Marquam Hill and Waterfront campuses), the other hospitals in the Marquam Hill complex, Portland State University, OMSI, numerous other cultural institutions, Portland City Hall, and the Portland Building.

Projects in the works

Numerous transportation projects are presently planned for the area, or are in the works. A rebuild of the OR99E viaduct east of OMSI is scheduled for completion next year, as is the Eastside Streetcar Loop project between the Pearl District and OMSI. In 2012, three "Innovation Quadrant" projects, in support of the Streetcar, will be complete. Longer term projects include Milwaukie MAX and the Lake Oswego Transit project; and Barbur Boulevard and Powell Boulevard have been identified for rapid transit corridors in the future. Outside the area under consideration, but important, is the project to replace the Sellwood Bridge (the replacement bridge is planned to have Streetcar tracks, to accomodate Streetcar service to the Sellwood neighborhood).

By far, the most important project planned for completion in the next decade in the area is Milwaukie MAX. We have blogged about it before, focusing on the financing and the portion of the line running parallel to OR99E. But the proposed "Caruthers crossing", a new "green bridge" between the Marquam and Ross Island bridges, linking the South Waterfront district to OMSI, is a key piece of infrastructure for reasons beyond light rail.

The new bridge

The new bridge will include facilities for transit--light rail, busses, and streetcar (which will operate in two shared lanes, one in each direction)--as well as for pedestrians and bicyclists. Private autos will not be permitted to use the bridge. On each end of the bridge (at SW Moody, and adjacent to OMSI) will be combined light-rail and bus stops (the Streetcar will have its own stops nearby on both sides). On the west side of the river, MAX will continue north along a viaduct adjacent to SW Moody, cross Naito Parkway at grade and head west on SW Lincoln, until reaching the current end of the Yellow and Green lines at PSU. On the other end of the bridge, MAX will continue east until it reaches the UPRR tracks, head parallel to the railroad, cross Powell on a new structure, and run down SE 17th. When the new bridge is complete, the Eastside Streetcar Loop will really become a loop.

Several of the frequent service lines serving the area currently cross on the Ross Island or Hawthorne bridges, but will likely switch to the new Caruthers bridge for faster service to downtown. (The 4, 9, and 33 are obvious candidates); many non-frequent routes will likely also benefit. In addition, busses running between the Transit Mall and the City Center garage will be able to use the new bridge instead of the Ross Island bridge, potentially saving time if the latter is jammed.

Ponies, and future enhancements

While the transit improvements in the area are laudable, a few other things come to mind:

It would be nice were a continuous bi-modal (bus/rail) transitway to exist from the current transit mall, to the Caruthers bridge (and across), all the way to Powell and SE 17th. Light rail will operate in its own right-of-way, of course, but busses will need to use surface streets east of OMSI to reach Powell or 17th. On the other end of the bridge, it appears that the "Harbor Drive structure" connecting the bridge to SW Lincoln will be rail only, meaning busses will have to use Moody to Harbor to Clay/Market to reach the Transit Mall. This will especially become important if Bus Rapid Transit is selected for the Powell or Barbur corridors in the future.
Even more in the "I want a pony" category: Given that two lanes of OR99E are now getting streetcar tracks (albeit mixed traffic); it Would Be Nice were these turned into a transitway as well (no private cars). Unfortunately, there is a parking lane next to the streetcar tracks in many places, and ODOT has little interest in turning over any lanes on MLK or Grand into exclusive-transit lanes. (And , businesses and such along neighboring streets aren't terribly interested in having them turn from local collectors into major thoroughfares, whether for cars, busses, or trains).
Burying the UPRR mainline would be nice--starting at the northern edge of the Brooklyn Yard. (So would burying I-5; both of these are a long ways off, of course). Likewise, a connection between the UPRR mainline across 99E to the industrial site presently served by the Oregon Pacific line would permit that right-of-way to be used for something better in the future. (Other than Oaks Park and Sellwood, the line doesn't serve any important destinations.
A way for MAX trains to move between the westside line and the new Caruthers bridge (besides crossing the Steele and doubling back) would be beneficial, especially if the future Powell LRT line happens to be light rail.

An unorthodox (and maybe crazy), but Really Simple idea for the CRC (and beyond)

2010-07-04T16:04:00.000-07:00

It's time to take a little time off from the Independence Day (in the US) festivities to make a suggestion--that will likely be dismissed as crazy. It's a proposal for the Columbia River Crossing that will strike many as absurd on its face--especially those who believe that a key goal of the project is to keep the freeway moving at "freeway speeds" for as many hours of the day as humanly possible. It's an idea that some might not only consider foolish--but unpatriotic. (The fact that certain ideas for bettering the country are considered treacherous in some quarters is itself idiotic in the extreme, but that's another topic...)

It's an idea that I can't take credit for... but I'll make the suggestion anyway.

A few weeks back, I had an email conversation with Jarrett Walker of humantransit.org fame on the Columbia River Crossing, a conversation which led to this post on the controversial project. Most of the content of the email exchange went into the posting (after much editing and expansion), but one exchange was left out. That exchange is the subject of this post.

Why is it so expensive, anyway?

One reason the project cost is so high is not the cost of the new bridge itself, but the cost to essentially rebuild I-5 and all its interchanges from SR500 on the Washington side, down to the Interstate Avenue interchange on the Oregon side. That's a distance of almost five miles. Why are ODOT and WSDOT so eager to pour $4 billion worth of concrete?

I-5, as currently designed, is functionally obsolete--there are numerous ramps with short distances between them, and ramps with very short merging lanes--particularly the two (from Hayden Island and SR14) immediately preceding the current bridge in both directions. There's about seven onramps and offramps in each direction over the stretch, including an infamous 400 degree ramp (!!!) from OR99E northbound onto I-5 north. (You cross over I5, turn right, pass back under the freeway, and then do a 270 back onto I-5--at which point you have to merge quickly if you're not headed to Jantzen Beach).

Through the magic of such things as collector/distributor lanes and braided ramps--and a vastly widened bridge, the two state DOTs (or should that be DsOT?) intend to make I-5 once again compliant with Modern Design Standards. Of course, it goes without saying that this sort of freeway construction requires a big footprint, a lot of concrete--meaning it does a lot of damage to surrounding urban fabric and costs a lot of money.

Whose design standards?

On my recent trip overseas, I noticed that many freeways in Hong Kong and China--both places are building them crazy, aren't built to anything remotely resembling US design standards--yet appear to be reasonably safe and functional. A six lane footprint (3 per direction) was common, ramps were frequently closer than the 2 miles (3.2km) that DOTs and traffic engineers here prefer for ramp spacing on arterial freeways. So I asked Jarrett, who's been in far more places than I have, about this:

Which gets me thinking: Are US standards for freeway design to strict? Is safety over-emphasized--a common issue with wealthy countries? (It's interesting to compare China and India--for example, see this article). Or is this an example of mobility values (in the highway sense of the term) trumping access? For a highway which penetrates the downtown core of a major city, it seems to me that access concerns ought to predominate--which means more ramps and lower speeds, not designing the thing so that through traffic can blast through at 55MPH (90 km/h) during rush hour, but with a tremendous footprint that wholly disrupts neighboring communities. Should highway engineers distinguish between "through" freeways" and "access" freeways--right now, pretty much all freeways are classified as throughput-focused arterials.

And Jarrett responded:

Re road standards for merges, etc, I think you're on the right track. Most standards for these things presume a "design speed," and you can reduce the amount of facility that the standards require by reducing the design speed. For example, there is some speed (of the entire freeway) at which the southbound ramp from SR 14 would be workable. What is it? 30 mi/hr? It seems to me that one no-project solution -- as long as the thing isn't really in danger of collapse -- is just to lower the speed limit to whatever the road geometry can serve. Throughout the CRC debate, any reference to highway design standards should be met with queries about design speed, and whether that speed is appropriate.

While I'm not one that favors a "no-project" solution--no project means no transitway (whether bus or rail), no decent pedestrian or bike facility, and continued interference with the Columbia navigation channel. I'm in the "do something" camp, just not the "build a 12-lane behemoth" camp.

One foot on the brake, and one on the gas....

So here's a thought experiment: What if I-5 were signed for a lower speed for a couple of miles; and the DOTs could just do a bridge replacement without having to rebuild the entire freeway as currently proposed? (Or could build less?) What affects would that have? Would the existing freeway, sans the current bridge, function adequately at the lower speed?

Some of the consequences would be:

Through trips on the freeway through the 35MPH section would take about 50% longer, assuming in either case, motorists routinely travelled 5MPH over the posted speed.

Highway throughput (per lane) might decrease slightly. A good approximate value for the throughput of a highway is 1800 vehicles/lane-hour, which is easily derived when one considers the two-second rule. If one vehicle passes by a point every two seconds, that's 3600/2, or 1800 per hour. A slightly more accurate formula (accomodating for the fact that cars take up room) is 1800*x/(x+5), where x is the speed in MPH--if x is 60, that comes to 1661 vphpl, at x=40 we get 1600 vphpl. More detailed analysis of this requires traffic engineering chops I don't possess (I'm not that kind of engineer).

Lower speeds may turn marginal ramps configurations into acceptable ones. The length of ramps (and of merging lanes) is dictated by the need to provide room for vehicles to safely accelerate to (or decelerate from) freeway speed, and in the case of onramps, successfully merge with freeway traffic. For loop ramps such as ramp from SR14 to I-5 south, and any ramp with with metering signals (essentially, all of them in the project area), the portions of the ramp which precede the signal and the straightaway don't count.
Lowering the speed limit wouldn't help the fuel economy of combustion-powered passenger cars much, and for some models may hurt slightly. Two important factors for fuel economy of a combustion-powered vehicle are its aerodynamic properties, and its transmission. Most passenger cars are sufficiently aerodynamic that drag doesn't dominate fuel economy until speeds exceed 60MPH (97km/h) or so--and given that, transmission gear ratios are chosen so that the car performs well in the highest gear at that speed. A highway speed which prevents the use of high gear would negatively impact the fuel economy of combustion-powered vehicles.
On the other hand, diesel-electric and electric powered vehicles, as well as some types of hybrids, have different considerations Internal combustion engines generate low torque at low RPMs (and stall outright if engine speed drops too low), and thus need mechanical transmissions or torque converters to keep the engine turning at adequate speed regardless of the vehicle's speed. Electric motors can generate high torque at low RPMs (includng zero)--thus low-speed operation can occur at correspondingly low engine speeds, with the result that fuel economy doesn't suffer from the need to downshift or idle.
For large vehicles, regardless of the powertrain, drag will dominate fuel economy at far lower speeds. Fuel economy for pickups and SUVs tends to peak at 40-45MPH (65-72 km/h); and larger vans, trucks, and busses peak at even slower speeds. Any reduction in highway speeds will improve fuel economy for these vehicles.
Speaking of such vehicles, they often take a long time to accelerate to typical freeway speeds, causing potentially more disruption when merging in and out of traffic at higher posted speeds.
At lower speeds, the storage capacity of a highway increases (the number of vehicles which can be accommodated on a given chunk of concrete). Storage capacity is maximized at low speeds, which is one reason traffic jams are so popular.

Where else?

Lowering the speed limit might help with some other stretches of substandard highway in the Portland area as well. OR 217, linking US26 in Beaverton to I-5 in the Tigard/Lake Oswego area, is a notorious parking lot, owing to having about 10 interchanges along its 7-mile (11km) length. In Beaverton, there's a stretch of four consecutive interchanges (Denney, Allen, OR 8/10, and Walker) where one ramp's onramp and the following offramp are each about 1000' (300m) apart. Last year, ODOT considered closing numerous ramps along the freeway during rush hour, to improve the highway's performance--an idea which was unsurprisingly unpopular with Beaverton and Tigard residents.

The problem with ODOT's proposal is that it focuses too much on mobility, and not enough on local access. While 217 serves an important role connecting the high tech Beaverton/Wilsonville corridor with I-5, it also serves much local traffic as well. The area doesn't have anything resembling a fully-connected street grid, and the parallel local transit service (WES, and the 76 bus which is well-used, but infrequent and slow) leaves much to be desired.

Plans to widen the freeway are in the works; although it is rather early in the process--and simply widening the highway will not fix the problems, as the study report indicates. The report in question also calls for "interchange improvements"--braided ramps and such--if and when funding becomes available.

If instead of doing this--could simply slowing down the highway, to make the existing ramp configurations safe(r)--improve traffic outcomes at a fraction of the cost? End-to-end commute times between I-5 would increase by several minutes in the worst case; but in times of congestion, the effective speed limit on the highway drops dramatically due to the numerous merge/weave conflicts--and that's without an accident occurring.

Precedents?

It is widely assumed, in the United States, that 55MPH (90km/h) or faster is the default minimum speed for freeways, without good reason otherwise. Mitigating dangerous road conditions due to geography is often considered acceptable; Interstate 5 is signed at 50MPH (80km/h) through the Terwilliger Curves (a notorious set of S-curves on a fairly steep grade, where the freeway passes through the Tualatin Mountains just south of downtown). However, the idea of mitigating dangerous road conditions due to excessive access seems to be out of scope--many take it as an article of faith that the proper response in these conditions is to redesign or eliminate the access in question--even if it costs billions of dollars and greatly increases the highway's cross-section.

But there are plenty of examples of freeways with lower speed limits, many of them labeled as "parkways". In Washington DC, for instance, one finds the George Washington Memorial Parkway and the Clara Barton Parkway--both controlled access, divided highways which look and act like freeways; yet are signed with speed limits ranging from 25-50 MPH (40-80 km/h). Even the Baltimore/Washington Parkway, a major freeway between DC and Baltimore, is signed at 45MPH for quite a bit of its length. Yet all three roads are widely used (and widely accepted) by Washington-area commuters.

Bottom line

The bottom line for this post is the following: Freeways perform fine at lower speeds. The most important attribute of a freeway is not a high speed limit, but controlled access and grade separation--the free flow of traffic. These attributes make safe travel at high speed possible--highways in urban areas which have high limits but at-grade intersections or unlimited property access tend to acquire reputations as deathtraps--or as ODOT likes to call them, "safety corridors". However, high speeds are not necessary for a freeway to function as a freeway--and eliminating things like stoplights and driveways will go a lot longer to improving the speed of a highway than simply raising the limit.

And in the urban context, where the regional mobility function of a highway frequently comes into conflict with the access functions, attempts to simultaneously improve mobility while keeping speeds high, generally are expensive--and interfere greatly with the surrounding community.

Trading speed (or other performance measures) of for reliability is a common solution in many engineering domains, not just traffic engineering. Yet the tradeoff seems to be something which is regarded as unthinkable by many.

Which is unfortunate. We could vastly slow down our need to engage in expensive and destructive highway re-designs... if we could simply slow down.

[edited for typos]

Charlie and the MAX

2010-06-30T15:41:00.000-07:00

Since fares are going up again September 1, and in honor of Neal McFarlane officially taking over the helm of TriMet--it's time to recycle a little ditty posted to portlandtransport.com last year--updated (and up-spiced) to take recent events into account, and to better reflect (ahem) the local culture. It's a satire of the infamous folk standard "M. T. A.", transplanted to the Portland area. The song, originally written as a campaign tune for a left-wing Boston mayoral candidate, later became a big hit in 1959 for the Kingston Trio. The band changed the name of the candidate in their version to avoid the appearance of endorsing a socialist politician, a big deal in the Red Scare area (even for a folk act). Nowadays, the fare card used by the MBTA (as Boston's transit agency is now known) is called "CharlieCard" in honor of the tune.

The Portland version takes a bit of artistic license: MAX uses of proof-of-payment rather than fare gates, and a zone system rather than any sort of exit fare collection. And I doubt that bojack will be running for mayor, though the fireworks in City Hall were that to occur would be spectacular. [Image courtesy of the Kinsgton Trio].

But anyhoo, here goes:

Let me tell you the story of a man named Charlie
And how he slipped through the city's cracks
He put two thirty in his pocket, kissed his live-in-lover
Went to ride on the Tri-Met MAX
Charlie bought himself a ticket at the Gateway Transit Center
And he changed at Pioneer Square
When he got there the inspector told him "one more nickel"
Charlie could not pay that fare!
And did he ever return, no he never returned
And his fate is still unlearned
He's doomed to ride forever on the rails of Portland
He's the man who never returned
Now all night long Charlie rides through the station
Thinking "What will become of me?"
"How can I afford to see my dealer in Gresham?
Or my bookie in Milwaukie?"
Charlie's girl goes down to the Rose Quarter station
Every day at quarter past two
And through the open window, she hands him a latte
As the train comes a-crawlin' through
Now commuters of Portland, isn't a scandal,
That the people have to pay the tax?
Fight the fare increase, vote for Jack Bogdanski
Help get Charlie off the Tri-Met MAX!
Or else he'll never return, no he'll never return
And his fate will be unlearned
He's doomed to ride forever on the rails of Portland
He's the man who never returned!

Transportation values, missions, and anti-missions

2010-06-30T00:57:00.000-07:00

Here in Portland, there's a transit advocacy organization called OPAL (Organizing People/Activating Leaders), which recently called for a major shift of the priorities of TriMet: away from future development of rail, and towards improving bus service. There are numerous similar organizations in cities around the country; the most (in)famous is probably the Los Angeles Bus Riders Union (though the latter organization takes many far more controversial positions than does OPAL). The point of this post is not to praise or criticize either organization, but to examine something more fundamental.

What OPAL is calling for is more than a simple change in funding allocation or transit planning strategies: they are calling for a realignment of TriMet's fundamental mission. From OPAL's website: "We need TriMet to prioritize working-class Portland, people who depend on our public transportation for access to the necessities of life." OPAL, and similar organizations, believe that social and/or economic justice (in practical terms, ensuring that adequate transit service is provided to the poor), ought to be one of TriMet's fundamental missions, if not the fundamental mission. While TriMet certainly does provide transit service to low-income neighborhoods, it would be difficult to argue that service to the poor is its primary mission.

Missions

In prior articles, the concept of transit values has been discussed--these are attributes of a transit system from which customers, or the public, derive some benefit. This article discussed and critiqued a University of Florida paper which sought to apply Maslow's Hierarchy to transit, this one responded to comments on the first (and to related articles elsewhere), and this one gave a detailed list of twenty-odd transit values, without regard to importance. The values listed in the latter paper were sorted into four broad categories suggested by Cap'n Transit; they are repeated here:

Availability values: Geographic coverage, temporal coverage, capacity, special accomodations.
Value values: Marginal cost, access cost, external costs, reliability, trip time, frequency, risk of accident, risk of crime.
Amenities values: Ease of use, understandability, ease of payment, en-route hassles, comfort.
Glamour values: Aesthetic/novelty issues, social status, self-actualization.

Whereas values all are specific attributes of a system, the mission(s) of a system (and of the responsibly agency) are the overall statement(s) of goals which the system is intended to accomplish. Whereas values reflect the how, the where, and the when; missions are the who, the what, and the why. In the context of transit agencies, the "what" is more or less the same--provide transit to the public; missions differ in the question of why the service is provided in the first place, and who should benefit. A mission, then, is the justification for the transportation service.

..and anti-missions

An anti-mission, if I may coin a term, is the same thing as a mission--a set of goals which the agency seeks to accomplish--but it's one that would be embarrassing to the agency if published. Few agencies actively seek out anti-misisons; but they are a common result of political pressure from various factions, of self-aggrandizing behavior by public officials, and in some cases, of corruption. In some cases, a goal or set of goals which are seen as beneficial in one locale may be seen as detrimental in another. The origin of the term anti-mission is explained at the bottom of the post.

It's also important to note that many agencies operate under constraints which prevent them from fulfilling their mission. Budgets must be balanced; credit, while available, is often limited in scope and hard to get, and few agencies have carte blanche to raise additional revenue through taxation. An agency's service footprint and revenue base may contains extensive areas of low-density sprawl which are difficult to serve efficiently, yet which must be provided service to maintain the revenue source. Even things like fares may be outside an agency's control. In addition, many external funding sources, in particular those in Washington DC, come with numerous strings attached; and cash-strapped transit authorities are generally more than happy to jump through the hoops necessary to bring home the dollars--even if requires doing projects in a manner that's outside the mission. It is useful to distinguish constraints from anti-missions. (One minor issue I have with organizations such as OPAL is that they frequently make demands of agencies which cannot be met without a radical restructuring of an agency's external environment--but offer little assistance with the work of performing that restructuring, instead taking a "that's your problem--you figure it out" approach. Sometimes it's an effective form of advocacy, but I often wonder if there aren't other ways to improve the situation for transit).

With all that in mind, we will now consider various missions and anti-missions (they are not identified as such--that is left as an exercise for the reader), and a rough ranking of the values implied by the mission. This article is US-centric, unfortunately. This article also generally assumes operation by a public entity, ostensibly for the common good--for private, for-profit operators, the only mission that truly matters is "make money", and the rest is an exercise in marketing. :)

So, without further ado, the list.

Comprehensive transit

The first mission we consider consider is comprehensive transit--transit for transit's sake, if you will. Many like to consider this mission the gold standard, asserting that its aims are based entirely on technocratic principles, rather than political compromises, interest-group politics, and other well-know attributes of the sausage factory. Comprehensive transit advocates generally pursue the values in the order set forth by Cap'n Transit: Availability, Value (to customers), Amenities, and Glamour concerns are last.
The problem with the "comprehensive transit" mission is that it's expensive to implement--and thus unrealistic in most places where there isn't widespread public support for transit. (There is, in many places, widespread public support for road construction, and thus many state DOTs do get to build "comprehensive systems as a result--a state of affairs which has got us where we are today). As a result, agencies typically find themselves pursuing one of the other missions (or anti-missions) listed in this article.

Social/economic justice

Next up is social and economic justice. In support of this mission, transit is deployed as a tool to primarily benefit traditionally-disadvantaged communities, such as the poor or minority groups. OPAL and BRU are both pursuing a social and economic justice mission (among other things), and take umbrage that TriMet and LACMTA don't necessarily share their priorities.
Values emphasized by this particular mission include low cost to users, good geographical coverage (emphasizing targeted neighborhoods and common destinations of the target groups), excellent temporal coverage (many of the working poor have jobs outside the normal daytime office shift), adequate capacity, and reliability and frequency of service. End-to-end speed is less of an issue, as is service to wealthier communities. Amenities and Glamour are unimportant. Many who advocate for social and economic justice are suspicious of capital-intensive infrastructure projects such as rail of any sort (other than as a capacity improvement along an overcrowded route), viewing these as attempts to cater to constituencies other than the poor or minority groups the agency ought to support.

Low cost transit

A mission which is superficially similar to social/economic justice in its values, but antithetical to it in its motivations, is the low cost transit mission. Here, the point is to provide the minimum level of service necessary to keep people on society's margins off more expensive forms of public support--or at is commonly (and indelicately) phrased, to get the poor to their jobs so they don't go on welfare. Many on the political right advocate this mission, and view transit as a necessary evil, rather than a valuable public good in its own right.
Low-cost transit advocates generally emphasize Availability issues such as coverage and capacity; and like social justice advocates, don't give a rip about Glamour and Amenities. Where they differ is in the Value category--whereas social justice advocates care about service quality; the low-cost advocate wants to minimize social cost. Many transit systems in the US (including the vast majority of small-city systems) are of this sort--both due to conservative politics, and also due to transit-unfriendly land uses, which make any other sort of transit prohibitively expensive. Given that, an aversion to capital costs or infrastructure of any sort causes low-cost advocates to invariably prefer local bus service (or BRT where demand warrants the additional capacity) to anything more expensive.

Environmentalism

The environmentalism mission is concerned, first and foremost, with improving environmental outcomes--lowering emissions and other forms of pollution (whether from vehicles or from energy sources external to the system), lowering energy usage, etc. Environmentalist advocates generally view comprehensive transit as an import goal. Zero-emissions vehicles are highly desired--a category which includes human-powered transportation, as well as movement away from combustion-powered vehicles. Reducing automobile trips, and opposition to the private automobile in general, is an important concern. In some cases, this is combined with social justice issues (OPAL also lists the environment as a key concern); in other cases, environmentalist transit goals may be motivated by a bourgeois constituency.

Externalized public costs such as pollution (and avoidance thereof) is the paramount concern; public costs captured as taxes, not so. Spending money on zero-emissions or high-capacity infrastructure is a common desire. Other Value attributes are also important, as are some Amenities and Glamour attributes--as reducing auto trips is a concern, advocates of environmentalist transit frequently seek to attract choice riders. Bourgeois advocates who are highly motivated may care less about comprehensive coverage, and neglect "social service" transit in favor of more productive routes--resulting in less comprehensive coverage.

Urbanism and community-building

The urbanism and community-building emphasizes the importance of land-use for transit outcomes, and the importance of transit in building liveable communities (by which is meant, among other things, urban land-use patterns such as high density and mixed use--and generally excludes much of suburbia). Transit is seen as an important part of the urban fabric, rather than as a service to be laid down on top of an already-built environment.

Urbanist transit values often express a preference for local forms of transit rather than regional ones; in many cases, trip-elimination rather than trip-accomodation is seen as an important goal. As a result, geographic coverage may suffer--the urbanist is generally not concerned with providing suburban service at all. Transit-oriented development (service to new communities designed to be transit-friendly, rather than to existing settlements) is also commonplace.

Like environmentalism advocates, there is a bourgeois faction to urbanism; which is often criticized for advocating "Starbucks urbanism" and neglecting the needs of the poor. This faction tends to place higher value on Amenities and Glamour, and has developed (at least in the US) an affinity for local-service, mixed-traffic streetcars, often on the grounds that busses will not attract ridership (due, of course, to insufficient Glamour). And with any sort of community-building or renewal project, especially those geared towards upper income levels, gentrification remains a key concern.

Premium service

The premium service mission is all about attracting choice riders who are extremely concerned about Glamour issues (particularly social status). In many ways, this mission inverts the traditional hierarchy and stands it on its apex. Premium-conscious riders view not mixing with the "wrong" crowd while on the bus or train as a key issue (often justifying it on safety concerns), and often view Amenities as important--in particular creature comforts, and other enhancements such as on-board Internet service. Ticket price is often less of an issue, though performance factors and safety remain important. Many Availability issues are unimportant however--limited geographic coverage (excluding the "bad" parts of town) is seen as an advantage, and high capacity isn't important to an exclusive audience. Many Premium riders prefer rail (though not always), and seating configurations are often optimized for maximum seated capacity rather than accommodating large numbers of standees.

Some transit agencies have discovered that offering such services at elevated prices is often a politically and financially sensible thing to do (assuming local traffic conditions are such that driving becomes an unattractive option). In the Portland area, both WES and C-Tran's express routes to Portland have been accused of targeting a luxury market (in the former case, bypassing a frequently-crowded parallel bus line). The travel industry has engaged in such price discrimination for years, of course.

Political patronage

OK, this one's an obvious anti-mission. Unlike other missions on this page whose political acceptability may depend on political context, virtually no transit agency will fess up to making choices designed to benefit political sponsors--at least not unless they can plead coercion. (And in some cases, agencies with noble intent may indeed be forced to accommodate rent-seeking power-brokers in order to remain intact). But it happens--and in some cases, in broad daylight.

When political patronage is an agency's mission, it seeks to benefit a wide variety of political backers: agency managers and politicians looking to pad their resumes with ribbon-cuttings, developers and landowners, vendors, tradespeople, and trade unions looking to have public money thrown their way. Few of the traditional customer-focused values truly matter; as neither the customer nor the public is the intended beneficiary; whatever values are politically popular will be offered up as justification. In general, though, the values which are cited include things like geographic coverage, capacity, and performance--all of which benefit from new infrastructure. Glamour issues are frequently cited as justification as well; builders of such projects will often cite the environment, or the alleged unpopularity of the lowly bus, as a reason for building more expensive forms of infrastructure. It is common for those pursuing a political patronage mission to pretend to be environmentalists and/or urbanists, and sometimes difficult for outsiders to tell the difference--however, the difference does exist. (One thing to look for: are the proponents of development actually interested in operating the new service, or merely in its construction?)

Labor patronage

In some ways, this is a subset of the political patronage mission discussed above, if one views transit unions as a "patron" in the same way as one might view developers or construction firms, then this becomes same racket, different customer. However, I'm treating labor patronage--where a key part of a transit agencies goals consist of providing high paying jobs to its employees--differently, because transit agencies in the thrall of labor act differently than those in the thrall of outside capital interests. (Note that labor here only includes an agency's own employees; not outside bargaining units such as construction unions--they are dealt with in the political patronage mission).

Whereas political patronage agencies are very infrastructure focus, agencies patronizing their own labor unions focus on operations--though again, not on providing service to the customer or the general public. Values which are cited include high availability and frequency--providing extensive coverage to all parts of the region at all times of the day. Reliability and end-to-end speed frequently suffer. Infrastructure improvements are frequently regarded with suspicion--construction of rail, for example, may be seen as a plot to downsize the workforce rather than as a strategy for improving the overall capacity or performance of the system. Local bus service is the mode of choice. Amenities and Glamour are generally unimportant.

In some cities (San Francisco comes to mind, where Muni's well-documented practices which result in lousy service nonetheless enjoy extensive political support), labor patronage is an open goal of a transit agency--however in many places, this is too regarded as an anti-mission. Whereas agencies pursuing a political patronage mission may instead pretend to be environmentalists or urbanists, agencies captured by labor unions instead frequently emulate a social justice agenda. (A common accusation against BRU is that it is a front for bus drivers--the organization does tend to side with transit unions in labor disputes).

Tourism

Tourism and special event coverage are seldom a fundamental mission for an urban transit agency--the bulk of the riders on a system will be local regulars--but it is an important mission for some parts of some transit coverage. Extra transit service for local events, such as football games, generally doesn't differ much from regular service, but tourist-oriented service may be another matter--and given the propensity of tourists to throw cash around, offer an excellent opportunity for price-discrimination.

Tourist-oriented service can be divided into two types--transit which is used by tourists to get places, and transit which frequently is the destination. Many cities operate special services, often branded differently, for ferrying tourists between lodging and popular destinations. And a few transit systems--ranging from well-known attractions like the San Francisco Cable Cars or the Seattle Monorail, to small-town operations like the Astoria Riverfront Trolley--are destinations in themselves; with tourists paying for round trips to nowhere (many of these also serve a useful transit function for locals as well).

In either cases, important values for tourists are ease of use/navigation, novelty or aesthetic values, safety, and comfort--though on "vintage" services, the latter is optional. Coverage and other Availability issues generally are not important. Tourists, being unfamiliar with a city, will not appreciate having to memorize a transit map or a timetable to get around; nor are they likely to be in possession of a transit pass or exact change (unless in whole units of the currency). This is an excellent way of practicing price discrimination, BTW--the cash fare on the SF cable cars is much higher (US$5) than for other Muni services, and transfers are not accepted; but there's no extra charge for passholders.

Rent-seeking

Our final mission occurs when a public agency decides to operate like a private one, and uses its position to engage in rent-seeking. Many transit agencies have monopolies on general-purpose transit within their region, and power to set fares--most of them set fares well below cost in order to attract ridership. Some, though, will actually attempt to profit from operations. Rent-seeking agencies are most likely to be found in cities whose socioeconomic or land use patterns encourage high degrees of transit use (and there's a large captive audience for whom switching to autos is not an option)--and where there is a great deal of corruption in the wider political culture. Rent-seeking agencies need to provide sufficient Availability to make the service tenable--but beyond that, aren't keen on providing any other types of value to passengers--especially things which might threaten the operation. Rent-seeking behavior can originate from a variety of factors--agencies which are dramatically underfunded; agencies explicitly chartered to earn revenue for a parent organization; or simple corruption.

Addendum

One final note, on the genesis of the term "anti-mission". In my field of professional expertise (computer programming), there was a movement in the 1990s known as the "design patterns" movement. Early research on the topic was done by a pair of Oregon-based programmers, Ward Cunningham and Kent Beck (the former of which designed a novel web-based collaboration tool hosted at his software consulting firm in furtherance of the effort--the first wiki). The seminal work in the field was Design Patterns: Elements of Reusable Object-Oriented Software, written by a quartet of computer scientists known as the "Gang of Four". The work on patterns, and much of the terminology, was borrowed from a similar concept in the field of architecture--specifically Christopher Alexander's opus A Pattern Language. In programming, a "design pattern" refers to a program fragment or structure which is beneficial and commonly repeated, but which is difficult to capture as a class or function or other programming abstraction. (If any other programmers are reading this, apologies for being rather imprecise).

Not soon after the Design Patterns book was published: AntiPatterns: Refactoring Software, Architectures, and Projects in Crisis, which instead of cataloging useful ideas, instead documented bad ideas which were commonly found in practice--a notion known as an anti-pattern. Anti-patterns are patterns; they're just ones that are bad for you. And so it is with anti-missions, my humble attempt to repay the fields of public works for a quite useful notion.

Driverless metros: All they are cracked up to be?

2010-06-27T17:30:00.000-07:00

For many transit activists, the "gold standard" of rapid transit is the driverless metro. While expensive to build, driverless systems are held to have a significant advantage over human-operated systems--the absence of a driver, and his/her salary and benefits. In the developed world, it is typically the case that a) labor is the predominant cost in transit operations, and b) most transit systems have a farebox recovery ratio of less than 100%--these two factors combined produce the result that in many systems, the limit on how much service can be provided isn't the amount of rolling stock or the capacity of the infrastructure, but the amount of operating subsidies which are available. By greatly reducing the operating subsidy (or in some cases, creating lines which turn a profit), a transit agency can offer much more frequent or comprehensive--and therefore more attractive--service.

The problem, of course, that driverless metro is expensive to build, and politically difficult to boot. Current automatic train operations systems are designed for a protected right-of-way--which generally means grade-separation. Allowing the public to cross the tracks seriously complicates things. And the driverless control systems themselves are expensive to design and install. An additional issue in many large cities, where the expense can be justified, is that transit unions are often sufficiently powerful to prevent driverless metros from being installed (labor is generally opposed to such systems, for obvious reasons) A third issue is public skepticism of the control technology--after the 2009 accident on the Washington Metro red line, blamed on a failed train-detection sensor (since repaired), the automatic train operation system has remained turned off. (The DC metro was never driverless, as operators were present on the train even when the ATO systems were enabled; but the switch to full-time manual operation has lowered system throughput). Despite the stated advantages of the technology, there are at present less than two dozen fully driverless rail systems in operation worldwide.

Say what?

However, the benefits of driverless metro, once installed and operational, are generally considered to be axiomatic by transit activists. Which is why I was astonished to find British Columbia transit activist "zweisystem", one of the contributors to the Rail for the Valley blog, make the following claim on a thread on the Transport Politic.

Jay, SkyTrain, being driverless doesn’t mean there is no one present on the metro system. Vancouver’s SkyTrain system has a large cadre of attendants who are on the train and at stations to maintain the integrity of the metro system. Added to this, we also have the SkyTrain police to counter increased crime on the metro system.
All driverless transit systems also maintain a Small army of electrical specialists, technicians and operators to keep the metro in operation. Unlike LRT, which has drivers, which can deal with small problems, on a driverless or automatic transit system, when a problem arises the metro stops until someone tell the computer it is safe to proceed. Sometimes this means an attendant must walk along the guide way to ensure there is no problem with the metro and is very time consuming.
SkyTrain has more employees (and higher operating costs) than LRT systems and what was once the flavour of the month in the 1980′s, is now reserved for the most heavily used metro lines in the world, where there are cost benefits with automatic operation.
Those who keep on proposing automatic metros for minor transit lines, really don’t know what they are talking about.

The thread was about Seattle's Link system, a light-rail system which is fully grade-separated (but not driverless). Zwei seems to be making two separate claims here:

The overhead of maintaining a driverless system cancels out any cost reduction from not having to pay drivers, except at very large scales (which the SkyTrain system allegedly doesn't meet)
The lack of drivers makes such systems (or at least SkyTrain in particular) less reliable, as many contingencies that could be handled by an on-board operator instead require a more difficult manual intervention, resulting in greater disruption of service.

Zweisystem is a bit of a controversial figure in many transit forums; generally due to his dogged opposition to SkyTrain expansion in the greater Vancouver. His opposition to SkyTrain stems from a variety of factors, but a significant complaint seems to be that BC authorities are spending a disproportionate amount of transit dollars in the metro Vancouver area, and neglecting the Fraser River valley east of Surrey. Furthermore, zwei claims that the expenses involved with SkyTrain leave little money for improving transit elsewhere in the province. Zwei frequently calls official TransLink statistics into question, and there have been other accusations of the system being the beneficiary of pork-barrel politics. I agree with zwei that commuter rail would make sense in the Fraser valley, should funding be available. Not being a British Columbian (or even a Canadian), I am neutral on the question of what provincial funding priorities for the province ought to be.

However, zwei's anti-SkyTrain advocacy frequently morphs into a general anti-metro (and pro-surface rail) position, independent of any specific application. Zwei has published numerous articles on the railforthevalley blog which underlie his claims: Several may be found here, here, here, and here. I generally consider such blanket praise (or condemnation) of a particular technology to be questionable--so with that in mind, let us consider each argument in turn.

Does driverless cost more?

Zwei's first claim is undoubtedly true if rephrased: Driverless systems incur a significant overhead--the staff needed to maintain the control systems and infrastructure (computer systems, track sensors, on-board control equipment). Some of these duties are essentially fixed, and other duties scale with the amount of trackage and rolling stock. There is some level of service--I don't know what, and it depends on many local factors, in particular the state of the labor market--below which driverless operation would be more expensive than manual operation, even if the capital costs could be ignored. This is true for many technology choices--there's a service level below which manual grade-separated metro doesn't make sense; there's a level below which surface rail doesn't make sense--and there's a level below which even plain local bus service is inefficient (and paratransit or dial-a-ride service would be more economical). This analysis focuses entirely on operational efficiency, it should be noted, and not on the quality of the service to passengers. (Were transit agencies to focus entirely on financial metrics, the logical outcome for most of them would be to cease operations altogether--obviously, not a desirable outcome for many reasons).

Some of the other roles zwei mentions--police, security, station attendants--perform functions which generally aren't performed by drivers on manually-operated rail systems. MAX operators, for instance, are not charged with duties such as customer service (beyond dealing with on-board incidents), fare collection/enforcement, giving directions, etc--they are focused on operating the trains. In addition, many of these roles, even if assumed to be required for a driverless system, scale with the amount of trackage or stations, not with the number of trains in service.

An important question to ask in any analysis: What is the marginal cost of train service? In other words, assuming that the rolling stock and line capacity exists, how much does it cost to add an additional train?

Zwei uses, for the foundation of his claims, an 1989 paper written by Gerald Fox (a fellow who was involved with the design of MAX) entitled A Comparison of Some New Light Rail and Automated Guideway Systems (abstract here, full paper appears to be unavailable in electronic form). The abstract, unfortunately, doesn't shed any light on the situation--it claims that LRT "may" offer lower operating costs than driverless systems, but not stating under what circumstances this is true. Given the advances in computer and control technology which have occurred in the two decades since the paper was written, and the changes in the labor market (public sector wages are generally higher compared to private-sector wages than was the case in 1989), what was true back in the 1980s may no longer be true in the 2010s.

What about SkyTrain?

Zwei is fond of comparing SkyTrain to C-Train, Calgary's excellent light-rail service, and one which has similar levels of ridership despite operating in a city half the size of metro Vancouver.

Currently, SkyTrain's Millennium and Expo lines operates peak service at 108 second intervals over their combined segment--a figure which is likely the capacity limit of the existing infrastructure. That's 33 trains an hour. C-Train's peak service frequency over its combined segment through downtown is less--presently 5 minutes (12tph), with plans to reduce peak headways to 3 minutes (20tph); the minimum possible headway is 2 minutes. Both systems peak headways are excellent; at these frequencies, adding trains becomes more of an issue of increasing capacity rather than improving service.

However, there is a significant difference in off-peak service: C-Train service frequencies reduce to 3-4 trains per hour during the off-peak hours; whereas SkyTrain's service frequency, on the Expo and Millenium Lines, never drops below 7.5 tph. Operations in off-peak hours aren't constrained by capacity; they're generally instead constrained by cost and staffing issues.

SkyTrain's Canada Line is another matter, unfortunately. Despite also being driverless, this line's peak headway (8 minutes) is no better than the off-peak headway of the other SkyTrain lines; and headway along the branches increases to 20 minutes during late-night hours. South of the Bridgeport Station, the line splits into two branches serving Richmond any Vancouver International Airport, respectively; these branches include significant single-track sections. OTOH, the decision not to run trains more frequently during off-peak hours is curious. Unlike the Expo/Millennium line, which runs diagonally across the street grid for a considerable distance, the Canada Line is much shorter and runs parallel to numerous city streets with excellent bus service.

Is driverless less reliable?

Zwei's second claim--that driverless metro is less reliable compared to other types of transit--also flies in the face of conventional wisdom. Zwei argues that driverless metro systems experience a longer recovery time from minor incidents (such as a passenger maliciously or accidentally pressing an alert button without a genuine emergency onboard), which could be handled more expeditiously with operators on board--turning them into major events affecting the system as a whole. (In particular, he suggests that many incidents require manual intervention from inspectors who must travel down the trackways on foot to reach a stopped train). Unfortunately, no reliability or availability statistics are provided by Zwei to support this claim.

Assuming zwei's observations are true (which, if they are, might be an issue with the particular implementation of SkyTrain--minor incidents which could be handled by an onboard operator can generally be handled remotely, including closed-circuit communication with passengers; and true failures of the trains, signals, or tracks are generally beyond the capability of a driver to resolve), one must balance these against the issue of human error causing a service disruption.

This paper reports on Paris' experience with driverless systems, and claims that the driverless portions of the Paris Metro have availabilities of 99.2-99.5%, with a significant part of the disruptions which do occur being caused by passenger misconduct. Paris opened its first driverless line (a rubber-tired metro) in the 1990s, and has been converting many of its existing rail subway lines to driverless operation over the years; and the experiences of both the operator and the public has generally been positive.

The preceding observations don't take into account the issues with surface-running rail; where service disruptions caused by collisions, track blockages, etc. are more likely to occur. (Surface rail cannot be made driverless with the current state-of-the-art in control technology).

In many ways, this line of argument is a common one in the transit industry--more complicated (and expensive) systems which are capable of higher performance under normal circumstances, are frequently held to be more subject to severe service disruptions than are systems which are lower-tech or more distributed. Similar arguments are frequently made in support of busses and against rail--busses can simply drive around any incidents; whereas major incidents on rail lines often take the entire line out of service (and typically resort in the deployment of busses to ferry passengers around the affected section of track).

Thoughts

There are many valid criticisms to be made of TransLink, and of BC provincial government. There are also many valid criticisms to be made of the SkyTrain system. However, the more general conclusion that metros are bad (driverless or otherwise), except in cities of New York or London scale, doesn't seem to hold water. Is Portland "ready" for a system such as SkyTrain? Probably not--out transit patterns are too downtown-focused, and the Portland metro area is too auto-centric outside the inner city. If the population continues to grow, and the newcomers are accommodated by increasing density rather than by sprawling outwards, then maybe--but today, the present system is probably adequate. (Conversion to a more metro-like system will probably occur in phases, such as construction of a downtown tunnel to bypass the slow slog through downtown streets that MAX presently makes). But for other cities which more transit-friendly densities, fully grade-separated metro is an option that makes sense; and driverless operation then becomes an option worth considering.

Lake Oswego transit DEIS slips to September

2010-06-24T22:13:00.000-07:00

Earlier indications from Metro would be that the DEIS for the Lake Oswego transit project would be coming out soon ("summer"), appear to be off the mark. Today, Metro issued a statement setting forth a new timeline for completion of the DEIS work, and selection of the locally preferred alternative. Metro also published a fact sheet giving more details.

According to the new schedule, the DEIS will be published in September, at which point there will be a 45-day public comment period, with the LPA selected in the November-December timeframe.

According to some commenters here who have been following the project closely, some of the published data in the current planning documents has run aground on the sharp rocks of reality--one hopes that the DEIS will reflect these findings. (And one hopes that the public comment period isn't entirely for show...)