Transit minimalism, and why the left and the right frequently come together to oppose rail

The Milwaukie MAX project, and its escalating costs and increasingly unstable funding, has become a prime target of criticism.  While I'm critical of quite a few particulars of the project (its cost, for one; it's routing, for another)--most of my criticisms center around particulars of the project itself and the current economic climate.  I think the corridor in question needs to have rapid transit of some form--by which I mean "real" rapid transit that runs mostly (if not completely) in an exclusive right-of-way.  Rail or bus is a secondary concern.

However, much of the criticism of the project goes well-beyond the details of Milwaukie MAX, and instead takes the form of an outright anti-rail position.  Several different identifiable factions have been advancing anti-rail positions, asserting that TriMet ought to cancel the project outright, and not advance any other rail projects for the foreseeable future.  (Occasionally one even sees the suggestion that the existing MAX lines ought to be dismantled and replaced with something else; a position I won't consider further).  Many of these factions have entirely different motivations and goals--in some cases, they even conflict--but their positions all lead them to the same conclusion.

The positions in question, and several others, were previously discussed in this post on transit agency missions; here we focus on only three.  Some of the criticisms discussed herein extend to other forms of rapid transit as well, such as BRT; others are rail-specific.

Social justice

One common set of light-rail critics are to be found in the community of activists desiring social and economic justice.   A prominent such organization in Portland is OPAL (Organizing People/Activating Leaders), which has, on numerous occasions, called for TriMet to halt future light rail constructions and instead provide more bus service.  OPAL's John Ostar, speaking to TriMet on the proposed property tax levy now on the November ballot, had this to say:

What we're doing – what you're doing, essentially, is requiring voters to pass bonds for absolutely essentially service, essential infrastructure, basic infrastructure. Things that we have payroll tax revenue to pay for. But instead, we're now using that payroll tax revenue to pay for non-essential service – light rail - and requiring voters to pass bond measures to pay for essential service. I think that we have it backwards.

Emphasis added by me.  Clearly, Ostar considers light rail to be a "non-essential" service--an interesting position to take given that 1/3 of unlinked trips are on MAX and not bus.  But when you consider what OPAL considers important, and what they do not, it makes perfect sense:

• OPAL, and similar advocates, think that a key part of TriMet's mission ought to be providing transit to the "transit-dependent"--people who cannot afford an automobile, or who otherwise cannot drive.  Given that the transit-dependent (and their destinations) are often widely-dispersed in the region, that leads to service patterns which require coverage of a large area rather than focusing on a smaller corridor--a pattern of service that is easier to provide with busses (and in many cases, with paratransit).
• Poverty advocates are generally less concerned with attracting "choice riders", providing extensive service to wealthier parts of town, increasing transit's mode share, or using transit as a land-use tool.  Amenities beyond basic coverage and service frequency/speed/reliability are deemed unimportant.  They are especially  wary of anything that looks or smells like gentrification--almost always a bad thing if you're poor.  (Your neighborhood might improve, but you won't be able to afford it anymore).  Many of the stated goals of rapid transit--especially rail--are simply unimportant to advocates to the poor, and some are viewed with hostility.
• Many poverty advocates are generally distrustful of government--which is often seen as in the hands of the wealthy and powerful, and inherently indifferent (or hostile) to the interests of the disadvantaged.   Such advocates, when a large project is proposed by the government, frequently start to smell a rat.

In a world with unlimited funding (or at least in one in which comprehensive, quality bus service is provided), I suspect that capital-intensive projects would not raise much objections among the social justice community--especially if the projects were demonstrated to improve service in ways that were considered important--but in a limited funding environment, any concentration of resources on a particular corridor is problematic--especially if the result of such concentration is higher rents along the line.

Economic conservatives

A second group who can be counted on to oppose capital transit projects are what I'll call "economic conservatives"--a group which includes libertarians, many Republicans, and a broader spectrum of the population that objects to high(er) taxes for services they consider to be wasteful or non-essential.  Motivations can range from ideological ("transit shouldn't be provided by the government"), to financial ("I don't want to pay for transit I don't intend to use"), to skepticism concerning particular agencies ("Sam Adams/TriMet/Metro are all crooks"), to hostility toward the community of transit users ("Those damn hippies ought to get a job and buy a car like the rest of us").  This community also includes a fair amount of lobbyists for industries (auto, petrochemical) which frequently regard transit as competition.  With the financial crisis and economic downturn, calls for greater fiscal austerity ("light rail is a luxury we can't afford") get added to the mix. 
The overriding concern for this group is that dedicated-ROW rapid transit, particularly rail, is too expensive.  While some in this group would eliminate public transit altogether, there is a significant faction that supports what I call "subsistence transit"--transit that provides basic mobility to those who have no other choice, but of a quality which is so low that only the desperate (or dedicated) would use it.  Almost invariably, this means POBS ("plain old bus service"), usually running at low frequencies--virtually any capital improvement to the system or attempt to provide frequent service (other than in places and times where the busses are crowded otherwise) is, by definition, superfluous.  This may superficially appear to be similar to the social justice position--which also isn't interested in expansive service--but differs in several important ways.  Where as the social justice advocate generally wants to provide decent transit to the communities s/he represents, those supporting subsistence transit generally care first and foremost about cost.
While some conservatives do generally care about (and will defend) basic levels of transit service; there are others who want to do away with it altogether--and frequently use the characteristics of "social service" transit to attack transit.  Social service transit is inefficient by its nature (the busses are often empty); and that is used to advance arguments that the transit agency is incompetent (otherwise the busses would be full!), or that transit is not environmentally friendly (an empty bus is less fuel-efficient than a single-occupant automobile, after all), or that it's wasteful because hardly anyone uses it (which is, after all, the point).
Conservatives are also frequently skeptical about politics and government in general--especially in large cities, where the political scene is often dominated by liberals.  Charges that rapid transit projects are exercises in "social engineering", or represent forthcoming Soviet-style totalitarianism, or are intended to enrich labor unions, are common.

Speaking of unions...

A third constituency which is often hostile to rapid transit, especially rail, is transit unions--and the reason is obvious:  Jobs.  The biggest operating cost for transit agencies is labor; and one of the selling points of rapid transit--especially rail--is that you can provide the same capacity and service levels with fewer payroll hours.  While this can mean increases in service without corresponding increases in labor cost, in practice it often means reductions in hours, or layoffs.  And while some transit agencies (such as Muni in San Francisco) are notoriously labor-friendly, in most cases, the agency and its workforce have a relationship that is at least somewhat antagonistic.

What do these all have in common?

What do these positions have in common?  Several things:

• A belief that the specific benefits provided by rapid transit are unimportant, and thus not worth spending money on.
• A desire for transit minimalism--lack of interest in increasing ridership or service beyond some baseline level which is held to be "good enough"; in particular, a lack of interest in attracting "choice riders" to the system.
• A lack of confidence in transit management/governance, often causing disbelief in the stated goals of the project(s) in question, and/or the projections concerning population growth, future ridership demands, and future revenue used to justify such projects.  In many cases, this is expressed as a public officials are acting in bad faith.

Of course, the different groups have lots of things which are not in common--fundamentally, social justice advocates are interested in service quality; conservatives in minimizing public costs; and labor advocates in maintaining payrolls and jobs.  These things are all somewhat in conflict--if you reduce the budget, you either have to slash service (and hours) or wages.  Increase wages, and either revenue must increase or service must be cut.  And increasing service requires either new revenue, or wage concessions. But in all cases, there is a fear that if money is diverted from the taxpayers, or existing uses, to fund new capital construction--that there won't be any return on that investment or expenditure.   And driving that fear, in many cases, is a lack of trust in the transit agency.

When someone makes a statement that light rail is not an "essential service", or that it is "anti-transit"--it is good to ask of them what their vision for the transit system is.  Chances are, their vision is one of minimalism--they believe that transit has a limited (and specific) role to play in the overall economy and infrastructure of a place, and that attempts at expansion are out of line.

A few final thoughts

Many transit activists, including yours truly, don't subscribe to the minimalist philosophy.  After all, we (as a society) haven't practiced minimalism when it comes to road-building over the past century--there's scarcely a capacity problem on the roads that doesn't provoke calls to build more of them.  And the result is a mess--and will become a larger mess the next time gas heads north of $4 a gallon.  I'm not a maximalist, either--I'm fully cognizant of the political and financial constraints which are in place, and believe that projects need to undergo public scrutiny.

However, the absolutist positions expressed by some, are extensively troubling.  They're political arguments couched as technical arguments.  (This is true for light-rail supporters as well).  It's far more open and honest to say things such as "I think TriMet should focus on social service to the poor, and not on trying to attract motorists from their cars", rather than attacking a particular mode choice as unsound.  It's better to have an open debate about values--what sort of service should be provided, then cloud that debate in pissing matches about bus vs rail.  Because that's what the debate is really about.  Arguments about mode choice are really arguments about values, and the vast majority of participants in transit blogs (including myself) have only a superficial understanding about the limitations of various technologies--often colored by what TriMet (or whoever the local transit agency is) does in practice. 

Transit and safety

Over at portlandtransport.com, a frequent poster who is a harsh TriMet critic posted a news item concerning a recent act of violence involving the MAX system.  Apparently, a pair of hoodlums were having a smoke at Gateway TC, when a TriMet employee and an off-duty deputy (who flashed a badge at 'em) told them to put it out.  They did, but got on the same southbound Green Line train as the deputy, and after the cop got off the train at Clackamas Town Center, the two men jumped him.  The attackers were quickly subdued and arrested, but the deputy suffered a few minor injuries.

The thread quickly turned into a heated debate about transit safety, or Why (Everyone Thinks) Transit Is Dangerous.  The incident is an isolated one, no civilians were injured, and the security personnel involved did their jobs.  Yet the attack was featured on no less than three different evening news programs, and prompted a few of the local anti-transit advocates to fan the "TriMet is unsafe" flames.  (Disclaimer:  Some of the content here was taken from my comments on that thread...I'm a sucker for a good heated debate).

Is TriMet dangerous?

The safety of TriMet has been in the news quite a bit.  There are two essential components of safety--risk of accidents, and risk of crime--and TriMet has attracted much bad press (some of it deserved) on both counts.  A series of high-profile attacks on the Eastside Blue Line a few years back prompted TriMet to install fare gates at some platforms (the system mainly runs on the proof-of-payment system; the fare gates are intended to keep thugs off the line under the theory that potential violent offenders are also likely fare-jumpers).  Recently, the Clackamas County Sheriff complained that crime had risen in the vicinity of Clackamas Town Center since the Green Line opened.  TriMet disputes these claims, and portlandtransport.com has been trying to get clarification on these claims--including information as to whether apprehended miscreants were (ab)using MAX, or whether the new park-and-ride is an attractive target for thieves, or whether this is just a result of increased traffic, increased law enforcement presence, or coincidence.  It's worth noting that the sheriff has publicly complained about tax-increment financing for the Milwaukie Line, so there's some evidence of a strained relationship between his department and TriMet.

TriMet has been fortunate in that it has not experienced any accidents resulting in serious injury to passengers in quite a while.  However, pedestrians and cyclists have not been as fortunate, and there have been several incidents in recent years of walkers and bikers being struck by busses and trains--in some cases, the fault of the operator, in others, the fault of the person struck.  After the April 2010 accident where a bus ran down five pedestrians in a crosswalk, killing two, the agency engaged in much navel-gazing, culminating with the appointment of a director of safety; who reports directly to the general manager.    

Or are standards too high?

Certainly, TriMet has had problems.  But are expectations too high for the agency (or conversely, too low for other forms of transport?

One common area of criticism from many critics is that the agency doesn't "do enough" to promote safety.  There are often calls for the agency to hire more security and more fare inspectors, to install fare gates on more of the system, or to even close stations in blighted areas.  Often, such calls come with the expectation that the cost of this will be borne by the agency and its passengers--not by additional tax increases beyond what the agency already receives--implying that the difference will need to be made up by lesser service, higher fares, or both.

But is this fair?  States, counties, and local governments in Oregon spend hundreds of millions, if not billions, on police officers (and other emergency responders) designated to traffic patrol--essentially, security services for roads and highways.  The Oregon State Police patrol division--which doesn't do anything but patrol the state highways of Oregon--has a budget of over $100 million.  The thirty-six county sheriffs and numerous municipal police departments in the state likewise devote considerable resources not to crime prevention or investigation, but to nabbing speeders and drunks and cleaning up accidents.  And virtually all of this police work is paid for out of the general fund.  There aren't suggestions that ODOT ought to pay for the OSP Patrol Division out of gas tax proceeds (in fact, OSP was funded by gas taxes in the past, but the law was changed twenty years ago).  Patrolling the highways and byways (and many other public speces) is generally assumed to be part of the job description of police--they just do it.  However, patrolling transit is treated by many law enforcement agencies like a budget-busting headache.

Of course, the "transit is dangerous" meme is an old one.  There are some places where public transit is (or was at one point) the exclusive province of the poor, and violent incidents on bus lines or subways are not uncommon.  Many people are uncomfortable travelling with other demographic groups, and this discomfort is often perceived as a safety issue.  Even in New York City, where busses and trains run every few minutes, you can get anywhere on transit, and driving is miserable--there are lots of residents who use taxis to get around.

A question of structure

But this debate poses an interesting question:  Why has there been complaints from law enforcement about servicing transit, when you don't hear the same complaints uttered about patrolling parks, highways, local streets and sidewalks, shopping malls, and other public (and quasi-public) places? 

Part of the issue might be one of structure.  There are several different arrangements by which public services (public works, police, fire, transit, schools, ports, utilities, etc.) can be provided by the government:

• As a department within "general" government (a city, state, county, or national government agency)--where the head of the department in question reports to, and serves at the pleasure of, elected officials.
• As a department within a larger general government, where the department head is him/herself an elected official; a common example in Oregon are county sheriffs.  
• As a "special district", separate from any mainline government agency, where a board of directors is elected by the voters, and in turn hires a manager, approves budgets, etc.
• As a commission, or similar arrangement, where an independent agency has directors which are appointed by an elected official.  Unlike department heads, who serve at the pleasure of their superiors in mainline government, the commissioners in such an arrangement are often appointed for fixed terms, and in many cases cannot be removed without due process (and generally not without cause).

Many public services can also be provided by the private sector; those arrangements aren't relevant to this post.

In a post at The Urbanophile, Aaron Renn mentioned an article concerning mergers among fire departments in the Midwest, and whether that would produce cost savings or not.  He concluded his remarks with this:

I’m generally all in favor of eliminating non-general purpose units of governments that aren’t controlled by elected officials of a real government that people actually care about (e.g., a city or county). But not for merger related savings, which don’t seem to exist. 

In a comment, he added the following:

I do dislike special districts that aren’t accountable. Indiana township government is a perfect example. Indiana townships are not general purpose governments. They provide only certain functions like poor relief and fire departments (mostly in rural areas). They are controlled by their own elected officials, who operate largely out of sight, out of mind with the public. Unsurprisingly, the trustees and boards who run them do so as if they were personal fiefs, often employing relatives, and giving themselves generous pay and benefits for almost no work. Center Township in Indianapolis, for example, which is entirely inside the city limits, has amassed a huge property portfolio and over $10 million in cash for no apparent purpose.

Schools are another interesting one. They are often a similar case. I support mayoral control of schools, generally.

This old school notion of Tocquevillian style government with a plethora of elected officials and a patchwork of jurisdictions is simply not relevant in the current era. For sure it doesn’t work, or get the benefits that Tocqueville saw from it today. I do happen to think there’s a loss there. For example, we’ve seen the rise of the political class versus the citizen government ideal of old. But we can’t roll back the clock, and today’s urban scale is very different from the past.

In general, my preference is for competent governance.  Muni is subordinate to the city of San Francisco, and the service their stinks in large part because city government is famously dysfunctional.  However, Renn has a point.  Many special districts are run by officials who are elected in noncompetitive elections that nobody cares about.

But another issue, that is relevant to this post--is that in Oregon, transit authorities are generally special districts (TriMet is run by a governor-appointed commission); whereas the police and public works are generally part of mainline government.  While Metro and other MPOs can help bridge differences; it often remains the case that public agencies which are not part of a common reporting structure will have different organizational missions and goals.  Communication may be deficient--as nobody is responsible for the intersection of the services provided.  They may compete with each for public resources, and in some cases, may actively try to undermine each other.  Such arguments may occur within mainline government of course, but when two departments are part of the same larger organization; there is a built-in means for resolving such disputes. 

This arrangement can have consequences beyond law enforcement complaining about the cost of patrolling transit.  Jarrett blogs about a recent event in Ottawa, wherein construction crews tore up a downtown stretch of the Ottawa Transitway, without informing the transit agency--resulting in a major disruption of bus service.  And many efforts to install BRT are routinely stymied by public works departments, who view signal priority for busses with hostility--understandable, as their organizational mission is often centered on efficiently moving cars.

Funding and the either/or fallacy

There's been a fascinating and extensive debate over at humantransit.org on competing proposals for how to improve transit along the Broadway corridor in Vancouver, BC.  Broadway street is a major east-west thoroughfare through the heart of the city (which is to say not through downtown, as downtown Vancouver is at the city's northern edge, across False Creek),  presently served by extremely-crowded bus lines.  This is one place where a legit claim can be made that rail is absolutely needed for capacity reasons.  The two competing visions for the corridor are a network of surface rail lines, on Broadway and the surrounding streets, presumably running in a dedicated right-of-way; or an westward extension of the Millennium Line of Skytrain.  While I lean towards the Skytrain solution, this is a Vancouver issue so my opinion on the matter is neither particularly strong nor particularly relevant.

What becomes apparent from listening to the debate, though, is that the two solutions are designed to serve different needs.  Skytrain supporters are interested in comprehensive regional transit; they want to get from UBC to the Canada Line or to Vancouver's eastern suburbs quickly.  Surface rail supporters are interested in community-building; they want to improve the quality of their neighborhood.  (Similar debates occur in Portland with regard to MAX and the Portland Streetcar--and ironically, the pro-surface-rail proposal sites Portland Streetcar as a model).  But not only are the two solutions designed to serve different needs, there's no inherent incompatibility between them.  There's no particular reason that Vancouver couldn't extent the Millennium Line all the way out to the University, and build streetcar lines to replace the busiest bus lines.

Except for money.




One big problem with these debates is many of them assume, a priori, a world of limited funding. Of course, that's a valid assumption in most cases (it is the world we live in, after all), but it often has the affect of chilling debate by forcing advocates to stake out either/or positions: In the present instance,  its either surface rail down Broadway or SkyTrain; but "both" appears to be out of the question. In Portland, we see calls to postpone or kill the Milwaukie MAX line not because the project lacks merit, but because many would rather use the money for something else they consider more important--such as preserving and extending bus operations.  Rather than viewing MAX as an important part of the transit system, it's viewed as a threat to other needs, and vice versa.

But obviously, we cannot pretend that we live in an unlimited-funding universe.  There will always be more worthwhile projects to pursue than money to pay for them--and that would remain true even if transit were funded as it ought to be.

Professional planning agencies have to deal with this as part of their jobs--and they have fairly effective methodologies for racking and stacking projects:  Rather than taking an either/or point of view, the potential projects that can be done are each considered and ranked.  Projects aren't ranked in isolation--in practice, there are far too many interdependencies to do that effectively--but they do specify different funding scenarios, and list which projects have to get done even in a limited funding environment, vs which ones only get done if money falls from trees, vs which ones aren't worthwhile in any case.

The advantages of doing business this way are obvious:  For one thing, you don't alienate potential allies quite as quickly.  For another, this allows all the needs of a region to be given fair consideration.  For a third, if the homework is done properly, and there are high-priority projects which nonetheless can't fit into a limited funding scenario, it gives leaders and activists a stronger case to seek out additional funding.  It's hard for an activist to make the case that we need more money to build whatever, when the same activist has been busy denouncing whatever as a ridiculous boondoggle--when he's not really opposed to the project on its own merits; but simply wants to preserve the funding for something else.

[Edited for links and minor additional commentary]

The Columbia River Crossing, and the role of state DOTs

[Image courtesy of CRC]

This blog, so far, has avoided serious comment about one of the most controversial projects being considered for the Portland metro area--the Columbia River Crossing.  Recently, I wrote about a blog comment concerning the advisability of adding MAX service to the project, in order to make a point in the bus/rail debate, but I haven't blogged about the CRC itself.  Now, it's time to correct that oversight.

The CRC project organization, which is jointly run by the Oregon and Washington Departments of Transportation (ODOT and WSDOT), recently published a proposed design for a replacement of the Interstate Bridge (an ancient pair of drawbridges which carry Interstate 5 over the Columbia River).  The price tag for the proposed design:  over US$4 billion.  Hardly anybody on either side of the river likes the proposed design, especially in the two cities (Portland, OR, and Vancouver, WA) which are directly affected by the project. 

The proposed design

The proposed design includes the following features:

• Rebuilding I-5 to modern design standards for about 5 miles--essentially from the Interstate Ave. interchange in Oregon, up to SR500 in Washington; this requires construction of quite a few C/D lanes and braided ramps and such.
• Three "through" auto lanes, and three "auxiliary" lanes, in each direction across the main span.  The auxiliary lanes are lanes which sooner or later you'll have to exit if you use them (though the freeway is always 8 lanes wide through the project area, except at the ends), while the "through" lanes are continuous.  On the main span of the bridge, all six lanes in each direction are on a single carriageway; there is no segregation into highway and C/D lanes.  (A recent revision to the proposal includes only 2 auxiliary lanes per direction rather than three, but keeps some of the other controversial features of the project)
• Below the highway lanes will be a facility for pedestrians and bicycles, and two "transit lanes", which will contain light rail.  (AFAIK, it will be trains only; not a combined rail/bus facility like the Caruthers bridge which is part of the Milwaukie MAX project).
• The impacts on Hayden Island, an island in the Columbia (part of Oregon, as it is south of the main channel) will be particularly server.  The I-5 interchange on the Island will be kept, but significantly redesigned.   Rather than the treacherous "trumpet" interchange (with short ramps) that currently sits there, a braided ramp confiuration will be added, which will also include ramp structures crossing the Columbia Slough for accessing Marine Drive and OR99E.  The effective footprint on Hayden Island will be 22 lanes.  As is the case today, road access to Hayden Island will require use of I-5. (The picture at the top of this post is an illustration of what this might look like--it appears that a giant aircraft carrier was parked in the middle of the island).

What's wrong?

Most people in the community recognize the need to do something.  The Interstate Bridge is functionally obsolete.  It's a major bottleneck for traffic, especially during the afternoon commute.  The connecting ramps are dangerous, particularly the onramps from Hayden Island onto I-5 north, and from SR14 onto I-5 south.  The pedestrian facilities on the existing are downright scary; there's no dedicated transit infrastructure at all, and the bridge must occasionally lift for river traffic.   And the combination of the drawspans of the Interstate Bridge, and the BNSF rail bridge a short distance downstream, make river navigation difficult for large vessels.  There's also some structural concerns:  although the bridges are not yet structurally obsolete, extensive work would be needed to bring them to modern structural standards.  There's a large consensus that the status quo is not acceptable.

But there's little agreement among local stakeholders (even ignoring the DOTs for now) on what needs to be done.  There is rampant sticker shock at the $4 billion pricetag on both sides of the river; and calls to scale back the design--but the sticking point is just what ought to be removed.

We don't need no stinking freeway

Many in Portland's transit and urbanist communities view the Interstate Bridge as an important chokepoint with which to discourage automobile use, and don't want to see any highway capacity added, other than what's absolutely necessary for safety.  Portland's urbanistas, while disliking suburbia in general, hold special disdain for the community across the river which is often derisively called "Vantucky" (and worse), and viewed as a gaping loophole in Oregon's land use laws (and Metro's implementation thereof).  Expanding freeway capacity into The Couv (what Vancouverites often call their city--a term which has the added benefit of only referring to Vancouver, WA and not Vancouver, BC; a persistently annoying ambiguity in the Pacific Northwest) would only encourage more urban sprawl across the river, they say, and the sort of capital flight that has devastated many cities elsewhere in the country.  (More than a few would be happy if the Interstate Bridge were to fall down into the river).

Another concern that Oregonians have, and one less politically sensitive, is the concern that widening the bridge will simply move the southbound bottleneck on I-5 a few miles further south, into downtown Portland--necessitating a costly rebuild of Portland's downtown core.  (In the Rose Quarter area, I-5 reduces to only two lanes in each direction).   And the eastbank freeway, as I-5 is known in downtown, is highly unpopular, and a favorite target of urbanists who would prefer to see it buried (or removed altogether).

We don't need no stinking tolls

Across the river, many in Vancouver naturally resent being viewed as Portland's Oakland.  Vancouverites, like many suburban-dwellers, don't consider their chosen lifestyle to be illegitimate in the least.  Many consider the problems of cities to be the problems of cities--not their concern.  And many in Vancouver are openly skeptical about Portland's famously liberal political consensus (and recently, famously dysfunctional city politics).   They aren't terribly interested in Portland's transit system or enviro-urbanist agenda--and are primarily concerned about the cost of the project.  This is especially important on the Washington side since tolls are a significant part of the proposed funding package.  Vancouver residents enjoy an advantageous tax situation, in that Washington has no state income tax (and very low property taxes), financing government primarily through sales taxes; whereas Oregon has no sales tax.  Thus many Vancouverites cross the river to shop in Oregon.  (Many also work in the Beaver State; though those who do are subject to Oregon state income tax).  Tolling is seen as an unfair surcharge on those who live on the north side of the river; and thus many Vancouverites see reducing the scope of the project--and thus the cost--as a key priority.  (The recent mayoral election in Vancouver turned on the question of bridge tolls; with the incumbent mayor losing re-election to a candidate who focuses on the issue of tolling).

The prospect of tolls also brings about concerns that traffic would be simply shifted to the Glenn Jackson bridge instead; particularly N/S through traffic, and traffic from the E. Vancouver area.    Tolling I-205 was proposed as a solution to this issue (the Glenn Jackson bridge, about seven miles upstream, is not part of the project); however it seems to be the opinion that this is not legally permissible.   This state of affairs in Clackamas County, to Portland's south, worried.

The result of this is that many in Portland want to see the highway features of the design reduced in scope.  A popular alternate proposal is for a seismic retrofit of the existing bridges, removal of many of the interchanges (including the dangerous Hayden Island ramps), and construction of a "supplemental bridge" which would connect Vancouver's downtown street network with Hayden Island and Portland streets such as MLK and Interstate, and provide transit, pedestrian, and bicycle facilities.  Many in Vancouver, OTOH, want the highway capacity, and would just as soon jettison the light rail lines--noting that the tracks would only go a short distance into Vancouver.

The devil's in the DOTails

If the issue were merely a disagreement between two cities (located in two different states) on urban vision, that would be one thing.  But the two state DOTs, who are responsible for maintaining I-5 and have been managing the project, seem determined to build a big megafreeway.  A common allegation is that the acceptance criteria set forth in the purpose and need statement were carefully crafted to exclude any solution other than a big megafreeway, and as a result--a big megafreeway is what the engineers came up with.   And now, the DOTs are (allegedly) playing "chicken" with the project--claiming that it's too late to make any material changes, lest the funding window for federal dollars close (the project is slated to receive funding from USDOT's Corridors of the Future program).  The city of Portland, in particular, is calling that bluff; and actually hired its own engineering firm to review the project.  Metro has been challenging the state DOTs in unusually blunt language as well, with outgoing Metro president David Bragdon suggesting that the CRC project team "get real". 

The project's design is severely constrained by several other factors:  the need to maintain a Columbia River shipping channel compatible with the BNSF rail bridge a short distance downstream, and the need to not affect the flight paths going in and out of Pearson Airpark in Vancouver (and to a lesser extent, PDX).   Until recently, Portland mayor Sam Adams also stressed the need for a "signature design" (a demand that the bridge be architecturally significant), a position that struck many as self-aggrandizement and placement of form over function--especially given the height restrictions which prevent the construction of towering arches or suspension systems.  (The proposed design, with box/girder construction, has also been criticized for being ugly).  As Adams has been politically weakened by a sex scandal, this concern has faded to the background, but still lingers.


A major issue with having state DOTs maintaining urban infrastructure, is that many of them are institutionally programmed to the "mobility" side of the mobility-access continuum.  Despite the multi-modal nature suggested by the name "department of transportation"; the primary responsibility for DOTs in most US states is building, maintaining, and regulating highways, often focused on smooth and timely passage of freight.  Other modes of regional or long-haul transportation--aviation, railroads, and navigation (whether on inland waterways or at sea) have long been primarily overseen by the Federal government, as are interstate motor carriers.  Local transportation links (including transit), on the other hand are generally handled by local communities.  Building highways is what DOTs are best at; and this role emphasizes throughput and mobility over local concerns such as access and community integration.  A big problem with freeways, generally, is that many of them don't really serve the communities they pass through; instead they simply disrupt them. 


It should be noted that this state of affairs exists despite having relatively transit-friendly administrations in Salem and Olympia.  Democrats occupy the governor's office in both Oregon and Washington, and control the legislatures of both states as well.  While both states have bicameral legislatures (the norm in the United States); both the upper and lower legislative houses in the two states are allocated based on population, not political subdivision.  (Many state Senates, as well as the US Senate;The US Senate assigns equal representation to political subdivisions regardless of population; a state of affairs which allows rural interests to dominate; for example, Alaska and New York each have the same number of US Senators--two). 


The good news

This project is a classic case of the paralysis that can result when state-level entities such as DOTs manage urban infrastructure projects.  The CRC is a particularly complex case, involving DOTs, MPOs, transit authorities, counties, and cities from two states and not just one.  Given that the project crosses a navigable waterway, is in close proximity to two airports, and even lies adjacent to a national park facility (Fort Vancouver); there are numerous Federal agencies involved as well, including several beyond the usual suspects.  There are many different players, all with different goals for the project, all playing hardball, and no supervising organization with the capability (or the authority) to solve the political conflicts necessary to generate reasonable requirements that are acceptable.   (Kind of reminds me of healthcare reform, actually).  Right now, many of the parties are perfectly happy to not cooperate, and to threaten to block any proposal which doesn't meet their specific needs.  (An ODOT official was actually quoted stating that Portland wouldn't be permitted to expand light rail across the Columbia unless as part of a larger highway project; and of course many in Portland hold the same attitude in reverse towards freeway expansion).

Whether this circle can be successfully squared remains to be seen.  The good news is that the DOTs are starting to get the message, so there's hope that a reasonable design can be produced.  OTOH, even if the DOTs let the two cities and their respective MPOs take the lead, there's bound to be friction given the apparent clash in values.

[Edited for correction as noted in comments]

TriMet and the quest for a Transit Professional (updated)

Update:  The initial reports that Grace Crunican would be named to the TriMet GM post were incorrect--TriMet has in fact named Neil McFarlane, who presently serves as the agency's executive director of capital projects, to the post.   Portions of this post have been edited to reflect the fact.

TriMet, it is now being reported, will on Wednesday named a new General Manager, to replace the departing (and oft-criticized) Fred Hansen.  The selection was an inside hire, capital projects executive director Neil McFarlane.  Such business is on the published agenda for Wednesday's board meeting, and while nothing official has been announcedPreviously, sources had indicated that the new bus boss willwould be one Grace Crunican.  Crunican has lots of experience in transportation administration, having previous gigs as the head of the City of Seattle Transportation Department, and of ODOT prior to that. 

Some, in town, are not happy with the rumored choice--either with the process undertaken to recruit a new GM, nor with the particularrumored choice.  The TriMet board didn't apparently seek outside advice in the hiring process (they are not required to, but the failure to do so is questionable politics); many at Metro, in particular, are annoyed.  And many local transit activists don'tdidn't seem enthralled with the choice of Crunican--whose ouster from Seattle city government was part of the campaign platforms of not one but two mayoral candidates.

At this point in time, I will not take a position on the wisdom of the hire, though I certainly have my doubts about the process.  Some consultation of Metro or the City of Portland, even if courtesy, would have been politically wise.  Instead, I will consider the qualifications for the gig, and what sort of person makes the most sense.

Duties

The GM of TriMet--a regional transit agency with a strong operational focus (but some planning responsibilities) and a significant investment in physical infrastructure, requires someone who can do--or delegate--the following.

• Budgeting and planning
• Overseeing operations and logistics
• Dealing with labor (particularly unions) and vendors
• Represent transit and transit ops in long-range planning activities.
• Serve as the public face of the agency--especially when the sh*t hits the fan.  (When things go well, the director of TriMet simply doesn't make the news).
• Interface with Metro, with ODOT, with the city and county governments, with other local transit agencies (C-Tran, SMART, Portland Streetcar), and with the various federal bureaucracies which care about transit and urban planning.
• Go begging for money from those levels of government--in particular, the feds, with large pots of it to throw around.
• Defend the agencies tax revenue stream from other rival agencies who might want it, and from transit opponents and tax hawks who might prefer to de-fund TriMet altogether.

That's a lot of things, and only about one or two of the above bullet items fall under the rubric of "operations".  Most of them are political or administrative chores.  There's not really any prepatory position that prepares you for all these roles, which is why delegation is mentioned above.  Unless you hire a director of some other transit agency, or someone who has served in many different roles in their career, anyone you hire is likely to be deficient in one or more of those areas.
The candidate pool for a position such as TriMet GM will generally consist of the following skillsets:

• Transit operations managers
• Public administrators (persons with training and experience running government bureacracies, not necessarily transit)
• Planning, engineering, or urban design professionals
• Politicians.
• Occasionally, private-sector managers or executives.
• Also occasionally, union officials.

Crunican, McFarlane, (and Hansen) both come from the public administration side of things--though Crunican has significant prior experience in public transportation.  McFarlane, of course, is an insider--but one from the administrative and political side of the house.  And this is the source of a common line of criticism concerning both all individuals.  Many critics and observers of the agency believe that TriMet should hire someone whose primary expertise is not in political glad-handing and schmoozing, but someone skilled in the nuts and bolts of running a transit agency.

In other words, a Transit Professional™.

The legendary, mythical Transit Professional

Simply running a transit agency, needless to say, does not make you a "transit professional".  When folks speak of transit pros, they generally mean those who have spent significant time in actual transit operations or engineering.  People who used to work as dispatchers or shop supervisors or as route planners (or possibly even as mechanics or drivers).  Those who know the ins and outs of scheduling, or when to order a new batch of brakes, or who can calculate overtime on the back of their hands.  People who get their hands dirty in the garage, rather than in the backroom.

Many demands for a Transit Professional seem to come from transit workers--and it's no wonder.  It's a common phenomenon in enterprises of all sorts, public and private, that the rank-and-file generally prefer "one of their own" get promoted into leadership positions, rather than seeing outside management professionals (especially those with little practical experience in the activity being managed) being inserted at the top.  Likewise, many well-meaning transit advocates--who interact with the rank and file every morning when they ride the train to work, express the same preference.

The term Transit Professional also suggests a degree of political independence and focus on technical merit.  It seems to be an article of faith for some that while your average bureaucratic hack will readily compromise the agency's mission for political expedience, a true Transit Professional will steadfastly put the agency and its patrons first and foremost every time; will make all decisions based solely on operational merits--politics be damned--and will slay whatever dragons get in the way.  A lack of political or administrative experience among many such professionals, is often considered a plus rather than a minus.

But is hiring a Transit Professional of this sort (either promoting a director of ops from within, or hiring an individual with said experience) really a good idea?

The risks of neophytes.

Getting back to the list of duties above--the majority of the list are political duties.  Interacting with other agencies and their heads.  Schmoozing.  Seeking funding.  Defending turf.  In short, anyone who heads a public agency of any significant size is going to be swimming with sharks--and chances are, the people that a transit head will be interacting with are going to be highly politically astute.  And some of them will be hostile to the transit agency (or covetous of its budget); and a sizable fraction of those will go to great lengths to conceal this intent.  As a result--the job requires political skills.  Some prospects with primary technical experience will have the "street smarts" to navigate these shark-infested waters--but many do not.  The halls of government (and the boardrooms of business) are littered with the remains of failed administrators who were technically proficient but politically clueless.

Of course, there are equally many examples of skilled politicians failing as administrators as well--often due to a lack of knowledge of what they were supposed to be administering.

Does that mean that administration of large organizations is hopeless, unless you can find that rare individual with both technical and managerial chops?

Of course not.  The key--is delegation.

The importance of delegation

Probably one of the most important skills in a manager is knowing his or her limitations, finding subordinates who possess the missing skillsets, and empowering them to do their job.  Oh, and listening to them and taking their advice on their areas of expertise.  Managers who cannot do this, who cannot successfully manage down, are likely to fail--no matter how skilled they are at dealing with peers, customers, and stakeholders.  A transit agency needs a politically skilled representative to be the face of, and advocate for, the agency--and they need someone who knows the nuts and bolts.

However, and this is key:  They don't necessarily need to be the same person.

And therein lies the rub.  Assuming you don't find that rare individual who can do it all; who walks on water when she's not busy parting it; the different leadership functions will probably be vested in different people.  Which brings up another important question:  Which one gets to be the boss?

And here, the answer may disappoint many transit advocates.  It is far easier to delegate operations  than it is to delegate politics.  Many cities nowadays have professional managers to oversee city operations--but they still report to a mayor or council.  Many corporations delegate day-to-day business to a COO--but when this is done, the COO is still subordinate to the guy whose job it is to schmooze with investors, interface with the board, and go out and make big deals with customers.  In the context of a public transit agency--it is easiest if the "transit professional" works for the boss, rather than is the boss.

All this assumes, of course, that the director or GM is competent.  If you have a leader who is more interested in empire-building than in running his organization well, that's a recipe for disaster.  But that's true regardless of who gets put in charge--no organizational structure can compensate for incompetent management.


A good hire?

Is the hire of McFarlane, or the previously reported hire of Crunican, a good idea?  I don't know.  She drew a lot of criticism during her tenure in Seattle--but also had her fair share of defenders.  Much of the criticism concerned the City's poor response to the massive snowstorm that blanketed the northwest in 2008--however, Seattle's books appear to be in far better shape than the organization she is reportedly joining. 

McFarlane was instrumental in much of the capital expansion of the system.  According to TriMet, "he led the development, design and construction of TriMet’s capital facilities, including the Airport, Interstate, I-205 and Portland Mall MAX extensions. From 1991 to 1998, he was TriMet’s Project Control Director for the 18-mile, $963 million Westside light rail project. Before coming to TriMet, McFarlane worked for Metro from November 1986 to February 1991 and helped manage construction for the 500,000 square foot $90 million Oregon Convention Center with landmark twin towers, successful public art program, and cost-effective design" (oregonlive.com).  His role in these projects may not endear him to many critics of the agency, who would prefer a more back-to-basics, operational focus.

But what ultimately matters to any person in the role is her their competence and her willingness to work with the transit professionals she they will interact with, both within TriMet, and in other agencies such as Metro or ODOT--not her knowledge of bus scheduling.  It's worth noting while Fred Hansen was frequently criticized for not being a transit pro--his biggest failings as TriMet GM were strategic and not operational in nature.  Like many a starry-eyed corporate CEO whose expansion plans lead the firm into bankruptcy, Hansen's plans and vision didn't adequately consider the possibility of a once-in-a-generation recession, leading to the agency's present precarious financial position.  But the busses and trains generally ran on schedule under his tenure; TriMet remains in far better shape than other agencies I could name.  (Muni, anyone?)

At any rate, I wish Ms. CrunicanMr. McFarlane luck in herhis new post, if rumors are indeed correct.  (If The Oregonian is wrong in its reporting, then I wish the same to whoever else is named in her stead.)   SheHe will certainly need it.  (And I wish the Oregonian better luck in its reporting... :)

And so, fellow Portlanders, will we.